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For almost two decades, the conventional civil rights political empowerment agenda of black activists, lawyers, and scholars has focused on the election of black representatives. 1 The belief that black
representation is everything has defined litigation strategy under the
Voting Rights Act. 2 Through judicially enforced spurs to black electoral success, black voters gain political self-confidence and legislative
influence.
A set of submerged premises and assumptions concerning the goals
and strategies for achieving black equality underlie this empowerment
agenda. 3 Through use of what I characterize as "the theory of black
electoral success," this article identifies, organizes, and presents these
related propositions. In black electoral success theory, empowerment
is obtained through meaningful enfranchisement, which exists where
blacks are elected. The theory thus promotes the election of individual
1. I use the terms "black" and African-American interchangeably. I prefer the term black
for two reasons. First, many of my observations about black political empowerment apply to
other racial groups. The term black succinctly describes a racial identity and status based on
color that is shared, to some degree, by other people of color with different ancestral lineages.
See Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 323, 335 n.50 (1987). Similarly, the black community is a convenient proxy for an
insular group that is politically cohesive, historically stigmatized, economically depressed, and
socially isolated.
Second, although I also use the term minority, especially to convey the numerical status of
blacks in this society, as Patricia Williams observes, minority "implies a certain delegitimacy in a
majoritarian system." Use of the term "black" eludes this problem. See Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 404
n.4 (1987); cf. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (three-judge court),
ajfd. in relevant part and revd. in part on other grounds sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
769-70 (1973) (protected minority does not have a merely numerical denotation; rather it refers
to an identifiable and specially disadvantaged group).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 1983 codifies as amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 445. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, was amended in 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402, and in 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134. Amended § 2 of
the Act, which provides a nationwide private right of action, states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting ... shall be imposed or applied •.• in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color •.• as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) ..• in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
The term "representatives of choice" refers to "black" representatives. See supra note 1. The
House Report accompanying the amendments defines representatives of choice as "minority candidates or candidates identified with the interests of a racial or language minority." H. Rep. No.
227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1981).
3. Although not synonymous, the terms empowerment, political equality, and effective representation are used here interchangeably to convey the concept of "full enfranchisement."

March 1991]

The Triumph of Tokenism

1079

black representatives as spokesmodels for political equality.4 Simply
by virtue of election opportunities, black electoral success advances
civil rights enforcement, government intervention on behalf of the
poor, and black "role-model" development.
Although pervasive and influential, the theory of black' electoral
success has not been explicitly endorsed as a strategy nor articulated
as a coherent conceptual model. Neither political science nor legal
academic literature has provided voting rights lawyers, courts, or activists with a clear theoretical understanding of their project. 5 Instead,
black electoral success has been pursued somewhat unself consciously
as the inchoate rationale and frame of reference for black political and
legal empowerment.
In this article, my goal is to organize the divergent themes of black
electoral success strategy within one conceptual framework in order to
give the themes more cogency and attention. 6 Having exposed the
existence of a coherent theory, I then argue that the theory posits
many of the correct goals but fails to provide a realistic mechanism for
achieving them. The article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I develop the ideological and statutory roots of black electoral success theory. In Part II, I analyze the inadequacies of current voting rights
litigation and its failure to realize the statute's original goals. I conclude in Part II by arguing that contemporary preoccupation with
black electoral success stifles rather than empowers black political participation for three reasons. First, black electoral success theory romanticizes black elected officials as empowerment role models. By
ignoring problems of tokenism and false consciousness, the theory promotes black electoral success in order to legitimate the ideology of
4. Spokesmodels are role models who also speak in a representational capacity on behalf of
others. Cf. Star Search (Television Program Enterprises 1991) (contestants compete for best
"spokesmodel" based on their physical attributes, poise, and ability to talk). In general, the
notion of spokesmodels seems to apply only to the black community. See Reed, The ''Black
Revolution" and the Reconstitution of Domination, in RACE, PoLmcs AND CULTURE: EssAYS
ON THE RADICALISM OF THE 1960s 61, 67-68 (A. Reed ed. 1986) ("No 'white leaders' were
assumed to represent a singular white population; social category 'black leaders' meant "certain
blacks were declared opinion-makers and carriers of the interests of an anonymous black
population.").
5. Black politics, unlike issues concerning employment or schools, is considered "offbeat," or
worthy of only occasional interest. See, e.g., D. PINDERHUGHES, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN CHICAGO POLITICS 253-55 (1987) (noting the absence of substantial body of research addressing
paradoxes in American black politics); Walton, Foreword to J. ELIOT, BLACK VOICES IN AMERICAN POLITICS at xi-xii (1988).
6. I also position black electoral success theory within current voting rights legal scholarship.
See e.g., Abrams, "Raising Politics Up'~· Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 472-75 (1988) (theory ofa "jurisprudence of political
opportunity"); Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 179-82 (1989) (theory of "civic
inclusion").
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"equality of opportunity."7
Second, even in jurisdictions with proportionate black representation, black electoral success has neither mobilized the black community nor realized the promised community-based reforms. As an
empowerment mechanism, electoral control of winner-take-all majority-black districts ignores critical connections between broad-based,
sustained voter participation and accountable representation. In addition, although it claims legitimacy as a practical enforcement mechanism of the original goals of the civil rights movement, district based
electoral ratification enforces only one of three original goals. While
the current approach may result in the election of more black officials,
it ignores the movement's concern with broadening the base of participation and fundamentally reforming the substance of political
decisions.
Third, the theory assumes that majority winners rule legitimately,
even where such rule leads to permanent minority losers. The theory
responds to minority disadvantage not by challenging majority rule
but by providing a few electoral districts in which blacks are the majority.8 Consequently, black electoral success theory simply reconfigures winner-take-all electoral opportunities into geographically
based, majority-black, single-m.ember districts. Representing a geographically and socially isolated constituency in a racially polarized
environment, blacks elected from single-member districts have little
control over policy choices made by their white counterparts. Thus,
although it ensures more representatives, district-based black electoral
success may not necessarily result in more responsive government.
In Part III, based on my critique of the black electoral success
theory, I put forth suggestions for a different approach to voting rights
reform. Relying on what I tentatively call "proportionate interest representation"9 for self-identified communities of interest, I propose to
reconsider the ways in which representatives are elected and the rules
under which legislative decisions are made.
7. See infra note 202 (describing false consciousness). The legitimating power of black electoral success was articulated, in the general context of civil rights law, by Professor Alan Freeman in his essay, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW 96, 11014 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
8. The theory also assumes continued residential segregation. As developed infra notes 31214 & 342, not all blacks presently reside within majority-black districts.
9. By disaggregating the majority and structuring decisionmaking to reduce the effect of prejudice, proportionate interest representation reflects an effort both to increase the number of black
officials and to minimize the disadvantages accruing to black voters in a majoritarian system. In
addition, the concept of proportionate interest representation embraces the civil rights movement's vision of effective representation. This vision extended beyond electoral ratification and
encompassed a broader theory of responsive government, the goal of which was to promise legislative accountability to black political interests.
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THE ROOTS OF BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS THEORY

As both an activist and a litigation strategy, black electoral success
theory evolved from the civil rights movement's empowerment vision.
The movement viewed broad-based political participation and representation as instrumental to community autonomy and to communitybased reform. The theory of black electoral success emerged in response to pressure for judicial supervision of the movement's political
agenda. To create a judicially manageable standard to enforce the
V:oting Rights Act, litigation adopted and modified the theory. By
focusing narrowly on electing black officeholders, however, the litigation strategy and the theory eventually eclipsed the movement's wideangled focus on transformative politics.
The perception that blacks were not effectively represented in majority-white jurisdictions because of racially polarized voting formed
the basis of the litigation strategy. Essentially activists holding this
view believed that officials elected by a bloc voting white majority ignored the interests of black voters without suffering any adverse electoral consequences. 10 Where such vote "dilution" 11 was established,
black electoral success theory justified majority-black remedial subdistricts in which black registered voters exercised electoral control. 12
The litigation strategy posited electoral ratification within majorityblack single-member districts as an appropriate mechanism for ensuring government accountability and responsiveness to black interests. 13
In this Part, I begin by presenting the civil rights movement's vision of representation, participation, and legislative reform. I then
demonstrate how the voting rights litigation agenda altered that
vision.
A.

The Civil Rights Movement's Theory of Political Participation

The civil rights movement's vision of black political empowerment
emanated from mass protests to achieve basic enfranchisement.
Movement activists perceived the rights to register and cast a ballot as
10. See, e.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub nom.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
11. See infra note 76 for a definition of vote dilution.
12. Voting rights litigants noted that black electoral success usually depends on black electoral control of small, majority-black subdistricts within a jurisdiction.
13. Such geographically configured districts would ensure government responsiveness
through the election of black representatives. The theory also posits that white elected officials
would become at least minimally responsive to their newly voting black constituents. See, e.g., T.
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 893 (1988) (one of
the primary goals in winning the right to vote was to drive the white segregationist politicians
from office).
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foundational for political action, effective social change, and redress
from, and representation in, government. These rights were important
not only for blacks but for the advancement of a progressive agenda in
general. I4 The movement was based on a redistributive theory of
"representation and the right to participate," which engaged the political empowerment agenda of both 1960s integrationists and
nationalists. Is
The focus on disfranchisement materialized in the early 1960s, reflecting a major shift from protest to politics. I6 Black voter registration and political participation gradually became the movement's
dominant vehicle for implementation of its legislative agenda.17
Although some activists initially failed to appreciate the dramatic potential of voter education and registration, particularly in light of
headlines generated by nonviolent integrated bus rides, electoral participation soon became the way to redeem southern politics.Is
The Kennedy administration, preoccupied with incremental re14. Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the federal government about
our basic rights . . . . Give us the ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of good
will . . . . Give us the ballot and we will help bring this nation to a new society based on
justice and dedicated to peace.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., quoted in Hamilton, Foreword, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs xviii
(M. Preston, L. Henderson & P. Puryear eds. 1982). In suggesting that the most important step
blacks could take was "that short walk to the voting booth," the NAACP, SCLC, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., anticipated that the development of "[a]n alert, independent, and aggressive
Negro electorate" would become an important progressive political factor. Cf. H. MooN, BAL·
ANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRO VOTE 9, 11 (1948).
15. See, e.g., Barnett, A Theoretical Perspective on American Racial Public Policy, in PUBLIC
POLICY FOR THE BLACK CoMMUNITY 3, 39 (M. Barnett & J. Hefner eds. 1976) (nationalists,
calling for black ethnic group unity, and black integrationists each pursued interrelated goals
despite often heated rhetoric). For the nationalists the right to vote necessarily meant the right
to constitute an "essential ingredient ..• of the sovereign principle,'' delegable only to "true
representative[s]." See Delany, The Political Destiny of the Colored Race, in THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF BLACK NATIONALISM 195, 197-98 (S. Stuckey ed. 1972).
16. See s. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS (1976); Negro Vote Surge Expected in South -Administration Experts Sure of a Political Break Through as Result of Recent Gains, N.Y. Times, June
26, 1961, at 1, col. 6 ("The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and other leaders of the new
militant movements - the sit-ins and Freedom Riders - have come around to agree that the
vote is the key."); see also Nelson, Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of the New Black Politics, in THE
NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 187 (since the mid-1970s, the black community has
accepted the idea "that electoral politics provide[s] the best avenue for advancing black interests."); Preston, Black Politics and Public Policy in Chicago: Self-Interest Versus Constituent
Representation, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 159-61 (politics is now the
"cutting edge" of the civil rights movement).
17. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 479 (voter registration defended during the early 1960s as a
priority in order to build political protections for the movement, especially when the religious
zeal faded); see also Williams, Black Political Progress in the 1970's: The Electoral Arena, in THE
NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 74-75.
18. See, e.g.• s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERA·
TION IN AMERICA 87 (1967) (SNCC started its first voter registration project in 1961 because it
believed that political power organized around the right to vote was the key to dismantling
southern racism).
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form, supported voter registration efforts because these efforts appeared to be less threatening and disruptive. 19 Robert Moses and
other black voter registration activists, however, defended their work
as the most promising response to indigenous efforts to transform local
reality. 20
The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 following "sustained
national pressure"21 to include all Americans in the liberal, democratic electoral process. Some commentators have argued that the
Act, which was passed and signed into law barely four months after its
formal introduction, represented the civil rights movement at its most
commanding. 22 Critics, however, have suggested that the Act's electoral strategy reflects the triumph of tokenism.23
Yet both proponents and critics agree that the Voting Rights Act
united the black ideological spectrum. The Act's passage bridged the
divergent aims of integration and nationalism24 in ways that both
19. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 482. Some of the earliest efforts to change tactics from
protest to politics were engineered by the Kennedy Justice Department "to coax [civil rights
activists] out of precisely the kind of confrontational actions [such as the Freedom Rides] around
which they were shaping their identities." Id. at 479. The Kennedy Administration pushed the
merits of voter registration, extending promises of draft exemptions, foundation grants, lawsuits,
newspaper coverage, prosecution of obstructionist white Southern officials, and federal protection
for voter registration activists. Id. at 480-81, 619-20. But cf. id. at 680-83, 713, 787 (FBI failed
to investigate certain complaints or simply gathered information for subsequent civil cases without enforcing criminal protections against harassment or intimidation of voters).
20. Id. at 330, 331, 486.
21. R. WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 150, 152 (1990) ("despite [the Voting Rights Act's] far-reaching implications, the legislation enjoyed broader, more sustained public support than any previous civil rights measure.").
22. Id. at 152-53; L. KILLIAN, THE IMPOSSIBLE REVOLUTION, PHASE II: BLACK POWER
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 74 (1975) (victory seemed complete when President Johnson de-,
clared on introducing the Voting Rights Act, "we shall overcome"); M.L. KING, JR., WHERE
Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR CoMMUNITY? 34 (1967) ("[W]hen the 1965 Voting Rights
Law was signed, it was proclaimed as the dawn of freedom .•..").
23. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7; Reed, supra note 4, at 63.
24. Integration and nationalism were the most salient characteristics of the African-American intellectual and political agenda in the 1960s. See J. GRANT, BLACK PROTEST 9, 13 (J.
Grant ed. 1968) (although integration in American political and economic mainstream has been
main tendency in fight for black rights, demand for positive assertion of blackness also persistent
thread); Marable, A New Black Politics, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1990 at 18, 20 (black protest
movements all based on fundamental racial ideologies of either integration or black nationalism).
Compare M.L. KING, JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE 10 (1967) (integration a basic
aspect of freedom, meaning the freedom to choose where to live, to eat, to attend school) and
Marable, supra, at 18 (racial integrationists consistently advocate elimination of all restrictions
that keep blacks from participating fully in society's mainstream) with id. (black nationalists
reject integration as a hoax, are suspicious of alliances with whites, and advocate self-help community based empowerment); c. LINCOLN, THE BLACK MUSLIMS JN AMERICA 45 (1961) (nationalism an involuntary, defensive response to escape hostile forces) and S. CARMICHAEL & C.
HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 47, 54-55 (black liberation lies in group action acknowledging race
as an overwhelming fact of life; goal is to build and strengthen the black community with its
racial and cultural integrity intact and to obtain "an effective share in the total power of the
society").
·
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committed the black community to collective action in pursuit of
political power and camouflaged the tension between assimilation and
recognition of racial group identity and interests. Through concerted
political action, integration and nationalism converged.
For integrationists and many nationalists, the struggle for effective
use of the ballot became "the number one civil right."25 Black activists saw political empowerment as a vehicle for mobilizing the black
community, articulating a black social and economic agenda, and
electing both authentic black and responsive white officials. 26
1. Political Participation: Mobilizing the Black Community
The goals of community autonomy and participatory democracy
inspired the consensus demanding meaningful access to electoral politics. The idea of community autonomy evolved from a group consciousness that reflected a collective identity shaped by historic
conditions and social realities. To differing extents, group identification reflected a shared perception that triggered collective activity. 27
Group solidarity and a general mistrust of the fairness of existing resource allocation increased the likelihood of political activity. 28
Group consciousness connected conceptions of efficacy to political
participation.29 Indeed, both integrationists and nationalists envi25. See, e.g., King, Civil Right No. 1 - The Right to Vote, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1965, § 6
(Magazine), at 26. Many black nationalists played an important role in the fight for the
franchise, reflecting their "admiration" for America's "free institutions." THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF BLACK NATIONALISM, supra note 15, at 21, 146-48.
26. See, e.g., J. GRANT, supra note 24, at 427 (independent black politics added economic
power to concepts of freedom and political action); M.L. KING, JR., supra note 22, at 37-38, 14950 (1967); M.L. KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T wAIT 166 (1963). King advocated full political
participation by an enlightened electorate to elect blacks to key political positions, to liberalize
the political climate in the United States and to influence the allocation of resources; see also
Voting Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 377-80 (1965) (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and
Chairman, LCCR) (eliminating voting restrictions means elected officials will become responsive
to the will of all the people).
27. See generally s. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972); infra notes 47-49, 62 and accompanying text.
28. Miller, Gurin, Gurin & Malanchuk, Group Consciousness and Political Participation, 25
AM. J. POL. SCI. 494 (1981); Shingles, Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 76 (1981).
29. Miller, Gurin, Gurin & Malanchuk, supra note 28; Shingles, supra note 28; see also S.
CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 46 (group identity mobilizes participation;
where blacks have a majority they will seek control; when they lack a majority they will seek
proper representation and sharing of control). Stokely Carmichael's views are particularly interesting because he worked in the civil rights movement doing voter registration work in the early
1960s. Toward the end of the decade, identifying with a black nationalist ideology, he became
one of the foremost advocates of "Black Power." According to Carmichael, even blacks associated with an integrationist ideology approved notions of group power.
America has asked its Negro citizens to fight for opportunity as individuals, whereas at
certain points in our history what we have needed most has been opportunity for the whole
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sioned political struggle as the means to group salvation. 30
The concept of participatory democracy31 was the heart of the civil
rights "mass movement." Developing a political identity was critical
to the movement's efforts to cultivate a grass roots base. Political organizing, particularly in support of black candidates, continued the
movement's affirmation of self-worth and human dignity. 32 Electoral
politics awakened blacks to their humanity, their heritage, and their
potential, as citizens, to participate equally in democratic self-government. 33 As one activist observed: ·
I think one of the things that made the delegation of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic party so hopeful, so expectant, was the fact that
people had made a discovery that there is a way out of much that is
wrong with our lives, there is a way to change it, and that is through the
execution of this vote.... That's the way we arrived in Atlantic City really excited about the fact that we were at long last going to be able· to
participate, to be represented. 34

The movement's leadership continuously reinforced interaction
with and equal participation by its "excited" grass roots base. Behind
the movement's protest strategies were civil rights activists, the seminal political campaign workers, with their "tireless enthusiasm for
group, not just for selected and approved Negroes.... We must not apologize for the existence of this form of group power, for we have been oppressed as a group not as individuals.
Id. at 49 (quoting paid advertisement by black church members affiliated with National Council
of Churches).
··
30. For the former, salvation would come ~ the result of a perpetual engagement to make
America true to its stated principles, extended on behalf of "the Negro people." For the latter,
group salvation would result from the development of group identity, expression, and independence. See, e.g.• s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 49; R. WEISBROT, supra
note 21, at 206, 216; see also Delany, supra note 15, at 196-97 (right to vote must include right to
constitute essential part of the ruling element).
31. The focus on equality and universal suffrage was greatly influenced by the one person/
one vote language of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Some of the marchers from Selma
to Montgomery in March 1965 carried "one man/one vote" signs. See, e.g., Eyes on the Prize
(videotape segment five). John Lewis was arrested for carrying a "One Man/One Vote" sign
outside a Selma, Alabama courthouse. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 900; cf id. at 587-88, 733
(describing predictions that the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions would transform
black voting the way Brown v. Board of Education changed education).
32. See S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 104 (describing how voter registration campaigns gave blacks "a sense of being").
33. The capacity to participate made integration meaningful. See, e.g., Black Power, N.Y.
Times, July 31, 1966, at ES, col. 1 (a paid advertisement by influential blacks affiliated with the
National Council of Churches), cited in S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 4849. Political power, for nationalists as well, meant black people making decisions that affect their
lives. Id.
34. VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM
THE 1950s THROUGH THE 1980s 197-98 (H. Hampton & s. Fayer eds. 1990) (quoting Victoria
Gray) (emphasis added) [hereinafter VOICES OF FREEDOM]. Approximately 80,000 blacks participated in "Freedom Vote," helping to dispel illusions about black political apathy. Id. at 181.
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door-to-door persuasion" 35 and their open welcome to "anyone who
will work, regardless of affiliation or ideology." 36 Civil rights workers
planted themselves in the daily struggles of local blacks. They followed an activist model of continuous community education and political campaigning, 37 as illustrated by attempts of the SNCC workers to
teach blacks in the rural south how to pass literacy tests. 38
For many black nationalists as well, political participation by a
self-consciously black community was important. The nationalists believed that a sense of community and group solidarity would potentially broaden political participation and include more blacks in the
decisionmaking process. 39 Political enfranchisement would "make
participants, not recipients, out of . . . a traditionally excluded
[people]."40
2. Political Participation: Promoting a Social
and Economic Agenda
Although basically engaged in liberal reform to provide a mainstream vehicle for advancement, voting rights activists sought also to
expand the liberal vision toward a redistributive agenda premised on
equality of condition, and not just freedom from overt discrimination. 41 Rather than a self-limiting movement to assimilate blacks into
35. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 194; see also s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra
note 18, at 103-08 (describing SNCC organizing efforts).
36. Zinn, The Old Left and the New: Emancipation from Dogma, NATION, Apr. 4, 1966, at
385, 387.
37. Although the march from Selma to Montgomery directly preceded congressional action
on the Voting Rights Act, the mass direct action efforts to achieve the ballot were not based on a
single march but were built from extended campaigns and were accompanied by nightly mass
meetings. Watters, Why the Negro Children March, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES 96 (A.
Meier & E. Rudwick eds. 1970) (Selma voting rights campaign involved prolonged siege of dem·
onstrations and mass meetings, day after day, week after week). Of course, the most famous
mass meeting was the August 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. See, e.g., T.
BRANCH, supra note 13, at 840-49, 874; see also id. at 689 (describing blueprint for the Birming·
ham, Alabama campaign combining small-scale sit-ins, boycotts, mass marches and other organ·
ized efforts to publicize efforts, enforce economic pressure and overflow the jails).
38. See, e.g., T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 573, 575-79. Septima Clark operated 95 citizenship schools across the South during 1962. See id. at 576.
39. s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 39, 43, 47 (broadened political participation means blacks choosing their own leaders and holding them responsible; it also means
more black people becoming politically active; goal of black self-determination is full participation in decisionmaking processes); id. at 44 ("The concept of Black Power rests on a fundamental
premise. Before a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this we mean that
group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position of
strength in a pluralistic society."); see also Carmichael, What We Want, N.Y. REV. BKs., Sept.
22, 1966 (black consciousness provides the basis for political strength).
40. Hamilton, An Advocate of Black Power Defines It, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES,
supra note 37, at 156.
41. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 37 (integration and nationalism both mean improving the lives of blacks both politically and economically); M.L. KING,
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the councils of government, the original civil rights message endorsed,
through the right to vote, broad notions of freedom from hunger, poverty, and discrimination. 42 Both nationalists and integrationists supported a common agenda on issues of civil rights enforcement and
social welfare spending.43
American principles of equality and democracy were not the only
factors compelling the representation of blacks through universal suffrage. Full political enfranchisement also would help complete the
movement's "social revolution."44 Blacks, like Fannie Lou Hamer,
advocated "true democracy" and not merely equality within the exJR., supra note 24, at 11, 14, 53, 61, 62 (political agenda involves economic justice, including a
minimum annual income). Even the Urban League, one of the more conservative civil rights
groups, projected a reformist view of democracy. Whitney Young, in his address at the League's
1963 national conference, expressed the group's underlying philosophy:
..• democracy is more than a convenient institution through which privileges and material
products flow to [white citizens]. For both [whites and blacks] democracy is a way of life,
an ideal in which all share its rewards, as well as its responsibilities.... For the public
official - whether city, state or federal - witnessing means greater concern for broad,
democratic promises and human rights, rather than preoccupation with technical, constitutional details and states' rights.
Young, For Protest Plus "Co"ective Measures," in M. BRODERICK & A. MEIER, NEGRO PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 287, 289-90 (1965).
From the time of the Niagara Movement, and the founding of the NAACP in 1910, black
activists have adopted a protest platform that included: the right to equal treatment, increased
public high school and college facilities, judicial reform, health care, and vigorous enforcement of
the post Civil War Amendments. M. BRODERICK & A. MEIER, supra, at 48-50.
42. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at xiii (civil rights leaders demanded equality of condition
not just desegregation); see, e.g. S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 39-41 (political modernization emphasizes human dignity, not sanctity of property, "free people," not. "free
enterprise."); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 357 (Martin Luther King's version of rights would require radical transformation of existing social structures; King was concerned with ending poverty and closing the gap between the rich and the poor); see also VOICES OF FREEDOM, supra
note 34, at 180 (quoting Unita Blackwell who attended a voter registration meeting held in a
church in Sunflower County, Mississippi, during Freedom Summer 1964):
I was only told when I started off that ifl registered to vote, I would have food to eat and a
better house to stay in, 'cause the one I was staying in was so raggedy you could see anywhere and look outdoors. My child would have a better education.... It was the basic
needs of the people. The whites, they understood it even larger than that in terms of political power. We hadn't even heard that word, "political power," because it wasn't taught in
the black schools. We didn't know there was such a thing as a board of supervisors and
what they did, and we didn't know about school board members and what they did.
Id.
43. See THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 17 (civil rights is a consistent black
interest-group value and preference). For example, at the National Black Political Convention in
Gary, Indiana in 1972, Coretta King and Black Panther Bobby Seale shared the platform at
which a "Black Agenda articulated a revolution of values, a social transformation placing 'community before individualism, ..• a living environment before profits, ... justice before unjust
order, and morality before expediency.'" Poinsett, Unity Without Uniformity, EBONY, June
1972, at 45, 52. The Black Agenda contained eighty-eight recommendations, including proportionate black political representation, reparations, free education through college, guaranteed
annual income, national health insurance and a National Black Political Assembly to sponsor
candidates, lobby for black issues, and make recommendations to the black community generally. Id. at 52, 54.
44. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 880.
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isting order.45 By registering and voting, blacks could get people
"outa office that [they] know was wrong and didn't do nothin' to help
the poor."46
Participation in the dominant political system did not necessarily
mean assimilating its substantive assumptions or power arrangements.
Black nationalists in particular asserted that blacks could gain political power without becoming indistinguishable from other groups in
society.47 Instead of becoming absorbed by the political mainstream,
blacks could change it.48
Preoccupied with development of group identity and political and
cultural expression, the nationalists shifted black activist concerns
away from integration and coalition building. The nationalists, however, still supported electoral strategies49 because they believed, as did
the integrationists, that political participation would lead to more responsive, black community-oriented legislation.

45. J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 244 (1987) (quoting Ms. Hamer at the 1964 Democratic National Convention).
46. H. RAINES, MY SOUL Is REsTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH
REMEMBERED 249 (1977) (quoting Ms. Hamer).
47. Indeed, black nationalists offered racial pride and solidarity as a means of transforming
the social, economic, and political conditions of black people. In this sense, black electoral success theory fit within a nationalist imagery that borrowed from the ethnic experience of group
unity and determination to reinforce individual aspirations. S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON,
supra note 18, at vii, viii (black power means, inter a/ia, psychic control by blacks over their own
lives; black consciousness involves a sense of "peoplehood" that relies on group pride and communal responsibility); see also R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 201, 206. Even Dr. King saw
group solidarity as part of his creative endeavor to reach the "Beloved Community" of interracial brotherhood and harmony. Id. at 206.
48. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at vii (black power will "contribute to the development of a viable larger society"); L. KILLIAN, supra note 22, at 113, 125,
161-63; Hamilton, supra note 40, at 156; Jennings, Boston: Blacks and Progressive Politics, in
THE NEW BLACK VOTE 208-18 (R. Bush ed. 1984) (political participation can mobilize voters to
alter the dominant substantive agenda while still retaining group consciousness).
49. From the 1960s through the 1980s, black nationalists supported voter registration and
electoral activity. Nationalists, interested in preserving racial-cultural differences pushed for sep·
arate and equal black representation to give blacks greater self-consciousness and pride. By
1972, when the National Black Political Agenda was passed by a convention of black delegates in
Gary, Indiana, group representation was openly perceived by most activists as critical to effective
voting rights. See, e.g., D. PINDERHUGHES, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN CHICAGO POLITICS 232
(1987) ("[b]lack nationalists of cultural and political dimension" actively involved in 1983 political campaign for black mayor); VOICES OF FREEDOM, supra note 34, at 225 (in 1964 Malcolm X
offered to assist with voter registration and committed to work with the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic party); Worry For Democrats: "Black Power Drive," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 27, 1972, at 82 (National Black Political Convention met Mar. 10-12, 1972, in Gary, Indiana, attended by 3500 delegates to set up an independent black political movement backed by the
voting strength of black registered voters) supra note 47;. Some groups, such as the Nation of
Islam, went through a temporary period of electoral isolation that ended at least by 1984 when
Jesse Jackson ran for President. See, e.g., Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Muslim Politics, Focus MAGAZINE, PoLmCAL TRENDLETTER 3 (June 1990).
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Political Participation: Electing Responsive Officials

By concentrating on political participation, black activists hoped
to achieve a fundamentally different political reality created in part by
responsive government decisionmakers. Because access to the political
process was measured, both pragmatically and ideologically, by the
authenticity and responsiveness of elected candidates, the energy of
the civil rights mass movement became focused on political organizing
to elect black officials.
In general, black political leaders would temper the rhetoric and
overt racism of white elected officials. 50 In particular, black representatives would, by definition, constitute a progressive force affirmatively
promoting black interests. In addition, with blacks in office, white
business and political leaders who wanted information about blacks,
would no longer be dependent on their own menagerie of responsible
"Negro leadership." 51 Led by black elected officials, black voters
would also be positioned both to articulate their own "interests" and
to challenge racially motivated or insensitive legislation. 52 Black
elected officials thus ensure black voters a voice in the process of allocating government benefits.
Black electoral success generated interest in and captured the momentum of the first two civil rights concerns: mobilization and reform. The connection between black electoral success and
mobilization was demonstrated during voter registration activity in
the early 1960s. In Mississippi, some voter registration activists
sought to run black candidates for Congress with the expectation not
of winning, but of planting the idea of voting in the minds of blacks. 53
50. See, e.g., Cutler, Using Morals, Not Money on Pretoria, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, at E23,
col. 2 (Mississippi Sen. James Eastland, noted segregationist, apparently confided, "When
[blacks] get the vote, I won't be talking this way anymore."); see also infra notes 254-58 and
accompanying text.
51. In 1963, for example, rather than consulting directly with the black civil rights leaders
involved, Attorney General Robert Kennedy relied on a haphazard group of black entertainers
and academics to explain events in Birmingham, Alabama. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 80911. Even more typical was Birmingham's Mayor Thompson's effort to appease civil rights requests for negotiations by announcing "he would meet with a biracial committee of his own
choosing, specifying Negro members who had praised his stand on segregation." Id.; see Wolman & Thomas, Black Interests, Black Groups and Black Influence in the Federal Policy Process:
The Cases ofHousing and Education, in BLACK PoLmCAL ATrITUDES 183, 193-94 (C. Bullock
& H. Rodgers eds. 1972) (describing indirect representation through practice of "consulting a
few well-known black leaders or enlisting them in formal and highly visible advisory capacities").
52. Black representation would thus obviate difficult equal protection constitutional challenges to discriminatory policies. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISrRusr 86-87 (1980) (the
right to representation attempts to protect minorities from denials of equal concern as subjects of
legislative policy).
53. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 560; see also s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note
18, at 100-20.
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In response to local white sheriffs' excessive use of force against civil
rights activists, blacks were urged to "Get that vote and pin that badge
on a black chest." 54 Even the most inflammatory use in the late 1960s
of the slogan, "Black Power," was an organizing tool to inspire political organization, to promote racial pride, and to provide a vehicle for
black leadership. ss
Civil rights activists linked electoral success to community based
reform by assuring that black representatives, who were authentic
community-based leaders, would be the vanguard for a new social justice agenda. 56 For example, black electoral aspirations stemmed, at
least in part, from the belief that a black sharecropper, if elected tax
assessor, would take a different view of taxing the poor. 57
Election by a mobilized group of blacks was critical to the black
official's legitimacy. The movement's unifying objective was to empower the black community, not simply its representatives. 58 King, in
particular, condemned electoral opportunism by black politicians deaf
to the demands of their community. 59 In addition, both the nationalists and the integrationists sought to elect descriptively black
officials. 60
For the integrationist, litigation to achieve black electoral success
incorporated the preeminent process theory of empowerment: measuring political equality by the fairness of the process through which
representatives were elected. Along with other liberal views about individual rights and democratic self-government, integrationists cheer54. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 200 (quoting Hosea Williams on the "Meredith March"
in Greenwood, Mississippi, June 1966); see also S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18,
at 46 (a black sheriff can end police brutality; a black tax assessor can channel tax monies to
improve services for black people).
55. s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 44-46, 98-120 (describing Black
Panther Party efforts in Alabama to run blacks for office in a manner that would serve as a
"model for democracy"); R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 204.
56. Indeed, it is not mere coincidence that many prominent black elected officials and black
candidates were once active in the civil rights movement. From Andrew Young to beleaguered
former D.C. mayor Marion Barry, to Harvey Gantt, the 1990 Democratic nominee for U.S.
Senator from North Carolina, many black political aspirants had their roots in civil rights struggle. See, e.g., Smothers, North Carolina Democrat Sets Strategy in Taking on Helms, N.Y. Times,
June 7, 1990, at B7, col. 1.
57. R. WEISBROT, supra note 21, at 235.
58. From Gary to Miami Beach, EBONY, Sept. 1972, at 142 (national black assembly "would
force white politicians to deal with the entire black community instead of with a few hand-picked
black politicians"); Poinsett, supra note 43, at 27, 45 (people work to create black politics to
empower all of black America - instead of only representatives).
59. King noted that simply electing blacks was not enough. "Negro politicians can be opportunistic as their white counterparts if there is not an informed and determined constituency demanding social reform." M.L. KING, JR., supra note 22, at 49.
60. A. KARNIG & s. WELCH, BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY 9 (1980) (organizing to elect blacks to public office logical extension of confluence of black attitudes).
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fully argued that a group has its requisite degree of political power if it
is able to elect a fair number of representatives.
The nationalists asserted that the community could self-consciously develop a strategy of social and economic transformation by
participating in politics on the basis of group power. The nationalists,
however, also soon supported the black electoral success strategy as a
shortcut to achieving.recognition of group identity and to providing a
mechanism for channeling group solidarity. 61 Because black representatives were both authentic community leaders and legitimated by
black voter support, they compelled greater support than sympathetic
white officials. Propelled by the basic "essentialism"62 of the nationalist position as well as the undeniable reality of ethnic politics and racial group segregation, 63 both the integrationists and the nationalists64
accepted a theory of representation based on four assumptions about
black elected officials: (1) black officials were authentic because of
their community and cultural roots; (2) they gained authority from the
fact of election; (3) they were legitimate because of community mobilization and enthusiasm; and (4) they were presumptively responsive
members of a historically, socially, and politically stigmatized group
"{ith strong and cohesive civil rights, redistributive, and communitybased agendas.
B.

The Evolution of a Legal Strategy of Political Empowerment

The civil rights movement empowerment vision was a statement of
strategy and faith. After passage of the Voting Rights Act, that vision
collapsed. Litigation to enforce the Voting Rights Act transformed
the original goals of broad-based voter participation, reform, and authentic representation into the shorthand of counting elected black officials. In addition, judicial interpretation of the statute compressed
the civil rights movement's capacious conception of political represen61. See, e.g., S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 46-47; see also supra notes

29-30.
62. See S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 46-47. Black electoral success
theory reflects the basic "essentialism" of the nationalist position. The theory locates meaning in
the concept of racial identity as a social-cultural, historically derived structure. For some nationalists, racial identity also has biological significance. For black power nationalists of the
1960s and early 1970s, however, essentialism meant recognition of their group identity as a
source of pride, culture, and as a politically animating force.
63. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 9 (political organizing based on view that
electing black officials would change laws by exercising control over parts of government
structure).
64. THE BLACK PoLmCIAN: Hrs STRUGGLE FOR POWER (M. Dymally ed. 1971) [hereinafter THE BLACK PoLmcAN] (diverse black leaders all stressed black political organizing); Clark,
Foreword to id. (black power movement is an "effective smokescreen" behind which quest for
"genuine direct political power for blacks could proceed with minimum interference").
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tation, redistribution, and participation into a narrow electoral focus
on black representation.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act was a landmark piece of legislation. 65
The Act responded directly to the most urgent claims of activists challenging direct impediments to registration and voting. In drafting the
Act, Congress was concerned with eradicating discrimination "comprehensively and finally" from every election in which voters were eligible to cast ballots. 66 Passed67 and amended68 to promote black
political representation, the Act contemplates the right to vote as the
right to meaningful political participation and to an effective voice in
government. 69 The right to vote is the right to effective representation:
65. Commemorating the Voting Rights Act's 25th anniversary, Governor Douglas Wilder of
Virginia, the first black elected governor this century, credited the important symbolism of his
own election to the Act, one of "two landmark events which literally changed the face of this
nation." Lewis, They're Wild About Wilder, Phil. Inquirer, May 28, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
66. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. S (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(I) (1988).
67. Some quarrel with the original legislative understanding of the right to vote. For example, Abigail Tbernstrom writes that the 1965 Act was concerned exclusively with registration
and voting, and later was transformed unwittingly into a statutory mandate for black electoral
success, or "job corps" for black elected officials. See A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNTl:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHI'S 11, 18, 22-30 (1987). Even Them·
strom, however, concedes, that by 1970 Congress, the judiciary, and voting rights plaintiffs all
acknowledged the importance of a meaningful right to vote, meaning the right to elect represent·
atives of choice. Id. at 22, 31. Without engaging in a semantic exercise or an extensive legislative
history of the 1965 Act, it is nevertheless significant that in bis message to a Joint Session of
Congress transmitting the proposed 1965 legislation, President Johnson referred to the right of
citizens to have a voice in electing their leaders as the cornerstone concern of the legislation. See
111 CoNG. REc. HSOS9 (1965) (equal right to vote affirms dignity of man because it rests, inter
a/ia, on most basic right of all, the right to choose one's own leaders). Even Republican opponents of the 1965 Act acknowledged the consensus "to free those of our citizens who now endure
the near-tyranny of nonrepresentation." See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., lst Sess. at
37-38, 53, (1965).
68. See 115 CONG. REc. 5517 (1970) (joint view of ten members of the Judiciary Committee). The Senate sponsors of the 1965 Act supported its renewal in 1970 in part because the Act
was so successful in encouraging blacks "running for office in Southern states to help assure
adequate representation of all interests." Id. at 5520.
69. For example, the Act defines "voting" to include "all action to make a vote effective." 42
U.S.C. § 197l(e) (1988); see also supra note 67. As the Supreme Court announced one year
before the Voting Rights Act was passed, "[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (striking
down whites-only preprimary selection process on the ground that the right to vote is a right to
an effective voice in governmental decisionmaking); cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422
U.S. 358 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (blacks should enjoy the opportunity to elect responsive
officials and have a significant voice in conduct of government affairs). Presidel)t Lyndon Johnson allegedly told Hubert Humphrey during the legislative struggle for the 1964 Civil Rights
Act:
Yes, yes, Hubert, I want all those other things - buses, restaurants, all of that - but the
right to vote with no ifs, ands, or buts, that's the key. When the Negroes get that, they'll
have every politician, north and south, east and west, kissing their ass, begging for their
support.
M. MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY 371 (1980); cf. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY
AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 4 (1988) (right to vote is core symbol of democratic ideal that ordi-
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the ultimate instrument of reform.1 0
Yet, within contemporary voting rights jurisprudence, mere electoral control by black voters over their representatives has come to satisfy the Act's conception of representation. In search of a statutory
core value and judicially manageable standards, the courts have cobbled from the statute a right to minority electoral success. The courts
have ignored statutory language providing for the "opportunity ... to
participate [equally] in the political process" and instead have focused
exclusively on language securing the "opportunity ... to elect the representatives of [the protected group's] choice."71 Especially since
1986, the courts have measured black political representation and participation solely by reference to the number and consistent election of
black candidates. 72 The submergence of black electoral potential and
the subsequent emergence of black voting majorities capable of electing black candidates have become the preferred indicia of a statutory
violation. 73 Issues of voter participation, effective representation, and
policy responsiveness are omitted from the calculus. 74
Given the development of voting rights jurisprudence, current judicial interpretation of the Act is not surprising. Initially, blacks focused primarily on first generation, direct impediments to elttctoral
participation, such as registration and voting barriers. 75 Once these
obstacles were surmounted, however, the focus shifted to second generation, indirect structural barriers such as at large, vote-diluting
elections.7 6
nary people would have a stake in government and their grievances addressed through the right
to elect representatives).
·
70. As President Johnson declared when he signed the historic 1965 Act, "But only the
individual Negro, and all others who have been denied the right to vote, can really walk through
those doors, and can use that right, and can transform the vote into an instrument of justice and
fulfillment." 111 CoNG. REC. 19649, 19650 (Aug. 6, 1965).
71. See supra note 2.
72. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 92-93 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Electoral
success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims.").
73. See Karlan, supra note 6; Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and
the Voting Rights Act, 11 VA. L. REv. 1, 8 n.27 (1991).
74. See, e.g., Mack v. Russell County Commn., No. 90-712 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990) (threejudge court), cert. pending 59 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1990) (issue is confined to changes in
black voting constituency not relative power of black elected officials).
75. The first generation of voting litigation, and the 1965 statute which represented the congressional response, were concerned with the complete and total exclusion of blacks from the
electoral process. The initial structure of the Act itself focused on the suspension of literacy
tests, the deployment of federal registrars, and federal administrative review of local registration
procedures in covered jurisdictions. Success under the Act was immediate and impressive. The
number of blacks registered to vote rose dramatically within five years after passage. See Karlan,
supra note 6, at 183-84.
76. "[D]ilution is a process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert,
combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength
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With its winner-take-all rules, the at large election format, instituted by many southern jurisdictions in response to increased black
registration, essentially allowed a bloc voting racial majority to control
all the elected positions. Fifty-one percent of the population consistently decided one hundred percent of the elections. In addition,
although everyone had one vote, some votes were qualitatively less important than others because of the voter's or the candidate's race or
both. As a result, the black minority was permanently excluded from
meaningful participation.11
Thus, second generation voting rights litigation focused on "qualitative vote dilution." Voting rights activists sought to elect more
black officials, primarily by creating majority-black single-member districts. Indeed, by 1980, the right most closely associated with the Act
was that of casting a "meaningful" vote for someone who could get
elected.78
In 1982, Congress amended the Act to include the right to a meaningful vote. 79 A "meaningful vote" became explicitly a vote for a viable minority preferred representative. 80 In addition, the amendments
of at least one other group." Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1,
4 (C. Davidson ed. 1984); see Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified
sub. nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), where the court considered:
the essence of racial vote dilution .•• is this: that primariiy because of the interaction of •••
racial polarization ... with a challenged election mechanism, a racial minority with distinctive group interests that are capable of aid or amelioration by government is effectively
denied the political power to further those interests that numbers alone would presumptively give it in a voting constituency not racially polarized ••.
590 F. Supp. at 355 (citations omitted). Structural barriers, such as at-large elections, dilute
minority voting strength and make voting a futile gesture where the electorate is racially polarized. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d
1297 (5th Cir. 1976). At-large elections have been struck down under a constitutional theory of
discriminatory effects, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), a constitutionally compelled intent test, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), and a statutory results standard, Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
77. While pluralist theories of democracy contemplate minority losses, they do not envision a
minority that always loses. See infra notes 170-73 (principle of "minority acquiescence" - that
minorities are supposed to lose - does not contemplate systematic bloc voting).
78. Encouraged by the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions as popularized by the
slogan, "one person/one vote," a meaningful vote became a vote undiluted by discriminatory,
though facially neutral election schemes. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964). Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 649-58 (1983),
refers to this as a "substantive effects test," which he concedes may be appropriate for fundamental constitutional rights.
79. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); see
supra note 2.
80. As amended, the statute states that a violation is established if blacks have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate ... to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1988) (as amended). By codifying the language of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766
(1973), proponents sought to embrace a line of cases with an· established, judicially manageable
set of standards for ascertaining abridgement of minority voting rights. Blacks would henceforth
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provided that dilution claims could be proved based on discriminatory
results alone. 81 Although not sufficient to establish a violation, the
absence of black elected officials is circumstantial evidence, according
to the Act's text, of discriminatory results. 82
From the perspective of its legislative history, the 1982 statute gave
litigants a flexible tool and a broad mandate to challenge inequalities
in the political process. Moreover, the statutory language seemed
vague enough to cover a wide range of political disablements. 83 Indeed, in light of this vagueness, supporters hoped a "core value"
would be discovered, distinct from either proportional representation
or discriminatory purpose. 84 To those reading the legislative history,
it appeared as if Congress had, consistent with the Act's mandate to
protect full exercise of the franchise by black voters, 85 avoided both
finger pointing and finger counting. 86 Within the wide net cast by the
statute, no particular factor could govern all cases. Yet, once the statute was enacted, the predictable search began for a justiciable formula,
ostensibly structured around a central, measurable factor. Foreordained by the nature of their adjudicative task, courts attempted to
discover which factor could become the first among equals, the center
around which to balance the other variables.
The linchpin of pre-1982 constitutional dilution challenges had
been unresponsiveness. 87 But unresponsiveness, an obvious metaphor
for political exclusion, was elusive as an evidentiary tool and almost as
enjoy the statutory right to elect candidates of their choice based on a functional view of their
political circumstances as reflected in local historic, social, and economic relationships. Dillard
v. Baldwin County, 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988); cf. Note, Defining the Minon"ty-Preferred Candidate Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 99 YALE L.J. 1651, 1665-67 (1990).
81. The Act was amended in response to a 1980 Supreme Court decision cabining dilution
claims to direct proof of intentional discrimination. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980).
82. See supra note 2. The statutory disclaimer stated that "[t]he extent to which members of
a protected class have been elected to office" is relevant, "provided [t]hat'nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). The Senate Report also identified minority
electoral success as a probative factor. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, repn"nted in
1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 193 (presence of minority elected officials is a
"recognized indicator of access to the process") [hereinafter 1982 SENATE REPORT].
83. See Mississippi State Chapter Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss.
1987); Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910 (D.C.N.J. 1986).
84. Boyd & Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347, 1399-400 (1983); Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 81, at 145, 159-61.
85. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); see also 128 CONG. REc. 14,302-341
passim (1982).
86. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 355 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom.
Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (D. La. 1983).
87. See, e.g., Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981); Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1291, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane). Unresponsiveness was initially perceived as a
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difficult and divisive as proving discriminatory purpose. 88 Thus, in its
place, post-1982 litigators favored evidentiary factors more sensitive to
sophisticated social science techniques and less malleable by unsympathetic judges. These litigators drew from the one person/one vote
quantitative dilution cases, where the issue of impermissible vote dilution was measured by "objective" evidence of numerical deviations
from absolute equality. 89
Because arithmetic had proved useful in the quantitative dilution
cases, voting rights activists advanced comparable solutions to their
evidentiary quandary. Activists sought an easily identifiable, uniformly enforceable proxy for the judicial inquiry into dilution jurisprudence. Expert witnesses were hired to provide "objective" evidence of
racial vote dilution. 90 In particular, the capacity to prove racial bloc
voting developed through application of computer technology to precinct by precinct election results. As a result, the "core value" for
racial vote dilution cases shifted to reflect the value of social science
evidence. The apparent ability of statistics to simplify and objectify
racial bloc voting obviated the need for other "gauzy" sociological
evidence. 91
In addition to its evidentiary sensitivity, litigation focusing on racial bloc voting had theoretical appeal. The "extent to which voting in
the [jurisdiction was] racially polarized" 92 provided a critical rationale
for rejecting election arrangements that diluted and submerged black
voting strength. If whites refused to vote for black candidates, and
"core value" since it was the unwillingness of the governing body to respond to the needs and
interests of the minority community that prompted judicial concern in the first place.
88. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to Mobile v. Bolden: Ha~·e the
White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L. REV. 1, 43 n.283
(1982). Proving unresponsiveness involved the awkward task of identifying specific pieces of
legislation sponsored and supported by particular legislators antagonistic to minority group interests. The claim also could be conclusively rebutted with evidence of peripheral and insignificant "minority interest" legislation. Because unresponsiveness was judicially unmanageable,
litigators convinced Congress to demote unresponsiveness to optional rebuttal. Unresponsiveness became a relevant factor only to the extent plaintiffs chose to prove it. See 1982 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 82, at 29 n.116, reprinted at 207 n.116.
89. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738-39 (1983).
90. One of the most successful efforts involved the analysis of election returns using both the
"interocular" test and "bivariate regression" to demonstrate polarization in the electorate,
although sophisticated racial bloc voting analyses did not surface in dilution litigation until the
late 1970s. See, e.g., Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951
(1980). After the 1982 amendments, however, proof of racial bloc voting assumed primary importance. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55 (1986).
91. See Mobile v. City of Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 n.17 (1980) (dilution claim rejected based
simply on gauzy sociological evidence).
92. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1982) (listing typical, evidentiary factors to be
considered within a totality of circumstances analysis).
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whites were in the majority, then political market failure existed. 93
Although politics involves winners and inevitable losers, pluralist theory depends on a fluid exchange between the two. If one group is
permanently excluded, political remedies ultimately will be bypassed
in favor of less mainstream altematives.94
That whites and blacks voted in racial blocs ultimately became the
preferred evidentiary linchpin. Many courts, however, still felt adrift
in a sea of factors. Jurisprudential parameters establishing cause and
effect, not just evidentiary anchors, were needed.95 Courts demanded
judicially manageable instructions which dictated where to draw the
line between marginal and substantive claims. If dilution was the submergence of minority votes in a racially polarized electorate, then
courts needed a mechanism for distinguishing that phenomenon from
undilution. The courts looked to the language of the statute for an
answer.
Because the key statutory phrase characterized equal opportunity
in the political process in terms of being able to elect "representatives
of choice," judicial intervention appeared to be limited to claims that
racially polarized voting denied blacks the ability to elect viable black
candidates. Black electoral success, which apparently defined undilution, became the statutory metaphor for equal political opportunity.96
93. See supra note 77.
94. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warning
that political second class status for blacks provides short-lived, superficial tranquility because,
without a reasonable judicial remedy, "the victims of discrimination" could not be long expected
"to respect political channels of seeking redress"); see also infra note 107.
95. Although racial bloc voting was relatively easy to prove, it seemed omnipresent; every
election system in every jurisdiction with some black population was vulnerable. Yet, judicial
intervention would not halt the private racial preferences of individual voters. Whereas racial
bloc voting might explain political market failure, it failed to identify which election schemes in
particular were responsible and remediable.
96. The absence of proportional representation alone was not evidence of a violation. This
absence, however, was still useful as a rhetorical device and to establish a baseline definitional
floor of political inequality. At the same time, the presence of roughly proportional black representation defined the limits of equality. As Justice O'Connor observes, proportionate representation is an inexact concept. In a jurisdiction that is 40% black, a governing body with either 30%
or 50% black representation would be sufficient to establish "undilution." Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 88-89 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). As predicted by the 1982 amendments
opponents, both the tool and the mandate became confined by judicial interpretation to the right
to elect black representatives. But, contrary to opponents' claims, proportional representation
was a ceiling rather than a floor. Even successful plaintiffs did not necessarily enjoy black representation proportionate to the black voting strength in the community. McGhee v. Granville
Cty., 860 F.2d 110, 120 (4th Cir. 1988). The phenomenon of the floor becoming the ceiling is not
unusual in legal and other prescriptive discourses. See letter from Frank Michelman to author
(Dec. 19, 1990) (on file with author). As long as black electoral success was consistent and
proportionate, further scrutiny of black representation was discouraged. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. at 77, 80 (remanding House District 23 because blacks enjoyed consistent, proportionate representation); see infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text. The quality of black representation was not investigated. Id. (describing black voters' unexamined claim in Durham that a
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The right to a meaningful voice through voting thus became simply
the right to elect minority "representatives of choice."
The litigation model's conception of representation produced a
very limited vision of the relationship between black voters and black
elected officials. Neither the degree of responsiveness of the elected
official nor the tendency of the electoral process to depress black participation triggered coverage. 97 The fact of election was the threshold
factor. 98 Mere electoral ratification by black voting majorities supposedly assured representational authenticity, authority, legitimacy, and
responsiveness.
In addition to proving the existence of dilution, black electoral success also became the preferred remedy. Once a violation was established, the cure was to subdivide larger, heterogeneous electorates into
smaller, homogeneous, majority-black districts where black voters
could elect candidates of their choice to the governing body. 99
Full exercise of the franchise was the Act's ennobling goal. But,
juridical preference for easy-to-apply, judicially manageable racial vote
dilution standards prompted the search for quantifiable and uniform
measures of empowerment. 100 Litigators sought standards they could
meet by using less costly social science evidence. In addition, Congress' failure to articulate a clear core value for defining political
black elected through single shot voting was not adequately representing their interests because
he was more directly beholden to white voters in the multimember district).
97. I make this claim notwithstanding the language in the legislative history accompanying
the 1982 amendments which recognizes the relevance of a "depressed socio-economic condition"
to judicial enforcement of the Act. See 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 82, at 29 & n.114,
reprinted at 206-07 & n.114. The role of the representative has simply not been explored. The
only discussion in the ca5e law, for example, of the nature of representation involves some recent
cases discussing judicial coverage under the Act based on the judicial "function." See League of
United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
bane), cert. granted sub. nom. Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 111 S. Ct. 775
(1991) (judges are not electorally accountable and are therefore not representatives subject to the
Voting Rights Act). But cf. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1200 (S.D. Miss. 1987), cited
with approval in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1063 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 853 F.2d 1186
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), overruled, League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 111 S. Ct. 775 (1991).
98. The statute tracks the electorally triggering approach taken by the Supreme Court in one
person/one vote cases. See, e.g., New York City Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688
(1989) (fact of election subjects board to constitutional scrutiny under the fourteenth amend·
ment). According to the Eleventh Circuit, "The language [of Section 2] is only and uncompromisingly premised on the fact of nomination or election." Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 831 F.2d
246, 251 (1987).
99. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977); McGhee v. Granville County, 860
F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988); accord Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1975); Mahan v. Howell,
410 U.S. 315, 333 (1975); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971); see also Parker, Racial
Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 76,
at 85, 111-13.
100. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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equality prompted voting rights lawyers to advance interpretations of
the statutory scheme in response to complaints about the absence of
black representation within the context of a viable, judicial remedy.
Voting rights case law thus evolved within a racial justice model
that accepted as its premise the fact that people of different races often
lived and voted differently from each other. Rather than insisting that
such separateness and difference be eradicated, as in the school desegregation context, or that poor blacks, isolated from and stigmatized by
an unresponsive government, be afforded equal government services,
as in equalization of municipal services litigation, 101 the Voting Rights
Act model of racial justice recognized racial difference. Group perspective was valued and legitimated by promoting electoral opportunities for black representation. 102 Using the conjunction of racial
identifiability and geographic insularity as a convenient proxy for societal discrimination and political group consciousness, the litigation vision of political equality promulgated four complementary
assumptions that eventually became the theory of black electoral
success.
First, the litigation focused exclusively on electoral outcomes. The
absence of black elected officials became both the symptom and the
cause of political inequality. In other words, political equality was defined exclusively in terms of the electoral opportunities afforded a
"fair" number of authentic - meaning chosen by the community black representatives.
Second, the right to political equality was granted as a premise.
But as the concept to which the statutory right referred, "political
equality" required definition. Ultimately, the phrase was defined in
terms of the ability of black voters to elect black representatives in
rough proportion to their presence in the population.
Although the voting rights model explicitly rejected "quotas," 103
choosing instead to speak in terms of "results," 104 numerical proportionality sufficed to establish legality. 105 If twelve percent of elected
officials nationwide were black, presumably reflective of the percentage of blacks within the population, the litigation model of political
equality was satisfied.
101. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
102. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977).
103. See supra note 96.
104. See Derfner, supra note 84, at 159-60.
105. The voting rights model exemplifies the problem of racial proportionality as a remedy.
Freeman, supra note 7, at 96, 102-03.

1100

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1077

Thus, roughly proportionate black representation legitimated the
electoral process. The idea underlying this concept was that only after
previously excluded groups were successful within the electoral process would the white majority learn to accept black representatives as
colleagues in collective govemance; 106 only then would blacks invest
in the normal channels of electoral mobilization and eschew more
activist protest strategies. I 07 These themes formed the basis for the
authenticity and electoral mobilization assumptions of a black empowerment theory of representation.
Third, majority rule was unquestioned as long as the majority admitted a fair number of blacks to its decisionmaking council. Minority
electoral presence "softened the harshness of the principal of majority
rule." 108 By virtue of their electoral success within majority-black districts, black representatives had representational presence, which was
. equated with authority and responsiveness to their distinctive group
interests.
Fourth, political equality was judicially enforced by subdividing
the electorate into single-member districts, a "fair" number of which
were controlled by black voters. Single-member districting was the
judicially preferred remedy for electoral discrimination. 109 Moreover,
the chosen enforcement mechanism, electoral ratification in majorityblack single-member districts, itself became a goal because it appealed
as a pragmatic, political tool to both the integrationists and the
nationalists.
Both nationalists and integrationists contemplated that small districts, controlled by black majorities, would be the best tool for ensuring minority inclusion, encouraging greater citizen involvement in
decisionmaking processes, simplifying organizing efforts, and reflecting residential and social segregationist reality. 110 The emergence of
black majority electoral districts became a justiciable proxy for black
inclusion in the exercise of government authority. This remedy satis106. The model assumes that in majority-white jurisdictions, whites must overcome the lasting legacy of Reconstruction era stereotypes to vote for black candidates. See infra notes 164-79
and accompanying text.
107. See T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 880 (quoting John Lewis, then head of the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), at the August 1963 March on Washington); S.
KARNIG & A. WELCH, supra note 60, at 15 (until blacks given fair share of political power,
danger of continued widespread violence); U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT. UNFULFILLED GOALS 63 (1981); Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and
the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 571, 590 n.106 (1978). See generally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. See letter from Jim Blacksher to author (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author).
109. See supra note 99.
110. See, e.g., s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 15-16; infra notes 237-39.
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fied the activists, who eventually abandoned a mass movement in exchange for election-oriented litigation campaigns.111
As an enforcement mechanism, the black single-member district
strategy achieved three separate functions: first, it provided a successful litigation approach to challenge the failure of the election to produce elected black officials; second, it gave courts a justiciable
standard to determine the problems and progress that were closely related to the ultimate limits of the voting rights inquiry; and third, as I
argue in the next Part, it "inescapably closed the door" on the real
goal of the civil rights movement, which was to alter the material condition of the lives of America's subjugated minorities. 112

II.

THE THEORY OF BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS

Q: Now, why would you come from Crittenden County to participate in a fundraiser for a county race that was basically a local race to
Phillips County?
A: Well, the reason I would come, first of all, there are no blacks
elected to a county position in eastern Arkansas and no blacks serving in
the House of Representatives in eastern Arkansas and no blacks elected
to anything other than school boards in districts that are predominantly
black. And I feel like blacks should be elected to public office because
they should have a chance to serve.
And I want to help get blacks elected so little black children can see
them serving and I want to dispell (sic) the myth that some whjte kids
might have that blacks can't serve or shouldn't be serving at the courthouse. And when my little girl goes to the courthouse or when other
little girls go to the courthouse, I want them to be able to see black
people working up there.
And if we can get some blacks elected at the local level, eventually
we can - blacks will have the expertise and we can groom them to the
point where they can run for the state legislature and other positions.
• • • 113

!

Black electoral success theory defines descriptively black representation as a meaningful empowerment goal of structural reform legislation and litigation. The theory contains four basic assumptions: (1)
the authenticity assumption; (2) the mobilization/electoral control as111. J. CoNYERS & W. WALLACE, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STUDY OF BLACK
AMERICANS HOLDING GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE 20 (1976) (89% of black officials surveyed believed court actions very important in achieving real progress); C. STONE, BLACK POLITICAL
POWER IN AMERICA 10 (1970) (age of demonstrations has passed to age of the ballot).
112. See letter from Samuel Issacharotr to author (Sept. 24, 1990) (on file with author).
113. Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Ark. 1988), ajfd. by equally
divided coun, 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (trial transcript at 654-55) (testimony of
black state legislator Ben McGee, who was elected to the Arkansas House from a majority-black
single-member district created as a result of a successful voting rights challenge in Smith v.
Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310 (1988)).
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sumption; (3) the polarization assumption; and (4) the responsiveness/
reform assumption. District-based electoral ratification by black voters is the theory's primary enforcement mechanism.
In this Part, I analyze each of these assumptions. I conclude that
the black electoral success empowerment model fails to provide a realistic enforcement mechanism for establishing either leadership accountability within the black community or representational
effectiveness within the legislative deliberation and coalition-building
process. The theory marginalizes black leadership and leads to token
representation. Black electoral success theory has failed to comprehend, or even to examine, the nature of representation within collective decisionmaking bodies controlled by prejudice and external
inequalities.
.
My critique of the black electoral success model rests essentially on
three claims. First, the status of blacks as a discrete, disadvantaged
minority cannot be addressed simply by mobilizing blacks to turn out
on election day to elect more black candidates. Black representatives
are not necessarily effective advocates for legislative responsiveness.
Second, the prejudice and hostility facing blacks within the political process cannot be eradicated by creating majority-black singlemember districts from which black candidates can be elected. Black
legislators, especially those representing geographically segregated districts, may be victims of prejudice. Thus, if racially polarized voting
results in electoral market failure, then the concept of political empowerment must also address failed legislative decisionmaking. Minority empowerment requires minority legislative influence, not just
minority legislative presence. In other words, blacks must develop explicit mechanisms for overcoming majority prejudice in the governing
policymaking body.
Finally, the first two claims will not be fully resolved until we focus
on the concept of proportionate interest representation, which has received virtually no attention from civil rights lawyers or scholars. By
directly undermining the legitimacy of winner-take-all majority rule,
proportionate interest representation responds to domination by a hostile, permanent majority.
A.

The Authenticity Assumption: Black Elected Officials Are
Authentic Role Models

Authentic black representation, or "descriptive" representation, 114
114. Descriptive representation is representation by culturally and physically similar persons. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967); Grofman, Should Rep·
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is the first important building block for black electoral success theory.
Authenticity refers to community-based and culturally rooted leadership. The concept also distinguishes between minority-sponsored and
white-sponsored black candidates. 115 Basically, authentic representation describes the psychological value of black representation. The
term is suggestive of the essentialist impulse in black political participation: because black officials are black, they are representative. 116
Thus, authenticity reflects the importance of race in defining the character of black political participation. 117
Authentic leadership is electorally supported by a majority of
black voters and is, at its best, culturally similar to its constituency
base. Thus, authenticity subsumes two separate concepts, the political
and the cultural. Black representatives are authentic because they are
elected by blacks and because they are descriptively similar to their
constituents. In other words, they are politically, psychologically, and
culturally black.
1.

Political Authenticity

Authentic leaders are those elected by black voters. In voting
rights terminology, electoral ratification from majority-black, singlemember districts establishes authenticity. These facts distinguish the
authentic representatives from those officials who are handpicked by
the "establishment," or who must appeal to white voters in order to
resentatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING lssUES
(B. Grofman ed. 1982).
115. Authentic representatives need not be black as long as the source of their authority,
legitimacy, and power base is the black community. White candidates elected from majorityblack constituencies may therefore be considered "black" representatives. Nevertheless, the term
usually connotes a minority group member. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of
Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1987) ("black preference is determined from elections which
offer the choice of a black candidate"). Although some civil rights advocates acknowledge that
whites who are sponsored by and elected within a majority-black constituency can and do represent minority interests, very few would support as authentic leaders whites who are elected
within a majority-white constituency with some black support. Others claim that even minoritysponsored white candidates elected within a majority-black jurisdiction, while sympathetic, are
not generally perceived as aggressive advocates of black interests. As discussed infra, the real
ambivalence asserts itself regarding the election of black representatives outside majority-black
districts with some black support.
116. See infra notes 253-55 (discussing responsiveness assumption). Representatives are any
elected government officials, arguably including members of the judiciary. See supra notes 97,
115.
117. See, e.g., c. STONE, R. WHELAN & w. MURIN, URBAN POLICY AND POLITICS IN A
BUREAUCRATIC AGE 17 (1986) (few factors are more important to contemporary urban politics
than race or ethnicity); Fainstein & Fainstein, The Racial Dimension in Urban Political Economy,
25 URB. AFF. Q. 187 (1989) (arguing that race plays a critical independent role in determining
political outcomes and political roles for blacks). But cf. Marable, supra note 24, at 20 (racebased strategy for social change minimizes growing class differences within black community).
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get elected. 118 Establishment-endorsed blacks are unlikely to be authentic because they are not elected as the representatives of choice of
the black community. 11 9 In addition, these officials are often marginal
community members whose only real connection with black constituents is skin color. Electoral support by a majority of black voters is
thus a convenient proxy for political authenticity.
2.

Cultural and Psychological Authenticity

In addition to electoral ratification, authenticity refers to a cultural
and psychological view of group solidarity. Black representatives are
not just physically black. Because they grew up being black, these
officials enjoy a cultural and psychic linkage that cuts across class
lines. Black electoral success theory suggests that black elected officials, who are physically and culturally similar to their constituents,
fulfill the black community's need for self-affirmation through "role
models." 120
From students protesting the absence of black college 121 and law
professors, 122 to church leaders ostensibly supporting black community needs, 123 black activists and white sympathizers consistently describe their efforts, at least to some extent, in terms of finding and
promoting black role models. By their presence, role models articulate black interests and represent the needs of aspiring young
blacks. 124 Role models are living symbols of the equal opportunity
ll8. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. Thom·
burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (trial transcript) (blacks elected from majority-white multimember districts sail trim, meaning they defer to other blacks to introduce and promote
controversial legislation that would affect black constituents); infra note 308.
119. Defendant jurisdictions are challenged when they attempt to get credit for establishment endorsed black leaders, unless they produce evidence that a majority of black voters also
supported the candidate. See Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989); Gingles,
590 F. Supp. at 345. The litigator's approach is to examine voting patterns to determine whether
the election system enables the black community to elect its own candidates or whether black
officials are chosen instead by white voters.
120. See, e.g., May, After 40 Years Making the Law, Rodino Now Teaches It, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1989, at Bl, col. 4 (black representative better serves as role model for black youths); see
also supra note 4 (role models who speak in a representational capacity become "spokesmodcls").
But see infra note 147 (spokesmodels may not articulate community-based vision).
121. Lee, Minority Issues Lie Behind Protest Over Cutting of Budget at CUNY, N.Y. Times,
May 28, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
122. See, e.g., Butterfield, Harvard Law School Torn by Race Issue, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26,
1990, at A20, col. 1.
123. Teltsch, Bronx Church Honors a 'Role Model: N.Y. Times, May 27, 1990, at A30, col.
1.
124. For example, some blacks claim that as teachers they have "a clear, racial representational function," meaning that they both "comprehend" and "represent" the needs and interests
of all black students. See Bell, Statement, reprinted in MINORITY GROUPS NEWSLETfER 18
May, 1990 (section on AALS) (advocating on behalf of black women role models and mentors);
see also Austin, Sapphire Bound/, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 574 (Many role models are "black
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process. 125 They reflect the importance of group consciousness to
black psychic identity.
Black elected officials are among the most prominent "role models." 126 The election of black representatives affirms that blacks are
participating citizens who take an active interest in policy decisions
that affect their lives. Authentic representatives also provide psychological uplift by affirming black culture, humanity, and group
solidarity.
In the electoral context, role models mediate the paradox of a representative democracy in which all citizens are equal, but some are
more equal than others. 127 Including all sectors of society in government operation is consistent with Madison's vision. 128 In a representative democracy, however, all citizens cannot be directly involved in
decisionmaking. Some citizens are either "actually" or "virtually"
represented. 129 Role model theory justifies the representative principle
by referring to a black leadership aristocracy which leads other blacks
by virtue of their own achievement and sense of social responsibility.130 The idea of a black leadership aristocracy was no doubt influpeople who have achieved stature and power in the white world because they supposedly represent the interests of the entire black community. Such role models gain capital (literally and
figuratively) to the extent that they project an assimilated persona that is as unthreatening to
white people as it is (supposed to be) intriguing to our young.").
125. For example, minority faculty assist minority student recruitment by suggesting the
opportunity to provide mentors for minority students and "hint[ing] at a culturally and ethnically heterogeneous campus environment." Minority Issues in Legal Education, LAw SERVS.
REP., May-June 1990, at 4, 13; see infra notes 132-33.
126. See, e.g., Ayres, Drug Trial Begins for Mayor Barry, Prosecution Says It Is a CaSe of
Addiction and Deceit, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1990, at A2, col. 5 (in the recent prosecution of D.C.
Mayor Marion Barry for drug use and perjury, "[t]he role model issue was unescapable.").
127. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY PoLmcs FOR A NEW AGE 14547, 291 (1984) (principle ofrepresentation that rescues democracy from the problems of scale is
itself inherently oligarchical; representation is incompatible with equality and social justice); cf.
Abrams, supra note 6, at 479 (representative democracy embodies unresolved tension between
equality of all citizens and the greater participation of a few as important policy decisionmakers).
128. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) (rejecting elitist plutocracy).
129. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 50-55 (1986); see also Guinier, Keeping the Faith, 24 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 393, 427-29 (1989) (actual representation involves direct election by constituents;
virtual representation consists of representation by someone elected by another constituency with
common interests and sympathies).
130. See Dubois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM 31, 45 (Amo Press ed.
1969) (1903). In Dubois' view, the "talented," whose own ability would be maximized, would
make racially unique contributions, thus raising up the level of the race they represented. J.
DEMARCO, THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF W.E.B. DUBOIS 46 n.61, 48, 51 n.73 (1983). The ideal
political system would enfranchise the talented tenth whose own empowerment and sense of
social responsibility would benefit the masses. Dubois advanced a theory of self-development,
voluntary self-segregation, and personal intellectual achievement to create an avant-garde that
convinced whites blacks were worthy of help. E. RUDWICK, W.E.B. DUBOIS: A STUDY IN
MINORITY GROUP LEADERSHIP 291 (1960).
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enced by W.E.B. Dubois' repudiated belief in a "talented tenth."131
As role models, these black achievers presumptively represent
equal opportunity. With few exceptions, their election signals that society's institutions are "color-blind" pure meritocracies. 132 Role models, who convey the message "We Have Overcome," also inspire those
not yet overcoming. 133 Thus, in general, black role models are powerful symbolic reference points for those worried· about the continued
legacy of past discrimination.
Some critics assert that the authenticity assumption is a meaningless cultural and descriptive concept. For example, Abigail Thernstrom, an outspoken critic of the conventional empowerment model,
denies the empirical or theoretical validity of culturally similar representatives, because whites can represent black interests. 134 Thernstrom attempts to revive the theory of virtual representation in which
black interests are occasionally taken into account even if they are not
actively promoted. 135 Thernstrom argues that the single act of voting
131. Id. Even though Dubois ultimately abandoned his early proposals for a talented tenth,
the concept remained influential to the advancement of middle-class aspirations and opportunity.
In many ways, treatment of the talented tenth became a barometer of the degree to which blacks
bad overcome racism, both as a direct measure of equal opportunity for individual black
achievers and as an indirect measure of the lowered racial barriers for those disadvantaged blacks
still suffering disproportionate levels of poverty and deprivation. Cf. Brooks, Life After Tenure:
Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 423
(1986) (arguing that black middle class is in position to speak on behalf of black problems in
general).
132. In the electoral context, promoting black role models is important to convince other
blacks that the system is working. See Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 310 (1987); Freeman, supra
note 7, at 96, 110.
133. Black elected officials are not only important role models, but their election, even in a
majority-white electorate, also legitimates them as group spokespersons. The spokesmodel the·
ory of empowerment affirms the status of blacks as full citizens who can not only vote but can
also bold elective office. The individual advancement of black elected officials inspires black
constituents to believe in the system, and the individual elected official, as a racial spokesperson,
attests reliably to the soundness of that belief. Especially since it was assumed that black role
models were meaningful cultural symbols, then spokesmodels were even more meaningful
bridges to those less fortunate. See, e.g., A. RAMPERSAD, THE ART AND IMAGINATION OF
W.E.B. DUBOIS 81 (1976) (Dubois recognized the need for a process of "natural selection" of
indigenous black leadership); see also W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1973); Austin, supra note 124, at 575 ("By their sheer visibility, [role models] are of service to those left
behind. They are functionally useful in providing images for emulation •••.").
134. Tbernstrom's theory of representation is essentially that representation is a neutral outcome reflecting voter preference. In the absence of intentional discrimination, efforts to ensure
"black" representation promote legislative set asides or electoral "quotas." A. THERN5fROM,
supra note 67, at 237-38. Thernstrom's theory of voting rights bas received considerable attention, in part because its proponent utilizes effectively the inflammatory language of quotas. See,
e.g., Greenhouse, The "Quota" Dispute Battle Over Civil Rights Bill Involves Larger Debate Considering Race, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at AlO, col. 5 (in issues of race, no word is "more
emotionally loaded or universally shunned than 'quota' "); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 63-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (condemning "racial electoral registers" and race
conscious districting which. encourages racial partisans).
135. But see generally Guinier, supra note 129, at 427-29 (concept of color-blind, virtual
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for any representative legitimates democratic self-govemment. 136
Themstrom's emphasis on color-blind, virtual representation abstracts the black experience from its historical context. 137 Virtual representation ignores the existence of group identity within the black
community. Themstrom's theory reduces electoral participation to
the individual unit within the voting booth. At that level, the perception is most acute that one vote will have a negligible effect on the
ultimate outcome. 138 Moreover, in neglecting the role of blacks and
whites as politically cohesive groups, Th,emstrom's electoral self-legitimating focus fails to acknowledge the role that group identity plays in
mobilizing political participation and influencing legislative policy.1 39
Empirical research also refutes the efficacy of race-neutral theories of
virtual representation.140
Even when elected officials are unresponsive and voters do not participate enthusiastically, some scholars suggest that voters are still virtually or collectively represented if the legislature as a whole is
representative. 141 These scholars suggest that representation is an institutional rather than a personal relationship. 142 Black electoral suerepresentation disenfranchises where interests of those "virtually" represented are not fungible
with those "actually" represented).
136. Actual participation by group members in an extended political process becomes superfluous because nondiscriminating representatives are responsive to their electoral constituency
regardless of race. The assumptions supporting this hypothesis have already been carefully dissected elsewhere. See, e.g., F. PARKER, BLACK VOTES CoUNT (1990); Abrams, supra note 6, at
481-88 (individual ,preferences not easily aggregated nor translated into governing policies);
Guinier, supra note 129, at 427; Karlan & Mccrary, Without Fear and Without Research: Abigail Thernstrom on the Voting Rights Act (Book Review), 4 J. L & POL. 751, 776-77 (1988).
137. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 101 (ideology offungibility fails to deal with the concreteness of black experience).
_
138. See B. BARBER, supra note 127, at xiii (citing "crisis in participation"); Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1034-35 (1984) (citing
problems of apathy and uninformed voting); Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating
Political Alternatives, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 185, 187 (1984); cf. S. VERBA & N. NIE, supra note
27, at 31 (table 2-1).
139. Most significantly, virtual representation is one step further removed from vicarious
representation through political spokesmodels. At least the possibility of electing a descriptively
similar representative mobilizes black voter turnout. Virtual representation, by contrast, offers
nothing to animate participation. To the contrary, virtual representation undermines the fundamental values of participation in a democracy. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
140. For example, studies suggest that House members are most responsive to their most
supportive constituency. R. FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 234
(1978); cf. infra notes 152-53, 158. and accompanying text.
141. Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 535
(1978).
142. Id.; H. EULAU & K. PREWITI, LABYRINTHS OF DEMOCRACY: ADAPTATIONS, LINKAGES, REPRESENTATION, AND POLICIES IN URBAN PoLmCS (1973) (voters may in fact be better represented by legislators outside their district); cf. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977) (white voter in majority-black district with nonwhite representative will be represented by legislator elected from other majority-white districts to the extent voting is along racial
lines).
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cess proponents dismiss such arguments as self-serving, because
"institutional representation" has widened the gap between whites and
blacks 143 and has resulted in general voter disenchantment. 144
I, too, reject the criticism that authentic black representation is
meaningless. Authenticity reflects the group consciousness, group history, and group perspective of a disadvantaged and stigmatized minority. Authenticity recognizes that black voters are a discrete "social
group" 145 with a distinctive voice. As I argue below, authentic representation also facilitates black voter mobilization, participation, and
confidence in the process of self-government.146
Authenticity, however, is a limited empowerment tool. As a descriptive matter, authenticity uses the nominally cultural to obscure its
substantively political meaning. Although an important source of authority and legitimacy, electoral ratification by black voters fails to
furnish a consistent mechanism for establishing community-based credentials or leadership accountability. Electoral success by culturally
and ethnically black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions does
not necessarily mean that black concerns will be addressed. 147
For example, where "authentic blacks" are elected by whites with
significant black support, electoral ratification by a majority of those
blacks voting may not in fact send a recognizable message regarding
substantive policies. 148 Especially in winner-take-all electoral systems,
"the aggregation device of the election garbles these messages, producing winners while obscuring the reasons for their victories." 149 Thus,
143. See A CoMMON DESTINY 6 (G. Janes & R. Williams eds. 1989); R. FARLEY & W.
ALLEN, THE CoLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA (1989).
J44. Oreskes, As Problems Fester, Voters Send Pink Slips, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at ES,
col. 1; see also supra note 138; Oreskes, Low Voter Turnout in Primaries, Once Again, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 4, 1990, at B16, col. 4 [hereinafter Oreskes, Low Voter Turnout] (Committee for the
Study of the American Electorate reports widespread decline in voter turnout).
145. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99
ETHICS 250, 259·61 (1989) (concept of social group is distinguished from simple aggregate or
association of people by its special history, identity, values, and expressive style; social group is
defined primarily by members' sense of personal identity derived from group affinity and relational differentiations from other nongroup members); see also infra notes 256-57.
146. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
147. See'infra notes 275-83 (election of authentically black candidates in majority-black districts does not necessarily mean that those black elected incumbents will be responsive to the
needs of the black community); see also infra notes 227-44 (authentic blacks not effective because
they remain a discrete, insular legislative minority).
148. Where electoral ratification is imprecise because, for example, the black elected role
model is elected in a majority-white jurisdiction, cultural authenticity alone often substitutes as a
mechanism for defining and validating the "black" leader. See infra notes 196-201.
149. Abrams, supra note 6, at 487. Even where an electoral majority sends a clear message,
the representative may have difficulty translating this message into substantive policy. She
may be unable to persuade her legislative colleagues or she may feel obliged to support
initiatives opposed by those who elected her. She may be subject to pressure from constituent groups or other organized interests not responsible for her election. Alternatively, a
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even where black support provides a critical margin, 150 successful
black candidates in majority-white electorates do not necessarily feel
obligated to black voters.1 5 1
B.

The Mobilization Assumption

The mobilization assumption claims that black electoral success
directly affects black political participation at the grassroots level. 152
To the extent that blacks can be encouraged to participate in the political process, the possibility of electing a "first" black tends to increase
election day turnout. 153 Indeed, the courts and commentators have
recognized that the inability to elect black candidates depresses black
representative's incumbency may so insulate her from electoral pressures that she feels little
need to respond to constituent demands.
Id. Cf. Barnes, Into the Mainstream; 22 NATL. J. 262 (1990) (Virginia black governor Wilder
"may become less accessible and less accountable politically to blacks whose demands will be
competing for attention against those of Virginia's white-majority constituency - and those of
Wilder's large campaign contributors").
150. The black "swing vote" is not usually critical unless there is a close split in the white
vote. See Williams, Blacks Cast Pivotal Ballots in Four Key Senate Races, Data Show, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at A33, col. 3. Moreover, white political beneficiaries of the swing vote are
often unaware of its decisive impact or deliberately ignore it because of even more decisive white
support. Davidson, supra note 76, at 9-10; see also Stodghill, After the Victory Party, Frustration
in the Black Community, Bus. WK., Jan. 8, 1990, at 49.
151. In Virginia, where Douglas Wilder is the first black elected Governor since Reconstruction, some commentators have interpreted his victory as a "new black politics:" But cf. Ayres,
Virginia Governor Baffles Democrats With Crusade for "New Mainstream," N.Y. Times, Oct. 14,
1990, at A22, col. 1 (Wilder considers himself "a governor who happens to be black, not a black
who happens to be governor."); Smothers, supra note 56, at B7, col. 1. Others see Wilder's win
as the triumph of a single-issue constituency in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions on
abortion. In either case, given the narrow margin of victory, Wilder's ability to govern on other
issues important to the black community is considerably vitiated. Cf. infra notes 170, 280 and
accompanying text.
152. Abrams, supra note 6, at 501 (Black election is a crucial aid to political morale "demonstrating to minority voters that defeat is no longer inevitable, and that there is someone in the
government who will respond to their interests."); see L. COLE, BLACKS IN POWER 110-18, 22123 (1976); J. CONYERS & w. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 6-7; Montague, The Voting Rights Act
Today, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 56 (statement ofB. Grofman); Morris, Black Electoral Participation and the Distribution of Public Benefits, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 76, at
275, 277 (political efficacy and level of trust in government affect black turnout); see also A.
THERNSTROM, supra note 67, at 122 (quoting Rolando Rios, legal director, Southwest Voter
Registration Education Project) ("When Hispanic candidates do not get elected, he said, they
cease to run, and without minority candidates, Hispanics do not vote.").
153. D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note 5 at 245 (quoting G. McWorter, D. Gills & R. Bailey,
Black Power Politics as Social Movement: Dialectics of Leadership in the Campaign to Elect
Harold Washington, 8-9 (1984) (unpublished manuscript, Afro-American Studies and Research,
University of Illinois, Urbana)) (black organizations worked so closely not everybody knew
"what group they were working under: Everybody seemed just to know.what they were working
for: the election of Chicago's first Black Mayor.") (emphasis added); id. at 244-47; Pettigrew,
Black Mayoral Campaigns, in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORmES (H. Bryce ed. 1976)
(black turnout declined second time a black candidate ran); see also S. KARNIG & A. WELCH,
supra note 60; D. McADAM, PoLmCAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY 51 (1982); cf. Johnson, Racial Politics: Chicago's Raw Nerve, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1989,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 37 (The night in 1983 Harold Washington was elected Chicago's first black
mayor, "black people literally danced in the streets of Chicago. They had voted in record num-
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political participation.154
The mobilization assumption measures representational effectiveness based on the ability of black candidates to increase black election
day turnout. Both this assumption and the authenticity assumption
presume that black voters will vote for, respect, be affirmed by, and
seek services from black elected officials. Neither assumption, however, proposes an ongoing relationship between the representative and
the represented. Nor do the assumptions provide a mechanism, other
than electoral ratification, for measuring representativeness. In addition, authentic black elected officials may not effectively mobilize sustained black participation, even when measured by the mobilization
assumption's own terms.
The mobilization assumption fails to anticipate the difficulties that
black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions encounter when they
seek simultaneously to appeal to white voters while retaining their
black political base. 155 Black voters, who feel neglected and taken for
granted by the black candidates "walking the tightrope," may not respond to opportunities for increased black electoral visibility. 156
When blacks are elected by whites with symbolic black support, their
victory represents a psychological, but not necessarily substantive
triumph. 157
The mobilization assumption has also depended in large part on
empirical evidence supplied by first-time election opportunities. The
assumption fails to explain how black electoral success will generate
sustained black election-day turnout. 158 Reelection opportunities may
fail to mobilize voter participation, even in majority-black single-members, charging to the polls by car, by bicycle, by foot, by wheelchair. There were elderly blacks
who said they had never voted before. Now, finally, they had a reason to vote.").
154. See, e.g., McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (11th Cir. 1984); Hendrix
v. McKinney, 460 F. Supp. 626, 631-32 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of
°Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. La. 1986), affd., 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); see also
supra note 152.
155. See supra note 151; see, also Smothers, Omen for Young: Low Black Turnout, N.Y.
Times, July 19, 1990, at B6, col. 4 (in Andrew Young's Georgia statewide governor's race, candidate's campaign workers cited tactical difficulties wooing whites while retaining black support;
Young had to "lean right and moderate his positions for whites while counting on blacks to see
this as a tactic and not a theological conversion").
156. Smothers, supra note 155 (Andrew Young neglected black vote in appeal to moderate
whites; as a result he received fewer black votes in Georgia precincts than Jesse Jackson did in
1988 running for the Democratic nomination for President).
157. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 108-09; Marable, supra note 24, at 21.
158. Cf. R. FENNO, supra note 140, at 184 (elected office becomes a way oflife not just a job;
incumbents enjoy the prestige, the policy influence, and name recognition); id. at 178 ("The first
• term is the hardest. If you win election a second time, you're in for quite a while."); id. at 172,
174 (elected officials are more involved with their constituency both before and immediately after
their first election); id. at 191-93 (once their electoral base is solidified, their interaction with
constituents decreases significantly, dwindling to providing access to a core group of constitu-
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her districts. Because it is the first opportunity to penetrate ~he previously all-white council that stimulates participation, once tlie council
is integrated, the symbolic importance of electoral visibilify is reduced,
especially where the representative has become a legislative token, incapable of influencing policy outcomes. 159
In addition to the above, by focusing exclusively on election day
turnout, the mobilization assumption fails to address any theory beyond symbolic political power. 160 The absence of a concept of representation that demands direct, extended accountability undermines
the ability of poor black constituents to participate effectively within
geographically insular and politically cohesive districts. The mobilization assumption ignores the need to encourage post election participation by black voters. As a result, their interests may simply be
outweighed by the advantages of incumbency and the perks of
patronage. 161
Even if a black candidate is elected, black voter participation
within a relatively homogeneous, insular district may not seem worthwhile because one black representative may not be able significantly to
alter public policy. Constituents within isolated single-member districts have little influence over the behavior of representatives from
other single-member districts. 162
Moreover, where blacks form a core but passive electorate, some
blacks may simply "manipulate racial symbols and language" to enlist
ents; at the end of a lengthy career in Congress, for example, one representative did not even
maintain a district office).
159. See infra notes 185-95, 241-42 (discussing problem of extending influence beyond geographically insular, homogeneous single·member districts where the black representative is a
legislative token).
160. Black electoral success both within and without majority-black districts rewards black
voters with "prestige" rather than "policies." See, e.g., A. REED, THE JESSE JACKSON PHENOMENON: THE CRISIS OF PURPOSE IN AFRO-AMERICAN PoLmCS (1986); Reed, A Critique ofNeoProgressivism in Theorizing about Development Policy: A Case from Atlanta, in THE PoLmcs OF
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 199 (C. Stone & H. Sanders eds. 1987) [hereinafter Reed, Neo-Progressivism]; (political power often ineffective in delivering to core constituency where based simply on
electoral strength) Reed, The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints, 1 CoMP.
URB. & COMMUNITY REs. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Reed, The Black Urban Regime].
161. Especially for established incumbents, tension often develops between representing constituent interests, on the one hand, and pursuing personal influence within the legislature, on the
other. R. FENNo, supra note 140, at 215, 216, 218 (long-term incumbent experiences gradual
erosion of local orientation in exchange for perception of governmental influence; legislative influence offered as a substitute for constituency access; allocation of resources to the reinforcement of constituency support declines over length of representatives' service). Representatives in
general tend to perceive a conflict between their role as ombudsman and lawmaker. M. JEWELL,
REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 2 (1982). On the other hand, for some representatives, interaction with constituents is a "security blanket." R. FENNO, supra note 140, at 218.
The conflict between political responsiveness and career development is one that a passive, economically depressed electorate is incapable of resolving.
162. See infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
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support from the poorest black constituents. 163 Although these
elected officials do not respond to constituent needs, under the authenticity and mobilization assumptions, their election and reelection
equals black empowerment. Yet, in such circumstances, neither assumption generates sustained, empowering participation in the political process.
C.

The Polarization Assumption

The polarization assumption is based on evidence that, absent
compelling reasons to do otherwise, whites and blacks vote for persons
of their own racial/ethnic background.1 64 Thus, in majority-white jurisdictions, racial bloc voting by a white majority inevitably causes the
electoral defeat of black candidates. Given racial polarization, black
electoral success theory assumes that majority-black single-member
districts are needed to overcome black electoral exclusion and to ensure black representational presence. The theory posits that, once
elected, black representatives will garner white support and become
effective minority participants in legislative negotiations and
deliberations.
As a general rule whites do not vote for blacks. Numerous court

163. Marable, supra note 24, at 21 ("These charlatans rely on the old nationalist rhetoric of
racial solidarity, but lack any progressive content and fail to deliver on a substantive agenda
because they are detached from any social protest movement for empowerment or resistance.").
164. For purposes of racial bloc voting, white ethnics are considered white. See, e.g., United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (Hasidic voters proportionately represented by white
elected officials). Although blacks may prefer black candidates, they often do vote for white
candidates, especially where no black candidate.runs. At the local level Carl Eggleston, the first
black elected to the Farmville, Virginia, city council following a successful§ 2 lawsuit in 1984,
experienced racial bloc voting after he rose to prominence in the State Democratic Party, and
tried without success to gain reelection to the council from a majority-white district when he
moved his residence. Mr. Eggleston explains his defeat as follows:
I really thought I had a chance . • . . There were a lot of issues in the campaign, and the
incumbent had voted wrong on a number of them and in general had lost touch. But I
found out that the only issue people were interested in was race. Whites voted against me
not on the issues, not on any stand I had taken, but just because I'm black•.•• People would
come to the polls and talk out loud - I mean out loud - saying, "We've got too many
blacks on council."
McDonald, Votes of Confidence, Found. News, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 27, 31.
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decisions, 165 anecdotal reports, 166 surveys, 167 and scholarly studies168
have confirmed the existence of racial bloc voting. Based on this overwhelming evidence, the polarization assumption concludes tJlat whites
still harbor racial prejudice. 169 Thus, mechanisms to surmount this
165. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982); Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d
1407, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 198 (E. D. Ark. 1989); Brown v.
Board of Commrs. of Chattanooga, Tenn., 722 F. Supp. 380, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); McNeil v.
City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1027 (C.D. ID. 1987); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494,
495 (D.D.C.) (Young deposition at 9).
166. See Applebome, 11/acks and the Election: What Was the Message?, N.Y. Times, Nov.
18, 1990, at A30, col. 2 [hereinafter Applebome, 11/acks and the Election] (racially charged contests bring out white voters; white incumbent in North Carolina injected racial issues into the
campaign in final days to win a massive white turnout that swamped black opponent); The 1990
Elections State by State, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at BS, col. 5 (poll of North Carolina voters
showed that 65% of whites supported Jesse Helms while 93% of blacks supported his black
opponent); Applebome, Racial Politics in South's Contests: Hot Wind of Hate or a Last Gasp?,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 5 (campaign commercial used white hands crumpling
rejection letter as part of racial appeal against black opponent); see also Toner, Unseating Helms:
Rival Charts Uphill Climb, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at Al2, col. 6 (although survey suggests
35% of whites backed a black candidate in the North Carolina Senate race, many preelection
surveys in other states found whites often reluctant to admit to unknown interviewer their prejudice against black candidates); Applebome, Drama ls Pas_t Tense in Georgia Race, N.Y. Times,
July 16, 1990, at Al2, col. 1; 11reakthrough in Virginia, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 54.
167. Attitudes in 11/ack and White, TIME, Feb. 2, 1987,_ at 21 (survey of attitudes); see also
Guinier, supra note 129, at 420-21 n.123 (citing 1987 Joint Center for Political Studies/Gallup
survey in which 55% of whites said they would not vote for a black mayor regardless of
qualifications).
168. Hahn, Klingman & Pachon, Cleavages, Coalitions, and the Black Candidate, 29 W.
POL. Q. 507 (1976); Halley, Acock & Greene, Ethnicity and Social Class: Voting in the 1973 Los
Angeles Municipal Elections, 29 W. POL. Q. 521 (1976); Walton, Black Politics in the South:
Projections for the Coming Decade. in PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE BLACK CoMMUNITY, supra note
15, at 77-100; see also F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 136 n.13; Bullock & Campbell, Racist or
Racial Voting in the 1981 Atlanta Municipal Elections, 20 URB. AFF. Q. 149 (1984); Hero, The
Election of Hispanics in City Government: An Examination of the Election of Fedenco Pena as
Mayor of Denver, 40 W. POL. Q. 93, 94 (1987); Hero, Multiracial Coalitions in City Elections
Involving Minority Candidates: Some Evidence from Denver, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 342, 344-46
(1989) [hereinafter Hero, Multiracial Coalitions]; Hero & Beatty, The Elections of Federico Pena
as Mayor of Denver: Analysis and Implications, 70 Soc. Sci. Q. (1989).
169. Despite increased acceptance of blacks in social settings, many whites still harbor racial
prejudice. See Delgado, supra note 132, at 316 n.87 (citing, inter a/la, G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 79-80, 197-202 (1954)); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 339 n.91 (1987) (social stereotypes
can and do create their own social reality; racism as a product of the unconscious is more complex than either the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of ignorant
bigots; racism is part of common historical experience and, therefore, culture, arising from
learned assumptions as well as from patterns of fundamental social activities); Pettigrew, New
Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 688-89
(1985)); Poll Finds Whites Use Stereotypes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at BlO, col. 2 (whites
believe blacks are less hardworking, more violence-prone, less intelligent, and less patriotic). The
Reconstruction era specter of black political control continued to fuel white antipathy during the
Mississippi voter registration drive of 1963. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 718; see also A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 143, at 11 (despite substantial consensus, in the abstract, on the broad
goal of achieving an egalitarian society, white resistance to equality continues, especially when
contemplating frequent interracial contact of long duration); cf. C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS,
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 154-55 (1975); A. CAMPBELL, WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD
BLACK PEOPLE ch. 7 (1971) (citing evidence of unfavorable stereotypes of blacks).
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prejudice and to ensure black electoral success are justified.
According to the polarization assumption, racial bloc voting
within the electorate eliminates pluralist bargaining among shifting intergroup coalitions. 170 Where members of the majority consistently
refuse to vote for minority-sponsored candidates, blacks are unable to
attract enough dissatisfied majority group members to create an effective race neutral majority. 171 White ethnic groups never encountered
the problem because, unlike blacks, "an unjust combination of a majority of the whole," 172 was never so dominant as to silence white ethnic voices over an extended period of time. 173
While pluralist theories of democracy do contemplate minority
losses, they do not necessarily envision a minority that never wins. In
other words, Madison's reliance on checks and balances to control
"factions" was both a way to monitor the "special interest" problem
as well as a hedge against the tyranny of a hostile majority. To fight
permanent majority tyranny based on prejudice, voting rights litigation focused on promoting electoral opportunities for black
candidates.
The polarization assumption posits that black incumbency tends to
diminish prejudice and weaken stereotypes of black incompetence. 174
Black elected officials will assuage white fears by engaging more intimately in legislative deliberations after the election. 175 Black represen170. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 52, at 135; Davidson, supra note 76, at 5-10 (hostile white
majority has "panoply of weapons at its disposal"; even if minority exercises electoral influence,
winning candidates do not always pay attention to minority interests after the election; postelection pressure from white constituents may nullify minority "influence"); cf. Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 315 (1972)
("Race prejudice divides groups that have much in common (blacks and poor whites) and unites
groups (whites, rich and poor) that have little else in common than their antagonism for the
racial minority. Race prejudice, in short, provides the 'majority of the whole' with that 'common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that Madison believed improbable in a pluralistic
society.").
171. w. RIKER, THE THEORY OF PoLmCAL COALmONS 179-80 (1962) (blacks excluded by
systematic agreement among whites who fear disequilibrium if any whites defect).
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 346 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
173. See, e.g., B. RINGER & E. LAWLESS, RACE-ETHNICITY AND SOCIETY 151-69 (1989)
(duality of qualitatively different political treatment of racial minorities and white immigrants
structured by constitutional underpinnings sanctioning two separate political-economic systems);
see also supra notes 76-77.
174. Black elected officials, by virtue of their status and tenure, tend to assuage white fears
during their incumbency. The power of incumbency is supported by studies which suggest that
black incumbents are in fact reelected with more white support. See L. COLE, supra note 152, at
4-5; J. CoNYERS & W. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 143-45; see also Johnson, supra note 153, at
37 ("among the white Cassandras who saw in a black man's election the impending ruin of their
city, hate turned to mere dislike, and perhaps even to grudging respect, as the garbage still got
picked up and the streets still got plowed").
175. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 732-735 (1985) (black
representatives not necessarily pariahs since familiarity may diminish hostility); Karlan, supra
note 6, at 216-18 (local governing bodies are intimate groups with ongoing relationships that
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tation is "a crucial lever for obtaining the benefits
patronage,
contracts, public services - that must be bargained for in the political
arena." 176 Regarding black interests, black representatives will "exert
special influence on their colleagues," providing "internal leadership"
to which people defer.17 7
Black electoral success advocates assume that prejudice results
from ignorance and unfamiliar difference. Once knowledge of similarities is present, or familiarity with differences is facilitated, these advocates contend that black and white elected officials will rationally
overcome prejudice and engage freely and equally178 in pluralistic bargaining or dialogic debate. 179 Particularly on the local level, in small
scale, intimate settings, it is hypothesized that black representatives
will persuade their colleagues to consider the interests or perspective
enable a single black legislator to build legislative bridges; continuous, open voting opportunities
also foster accommodation; institutional setting with debates, amendment processes and hearings
encourages active participation of minority representatives); see also L. CoLE, supra note 152, at
222 (the presence of black elected officials sensitizes white associates); Abrams, supra note 6, at
500 (increasing number of black representatives creates opportunities for greater cross-racial interaction and requires white officials to hear black officials articulate black interests); see also note
178.
176. Montague, supra note 152, at 58; see also Morris, supra note 152, at 277.
177. In recent interviews, members of the House of Representatives have acknowledged the
importance of black elected officials. Roberts, Letter Critical ofIsrael Stirs Political Fallout, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 25, 1988, at BS, col. 4; see M. JEWELL & s. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 197-98, 211-12 (4th ed. 1986) (both national and state legislators
take direct cues for decisionmaking from other legislators with specialized information); see also
Barnett, The Congressional Black Caucus: Illusions and Realities of Power, in THE NEW BLACK
PoLmCS, supra note 14, at 28 (black representatives seek to influence congressional legislation
on behalf of blacks at every step; black elected officials are an "authority structure" within the
black community).
Some proponents of the polarization assumption go even further and suggest that coalition
politics within the legislature may be more effective than attempts at the electoral level to break
down racially polarized voting, especially because legislators have more voting opportunities to
further the process of accommodation. These scholars hypothesize that the legislative process
itself may maximize opportunities for a strong proponent of black interests to persuade sympathetic but less informed colleagues.
178. Robinson & Preston, Equal-Status Contact and Modification of Racial Prejudice: A Reexamination of the Contact Hypothesis, 54 SOCIAL FORCES 911 (1976).
179. Michelman, Conceptions ofDemocracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case
of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989) (deliberative politics suggests an
openness to persuasion by reasons; deliberation involves argumentative interchange among
equals); Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in Amen"can Constitutional Argument: Voting
Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 448 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy]
(strategic interaction, or classic pluralist interest-group politics, seeks coordination rather than
cooperation based on self-interested bargaining not good-faith argument); Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 29 (1985); cf. Abrams, supra note 6, at 500 ("Collegiality requires •.• that [white officials]
give a hearing to the interests articulated by minority officials."); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 91 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548 (1988) (civic republicans emphasize rationale deliberation
covering ends as well as means); see also infra note 179 (assuming, first, a critical mass of allies
for moral support and resonance and, second, a disaggregated majority, even a lone black may
effectively rely on normative persuasion or on bargains within a pluralist exchange, especially in
a small body where a face-to-face encounter is an unavoidable fact of life).
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of black voters.1so
Black activists have long recognized that blacks cannot become an
effective political majority without legislative allies. Yet, electing black
representatives may simply relocate to the legislature polarization experienced at the polls. 181 Indeed, some political scientists studying
"the new black politics" in Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta have
challenged the working assumption that black electoral success will
ultimately reduce polarization. 182 Based on empirical studies of local
black officials and city council members, these scholars argue that
black representatives often become an ineffective, "seen but not heard"
minority in the legislature. 183 Because the individual black elected official may not be able to overcome polarization to "infiltrate the decisionmaking process" at the legislative level, 184 the election of black
representatives does not, by itself, translate into intergroup
cooperation.
Black representatives may be perceived as tokens or marginalized
in the legislative process. 185 Disillusionment produced by such mar180. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; see also F. Michelman, Justice Marshall's
Bolden Dissent 5-6 (Nov. 28, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (classical interest-group pluralist
account would claim that racial bloc voting is "harder to sustain within the face-to-face dealings
among a commission of three members than in the mass-political conditions in which members
are elected"; politically salient issues may split two white members and encourage alliance with
lone black; from a less strategic, dialogic perspective, "immediacy of .•• Black presence ••• [and]
Black voice ... in ... daily encounters and public deliberations .•. make the difference"; see also
letter from Frank Michelman to author (Dec. 19, 1990) (on file with author) (despite distinctions
between normative persuasion and pluralist exchange, within either perspective ·a single black
may be effective within a dialogic understanding or hold critical swing vote, especially in a small
legislative body where critical mass of allies more likely). But cf. infra notes 185, 204-09, 220-32
and accompanying text.
181. Abrams, supra note 6, at 502 n.269 (contemporary record of intergroup cooperation is
mixed); Karlan, supra note 73, at 41-43 & n.159 (giving blacks some seats on a multimember
body poses no immediate threat to continued white predominance in the political process; volu·
minous literature on "tipping points" suggests gulf between black presence and influence); cf.
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1972) (having minority group representatives on jury
does not assure outcome because they may simply be outvoted by majority).
182. Nelson, supra note 16, at 187 (black political influence in Cleveland moving in reverse);
Preston, supra note 16, at 159, 163 (black political representation in Chicago fairly large but
ineffective); Stone, Race and Regime in Atlanta, in RACIAL PoLmcs IN AMERICAN CmES 125
(R. Browning, D. Marshall & D. Tabb eds. 1990); Reed, Neo-Progressivism, supra note 160, at
199.
183. Supra note 182; see also s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 7; J. WIL·
SON, The Negro in American Politics: The Present, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE
BooK 453 (1966) (the larger the black population, the greater the perceived threat, and thus the
greater the resistance to intergroup participation and dialogue).
184. See Coleman & McLemore, Black Independent Politics in Mississippi: Constants and
Challenges, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs,supra note 14, at 131, 151 (blacks may enjoy individual, vicarious access through black representatives but not meaningful political access in which
demands are authoritatively decided upon).
185. Abrams, supra note 6, at 502; see also Michelman, Laws Republic, supra note 178, at
1523-24, 1530-32; Michelman, supra note 129, at 50-55; see also infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
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ginality may frustrate attempts-at further participation. 186 Without
allies, the mere presence of even authentic black representatives does
not assure a cooperative environment where normative persuasion and
open exchange of ideas prevaiJ.181
For example, in Arkansas, blacks successfully challenged a legislative redistricting plan that had produced only four majority-black districts.188 Black legislators elected from those districts testified that
they were an ineffective minority in the overwhelmingly white state
legislature. 189 White representatives, including those representing districts with a substantial, extraordinarily poor black constituency, testified that they had no black employees working on their staffs.19o In
addition, these white representatives admitted to using racial slurs to
refer to prominent blacks when conversing with other members of the
legislature. 191 The pres~nce of blacks in the electorate, one.. of the bases for the mobilization and polarization assumptions, failed to make
these white legislators responsive, even though they represented substantially black constituencies.192
Successful black candidates from majority-black districts are also
frequently unable to form legislative coalitions that build on and ex186. Oreskes, See Blacks in New York: The Anguish of Political Failure, N.Y. Times, Mar.
31, 1987, at Bl, col. 3 (failure of black elected officials to penetrate governing coalitions may
reduce morale and participation within the black community in general).
187. See infra notes 210-32 and accompanying text. In a collective decisionmaking body,
decisionmaking generally proceeds from public discussion and debate of policy issues to enactment of proposals using agreed upon mechanisms or decisional rules for ascertaining collective
preference. Because of prejudice and inequality, black representatives may not participate meaningfully in either the deliberative or voting stages of collective decisionmaking.
. 188. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (three-judge court).
189. Trial transcript at IV-20, IV-30, 730 F. Supp. 196 (no. 89-004). Senator Jewell sought
public office to "try and come in and see if I could do something inside and do so with complete
integrity"; because black concerns meet a "very negative response." Representative McGee, unable to initiate legislation on the "real issues" of black concern such as "teenage pregnancy,
housing, and education reforms,'' "decided that [his] role should be just to try and stop bad
legislation.").
190. Trial transcript at IX-51, 730 F. Supp. 196 (No. 89-004) (trial testimony of Nancy
Balton, Rep. from Mississippi County).
191. Trial transcript at 178-79, 730 F. Supp. 196 (No. 89-004) (trial testimony of Senator
Paul Benham, Jr. who referred to Jesse Jackson as a "coon" in conversations with other state
legislators); see also Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court) (white
state legislator voted against creating a majority-black Louisiana congressional district because
"we already have one nigger bigshot" in reference to the black mayor of New Orleans); cf. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 500 (D.D.C. 1982) (identifying a prominent member of the
Georgia legislature as a "racist").
192. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (Rep. Nancy Balton of Mississippi County voted against bill exempting very poor people from paying taxes to appease white
middle-class constituents who felt that "poor people on welfare were living better than they
were." In Mississippi County, per capita income is $5685 for whites and $2426 for blacks; 45%
of black families, compared to 13.4% of white families, live in poverty.). But cf. infra note 239
(black constituency size has positive impact on legislative support for black issues).
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pand their numerical power base. In the Arkansas legislature, the district court found: "Some white members, on being approached by
black citizens in their own districts for help, referred these constituents to black legislators representing other areas. And black members
have found it difficult to get white members to cosponsor soine bills of
interest to black voters...." 193 As the most visible members of a
stigmatized "out-group,'' black officials may even be harassed by local
officials attempting to suppress black political activity. 194 At least
within the black community, the perception is credible that black
elected officials are selectively prosecuted. 195
On the other hand, where black officials are successful in increasing their appeal to white voters, their ability and enthusiasm for advocating on behalf of their black constituents may be undermined.196
These officials may, for example, attribute their success to individual
personality and campaigning rather than issues. 197 These representa193. 730 F. Supp. at 214.
194. See 130 F. Supp. at 210-11 (felony charges instigated by the county sheriff against a
black lawyer and political candidate, the court concluded, were "designed to discourage (the
black candidate] in particular and black political activity in general"); 730 F. Supp. at 212 (black
attorney running for county judge threatened by "individuals wearing hoods," and subjected to
official harassment by the county, which, after he lost, reduced its business with his funeral
home, and paid premium rates to a "white" funeral home to bury black paupers). Even when
blacks are elected by a landslide, they are often the victims of hostile gerrymandering to eliminate
their districts. Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Busbee v. Smith, 549 F.
Supp. 494 (D.C. 1982).
195. Mathews, Hooks Says Prosecutors "Overzealous," Phila. Inquirer, July 10, 1990, at lOA,
. col. 1 (NAACP convention delegates unanimously condemned unfair treatment of black elected
officials by white prosecutors, citing as examples Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, Rep. William H. Gray (D. Pa.), Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson and former Atlanta Mayor Andrew
Young; Executive Director Benjamin Hooks criticized as overzealous even the notorious prosecution of D.C. Mayor Marion Barry for perjury and drug possession); see also Farber, U.S.
Dismisses Charges Faced By Rep. Flake, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 3 (many blacks
viewed case as latest example of selective prosecution against black elected officials); Kaplan &
Miller, Persecution or Prosecution?, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1990, at 21 (enough high-profile cases
make the perception of racial prosecution credible).
196. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 112; Reed, Neo-Progressivism, supra note
160, at 199; see also Applebome, As a Mayor Returns, Atlanta Is Rich and Poor, N.Y. Times, Jan.
7, 1990, at D4, col. 3 (black civic and political leaders claim Atlanta's black mayor Andrew
Young "squandered" opportunity to help the poor, who are overwhelmingly black; Young
"helped the rich get richer, but the poor just got poorer"; Young's record and agenda were not
much different from that of Atlanta's white business-oriented mayors); cf. infra notes 260-283
and accompanying text.
197. See c. GREEN & B. WILSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EMPOWERMENT IN NEW
YORK CITY: BEYOND THE PoLmCS OF PIGMENTATION 85-113 (1989); cf. R. FENNO, supra
note 140, at 241 (House members believe that voters are "equally or more interested in using
issue presentations as an opportunity to judge representative as a person"; treatment of persons,
not issues, is centerpiece of representational relationship); M. JEWELL, supra note 161, at 14; W.
RIKER, supra note 171, at 207-08; Freedman, One Struggle Over, Attention Turns to Guilt, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at HS, col. 1 (black elected officials consumed by "cult of personality");
Marable, supra note 24, at 18, 20-21 ("post-black politicians," recruited from the professional
classes, favor programs with little kinship to traditional civil rights agenda).
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tives may also be coopted. by the dominant majority and thus may
effect little substantive change in policy. 19s
Once assimilated. into the political mainstream, black officials may
define their political agenda without reference to or consultation with
a community base. 199 Their reference point may instead become other
members of the governing elite with whom they share personal experiences and comparable "rank." With access to prestige rather than
power, some bla.ck politicians may simply censor themselves in order
"to play ball,"200 or characterize political patronage as constituent
servicing.201
Recognizing that authentic black officials may not be effectively
198. R. BROWNING, D. MARsHALL & D. TABB, PROTEST Is NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HlsPANlCS FOR EQUALITY 1N URBAN PoLmcs 56-61 (1984) ("access to
mayor's office did not lead to full minority incorporation into city bureaucracy"); A. KARNIG &
s. WELCH, supra note 60, at 14; c. STONE, REGIME PoLmCS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 19461988, at 242 (1989) (Atlanta white business interests secured place in governing coalition to
safeguard special privilege; business elite exercised preemptive power over black middle-class
politicians); Fainstein & Fainstein, supra note 117, at 189 (while black elected officials produce
more government jobs and contracts for middle-class blacks, they fail to redirect government
programs to benefit poor blacks); see generally Nelson & Van Home, Black Elected Administrators; The Trials of Office, 34 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 526 (1974).
199. See Nelson & Van Home, supra note 198, at 529. Even where elected from majorityblack districts, black officials may be rewarded for individual achievement in unrelated fields.
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (testimony at trial that only black elected to county office was former
football star in Wake County, North Carolina). They may be effective public speakers but not
spokespersons. See telephone interview with Norman Lockman, black journalist in Wilmington,
Delaware (May 22, 1990) (black city council members in Wilmington are social workers, not
power brokers); interview with Jerome Mondesire, Chief of Staff for the Philadelphia office of
Rep. William Gray (May 6, 1990) (blacks often elect blacks to celebrate a cause not to advocate a
legislative platform). They may become preoccupied with individual rather than group opportunity. Id.; see also THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at 204 (Detroit mayor Coleman
Young's political alliances and policy preferences shaped by patronage and economic gain, not
community service). To the extent assimilation is a legal strategy for diffusing the redemptive
force of citizen's movements, coopting local leadership, and ultimately maintaining existing
power arrangements, it is inconsistent with the original aspirations of voting rights activists. See
generally F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED,
How THEY FAIL 181 (1979).
200. W. Singham, The Political Socialization of Marginal Groups (1966) (paper presented at
American Political Science Association annual meeting), cited in S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 15 n.4 (position within party hierarchy does not necessarily mean inclusion within decisionmaking process; blacks often "go along with all that talk" to make sure of
continued access); see also S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 12-14 (criticizing
black elected officials who "play ball" to promote benefits of status and material gains for individual black constituents); R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 208-09
(1977) (where minority group members are numerically dominated in a "skewed" grouping less than 15% of an institution in which an overwhelming preponderance of another type is
represented - they often have difficulty gaining peer acceptance and difficulty behaving "naturally");
SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 204-06 (1964) (describing cooptation of
black Chicago congressman).
201. See supra note 199. But see Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2752
(1990) (dissenting opinion) (recognizing importance of patronage as powerful means of achieving
social and political integration for excluded groups).
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representing the black community does not require that we label all
black politicians "as victims of 'false consciousness.' ,,202 Authentic
representatives are less able to participate effectively in intergroup deliberations primarily because of the dual effects of prejudice and minority status on group dynamics.203
To consider effectively all viewpoints, deliberation requires sustained communication and participation among equals. 204 Effective
deliberation also demands that group members be receptive to relevant
information and willing to compromise. 205 Members of a deliberating
body should share information, exchange views, and debate the issues.
In addition, the deliberation ideal contemplates consensus and cooperation derived from honest, good-faith interaction, and not heavyhanded normative pressure.206
Testimony from recent cases207 and research into group
processes,208 however, demonstrate the corrosive power of prejudice
202. Ackerman, supra note 175, at 735-37. Ackerman defines false consciousness as minority
group members' belief in unfavorable group stereotypes. I use the term to refer to tokenism in
which individual advancement defines empowerment. False consciousness rationalizes the privileged position of some minority group members. Ackerman's critique of a "social-psychological" approach to analyzing minority legislative power may simply reflect a differing view of false
consciousness or the still primitive development of legal analysis of group processes.
203. See supra note 169 and infra notes 210-29 and accompanying text. This observation
affects collective decisionmaking bodies operating under either a pluralist interest group analysis
or dialogic confrontation and contestation. See supra notes 179-80.
204. Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17, 22-23 (A.
Hamlin & P. Pettit eds. 1989); see Sturm, Toward a Jurisprudence of Public Law Remedies, 19
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1991). In shifting coalitions with no repeated and continual losers, all
potential participants must be "acceptable role partners."
KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE
AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 172 (1988) (first component of
dynamic deliberation is one of independence and equality; indeed, in context of jury deliberations, courts often exclude from service people who might exert disproportionate influence); W.
RIKER, supra note 171, at 162.
205. See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering ''Nondiscemible" Differences: Empirical Research and
the Jury-Size Cases, 13 MICH. L. REV. 643, 679-80 (1975); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 23234 & n.21 (1978) (likelihood of compromise important phenomenon for fulfillment of jury common sense function); S. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 173 (openness to informational influence is second component of deliberation ideal).
206. See S. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 173; see also Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896); Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy, supra note 178, at
448. I do not mean to imply, however, that all forms of pressure are coercive and necessarily
opposed to honest interaction. Indeed, impassioned, personal, or dramatic appeals are consistent
with fair political deliberation. See, e.g., I. Young, Justice, Democracy and Group Difference 10
(Sept. 1, 1990) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at American Political Science
Association) (deliberative process does not require emotional detachment nor rigorous adherence
to specific rules of argumentation; formal rules of argument may silence just as much as physical,
economic, or political domination).
207. See, e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Major v. Treen, 574 F.
Supp. 325, 334 (E.D. La. 1983) (three-judge court) (black legislators excluded from critical redistricting meeting).
208. See Latane, Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 343 (1981); Latane &
Wolf, The Social Impact of Majorities and Minorities, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 438 (1981).
Some of the most important research is in studies of juries. The process of jury deliberation

s.
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on deliberations by collective decisionmaking bodies. Even where minorities are proportionately represented, they may find themselves
without allies. 209
To exert any influence, minority advocates must be consistent and
confident. 210 Yet, to advocate consistently and sincerely on behalf of
constituents with unpopular viewpoints a representative needs at least
one ally. 211 Moreover, absent substantial minority companionship at
the beginning of the deliberative process,212 minority representatives
may feel pressured to modify their position in response to the "considerable stress" inflicted by prejudiced majority group members. 213
Black officials may not be treated with respect in a polarized deliberative process, especially if important debates take place in private,
informal,214 small group settings.21s Formal rules and sanctions may
limit public displays of prejudice and racism. 216 In informal settings,
reveals much about the group dynamics of managing minority and majority viewpoints, developing consensus, and respecting the contribution of individual members. See, e.g., H. KALVEN &
H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462 (1966) (substantial minority viewpoint presence of 4 or 5
jurors out of 12 at beginning of deliberations usually necessary to influence jury outcome); S.
KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 169-88).
209. See supra notes 181-83.
210. Nemeth, Differential Contributions ofMajority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 23, 26 (1986).
211. Psychologists experimenting on the effect of group pressure in a deliberating body conclude that the presence of allies is critical to minority members' integrity and influence. See R.
KANTER, supra note 200; Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion
ofJudgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 (G. Swanson, T. Newcombe & E. Hartley
eds. 1952); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101-02 & n.49 (1970) (citing Asch's conformity experiments, Court reasons that in the context of jury deliberations, jurors in the minority are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of the majority aligned against them). But
cf. S. KAssIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 204, at 197 (it is the absolute, not proportional size
that enables minorities to withstand normative pressure; the presence of a single ally is powerful
determinant of ability to maintain independence).
212. See Asch, supra note 211; see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 208, at 463 (for
one or two jurors to hold out to the end, a substantial minority needs to exist at the beginning of
deliberations).
213. Maass & Clark, Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen Year.s- of Minority Influence Research, 95 PSYCH. BULL. 428 (1984); Nemeth, supra note 210, at 25 (high degree of stress may
affect performance among minority group members); Nemeth & Wachtler, Creative Problem
Solving as a Result of Majority vs. Minority Influence, 13 EUROPEAN J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 45
(1983) (majority assumes differing minority is incorrect and manifests outright "derision" towards minority); see also supra note 211.
214. See Delgado, supra note 132, at 314-18 (describing the confrontation theory and the
formality/informality axis generated by the theory). "It is a sad truth that, even today, many
minorities find success and relative relief from racism only in highly structured, rule-bound environments such as the Army." Id. at 321; see also Lawrence, supra note 169, at 341 n.100.
215. See supra notes 181, 211-12 and infra note 218.
216. This is the view presented in recent legal and political science literature. Delgado,
Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1385-87; Lind, Thibaut & Walker, A

Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Effect ofAdver.s-ary and Inquisitorial Processes on Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L. REv. 271 (1976); Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adver.s-ary Presentation
and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972). Yet, "it is also true that
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where conduct is less regulated, blatant "microaggressions" 217 against
minority victims are more likely. The dynamics of informal groups
within the legislature may therefore constrain black/white interaction
and deliberation. The number of persons within the deliberative body
may also influence the willingness of majority group members to consider minority viewpoints and to counterbalance bias. In smaller
groups, minority group members may fail to make critical contributions and are less likely to participate effectively in the deliberation. 218
In addition, the rules governing the deliberative process may circumscribe a minority group member's infiuence. 219 Differing decisional rules do not promote fair deliberation to the same extent.
Where decisions are made by a simple majority vote, deliberation may
be incomplete and less inclusive of minority viewpoints. 22° For example, the "social climate" of deliberation in juries using majority decision rules is more adversarial because members of the majority can
reach a decision without responding to opposing arguments. 221
demands for order, quiet, and 'civility' can also protect racism against effective, passionate challenge." Letter from Frank Michelman to author (Dec. 19, 1990) at 4 (on file with author).
217. Delgado, supra note 132, at 305 n.30 (citing C. Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty-Three
Years of Stress, Solomon Carter Fuller Lectures, American Psychiatric Assn. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 12, 1986)) (describing microaggressions as those "subtle, minor, stunning automatic assaults ... by which whites stress blacks unremittingly and keep them on the defensive, as
well as in a psychologically reduced condition").
218. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10, 233 (1978) (citing social science
literature). Progressively smaller groups are less likely to engage in effective deliberation. R.
HAsTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 228 (1983) (members of small dissenting factions "participate at lower rates in majority rule juries and are less satisfied with the
jury verdict"). But cf. W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 51, 55 (in small groups, "considerations of
maintaining the solidarity of the group and the loyalty of members to it probably often dominate
considerations of maximum victory"; local governing bodies "are often operated as small groups
in which considerations of loyalty and local solidarity outweigh rational calculations of advan·
tage"; for example, in the South the zero-sum gain is between whites inside the system and blacks
outside of it).
219. Some commentators have noted that public voting may pressure group members to join
the majority and generally to behave less cooperatively. See S. KAsslN & L. WRIGHTSMAN,
supra note 204, at 203-04 (public ballot prompts "verdict-driven style" of deliberation; formal
commitment to a position creates advocates, not factfinders); J. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 72-75
(1987) (voting enables an internally conflicted group to act and recognizes that legitimate differences exist within it; yet where conflict persists, use of other adversary decision procedures be·
sides majority rule voting may be less divisive; majority rule balloting may produce a permanent
minority; more inclusive would be a rule of proportionate outcomes, distributing goods on the
basis of the numerical strength of competing factions or other appropriations formula, or deci·
sional lotteries).
220. See, e.g., R. HASTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 218, at 228-30 (dissenting or minority viewpoints are disadvantaged by nonunanimity rules); S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTS·
MAN, supra note 204, at 201-02; M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977); Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt &
Mech, The Decision Processes of 6- & 12-Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and TwoThirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1 (1975); Nemeth, Interactions Be·
tween Jurors as a Function of Majority Vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSY·
CHOLOGY 38 (1977).
221. R. HASTIE, s. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 218, at 112; see also Nemeth,
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The presence of members of the riiinority group often exaggerates
in-group solidarity among majority group members. 222 Whether "tokens" or proportionately represented, black elected officials may fail to
generate cross-racial alliances. In groups where one race greatly outnumbers the other, group members may treat those in the minority as
stigmatized racial tokens. In such "skewed" groups, cross-racial association, laden with cultural and racial overtones, is more difficult to
sustain on an issue-by-issue basis. 223 As a result, the numerical minority may be socially segregated and stereotyped even in small, informal
deliberative bodies. For example, one black elected official proportionately represented on a small city council operating by majority vote
may be isolated and ignored. 224
Thus, in order for minority groups to participate in winning coalitions, majority group members must be receptive to political bargaining22s and deliberation. 226 Prejudice against minority group members
inhibits admission to the governing majority, ensuring a strategically
weak position as a permanent loser.227 In a racially charged ~nviron
ment, the presence of black representatives may simply increase the
supra note 220 (majority rule appears to suppress robust conflict, reduces the number of informational and opinion comments, shortens functional deliberation time, and undermines confidence
in the outcome).
222. See infra notes 223-24, 229.
223. Some legislators resist alliance with minority group members because they fear their
constituents will permanently identify them with "black" issues. See, e.g., Pelman, ''Black
Party" Image Splits Democrats, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (white party activists
complain that Philadelphia's Democratic Party is now seen by white voters as the "black party"
since the city's black mayor is a black Democrat); see also R. KANTER, supra note 200, at 209 (in
racially imbalanced groups, racially dominant group controls both the group's culture as well as
the group; proportional representation of the minority, or at least 35% minority representation,
is necessary to empower a minority within a working group); F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 13536 (blacks have difficulty foi;ming coalitions with white legislators on measures identified as black
issues; bills identified with black caucus sponsors failed; only when white legislators take lead can
blacks provide votes necessary to win).
224. See A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 14 (Blacks usually hold office as "one of
a small minority unable to take decisive action - certainly not unilateral action."); see also supra
notes 218-21.
225. The model described here is essentially a pluralist one, because it remains the dominant
political science explanation of contemporary political participation. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra
note 127, at 14344 (pluralist model of "mainstream American political science" relies on selfinterested groups formulating and aggressively pursuing private interests within a framework of
competitive legislative bargaining); D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note 5, at 253-55 (pluralist theocy
presumes equivalence between all political and economic demands, and incremental decisionmaking based on bargainable issues).
226. See supra notes 179-80, 187 and accompanying text (describing deliberative ideal of
normative persuasion model).
227. See W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 179-80 (where blacks excluded by systematic agreement among whites, no whites defect; no white factions so dissatisfied as to attempt to bring
blacks into controlling coalition; black participants unable to attract dissatisfied whites because
of intense fear shared by all white participants that breakup .of white hegemony would yield
devastating results).
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value of white membership in the winning coalition. 228 Indeed, the
majority may appear to improve its own position by refusing to meet
the demands of a minority.229
Achieving some degree of reciprocity is essential to sustaining collaborative efforts. 230 Yet, without institutional incentives for cooperation, coalition-building serves only the temporary interests of white
allies, who may limit their participation to issues that ultimately promote stability and majority rule. These allies may also choose to leave
the coalition. 231 Thus, some scholars, most notably Professor Derrick
Bell, have concluded that black rights are recognized only when and
to the extent that they coincide with the interests of those in power. 232
Finally, the mere presence of black officials in the legislature furthers neither the goals of the integrationists nor the nationalists. The
integrationists were always concerned with coalition building. 233 They
correctly perceived that electoral coalitions affect the ability of representatives to govem. 234 Thus, for some integrationists, coalition build228. See W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 95-96 (size principle reflects tendency of winning
coalitions to minimize size in order to divide gains among fewer persons; role of minority opposition is to create value in coalition of the whole). Empirical studies suggest that black candidates
frequently seek to create electoral coalitions with white liberals, but often fail. See, e.g., R.
BROWNING, D. MARSHALL & D. TABB, supra note 198; see also Johnson, supra note 153, at 34,
col. 2 (For blacks, the inevitable outcome of a rainbow coalition that does not emphasize black
representation is that " 'black folks get all the rain and white folks get all the bows.' ") (quoting
Thomas N. Todd); Holloway, Negro Political Strategy: Coalition or Independent Power Politics?,
49 Soc. SCI. Q. 534 (1968); cf. s. CARMICHAEL & c. HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 7 (white
groups solidify when confronted with black demands).
229. See W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 139.
230. See, e.g., C. STONE, supra note 198, at 8 (in the absence of coercion, achieving cooperation requires constant effort, most often through mechanisms to ensure reciprocity). Especially
where they are also dependent on support from the white majority, coalitions between minority
groups may also be tenuous and susceptible "to disintegration in the crucible of day-to-day governing." Hero, Multiracial Coalitions, supra note 168, at 349; see also Guinier, supra note 129, at
416 ("reciprocity in bargaining requires the active promotion of black interests, not just occasional subvention" of civil rights issues; "black legislative issues can be ghettoized from the Left
as well as the Right").
231. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 348 (volunteers from the ranks of the privileged can leave
a cause with the same privilege of choice with which they joined); supra notes 223, 228; see also
W. MARTIN, THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 25 (1984) ("whites became abolitionists out
of choice; blacks were abolitionists out of necessity").
232. See, e.g.• D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW (1980); Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
233. See, e.g., M.L. KING, JR., supra note 22, at 150; Rustin, "Black" Power and Coalition
Politics, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1966, at 35; Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the
Civil Rights Movement. COMMENTARY, Feb. 1965, at 25. Dr. King consistently acknowledged
the importance of coalition building. M.L. KING, JR., STRIDE TowARD FREEDOM 34 (1958); T.
BRANCH, supra note 13, at 875; 884 (quoting Walter Reuther).
234. C. STONE, supra note 198, at xi-xii (electoral coalition not equivalent of governing coalition; political regime dependent on getting strategically positioned people to act together); Hero,
Multiracial Coalitions, supra note 168, at 343; see also B. FERMAN, GOVERNING THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY (1985); J. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESrED CITY (1983); T. SWANSTROM,
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ing was at the heart of govemability. The nationalists also expected
more than token representation. For the nationalists black political
power meant significant participation in political decisionmaking. 235
Thus, without "more meaningful structures, forms and ways of dealing with long-standing problems," the nationalists felt that political
participation did not empower black.representatives who enjoyed only
a token or proportionate numerical presence. 23 6
The polarization assumption ignores these insights. The assumption's hypothesis about the nature of prejudice simply requires blacks
to avoid direct electoral competition with whites. Given residential
·segregation, the assumption supports district election structures to
reconfigure a heterogeneous, polarized electorate into a homogeneous
one. 237 The assumption correctly perceives that district elections favor
black electoral success "because black candidates seeking district seats
can steer clear of direct competition with white candidates."238 District elections also provide greater opportunities to elect people of
THE CRISIS OF GROWTH PoLmcs (1985) (arguing importance of coalition building and political
struggle).
235. See supra notes 4748 and accompanying text.
236. Some nationalists anticipated the arguments advanced here. See S. CARMICHAEL & C.
HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 173-77 (mere election of a few blacks will not solve problem of
political representation; black visibility within present institutions of political representation is
not black power).
237. F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 136, 147 (black representation limited by number of
majority-black legislative districts); Note, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the
Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1251, 1265 nn.79·80 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Racial Geography] (black physical/geographic solidarity necessary for political power). But cf.
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1988) (for geographically dispersed minority living in pockets of residential segregation, minority districts may not capture all, or even
most, minority voters; those outside the district are merely "virtually" represented). Compare
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 383 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom. Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (no judicially manageable way to measure black influence in majority-white districts). In a residentially segregated community, district elections use a territorially
defined constituency as a proxy for interest representation. The use of single-member districts is
also premised on the "ubiquity of territorially based representation in American government";
see F. Michelman, Justice Marshall's Bolden Dissent 9 (Nov. 28, 1990 draft) (unpublished
manuscript).
238. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 29. Most research reveals significant links
between district elections and greater black electoral success. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 76,
at 5-6; see also Campbell & Feagin, Black Politics in the South: A Descriptive Analysis, 37 J. POL.
129, 143 n.28 (1975); Engstrom & McDonald, The Election ofBlacks to City Councils: Clarifying
the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 344 (1981); Gelb, Blacks, Blocs and Ballots, 3 POLITY 45 (1970); Jones, The Impact of
Lacal Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 URB. AFF. Q. 345 (1976); Kamig,
Black Representation on City Councils, 12 URB. AFF. Q. 223, 223 (Dec. 1976); Kamig, Black
Resources and City Council Representation, 41 J. PoL. 134 (1979); Kramer, The Election of
Blacks to City Councils: A 1970 Status Report and a Prolegomenon, 1 J. BLACK Sruo. 443, 449
(1971); Robinson & Dye, Reformism and Black Representation on City Councils, 59 Soc. SCI. Q.
133, 133-34 (1978); Taebel, Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure
on Blacks and Hispanics, 59 Soc. SCI. Q. 142, 151 (1978).
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lower income, education, and status. 239
Thus, the assumption's predominant enforcement mechanism is
black representational control of majority-black districts. This enforcement mechanism enables blacks, through their representatives, to
put their case to the legislative majority. Given the prejudices and
desires of that majority, however, the mechanism hardly guarantees
blacks any real legislative influence.
Although efforts to increase black representation have an independent value,240 prejudice may simply transfer the "gerrymandering"241 problem from the electorate to the legislature. Black electoral
visibility is useless if district-based electoral arrangements gerrymander legislative decisionmaking and reproduce in the legislature a mirror image of a racially skewed electorate. With few exceptions, the
litigation and activist strategy has thus far failed to anticipate the inevitable third-generation problem: the deliberative gerrymander. 242
Blacks elected from black single-member districts are less empowered to influence their white colleagues, whose homogeneous white
single-member district base enables them to ignore black interests
without adverse electoral consequences. For this reason Themstrom
and other conservative critics of the assumption's enforcement mechanism assert that the preoccupation with creating majority-black districts "ghettoizes" black issues. 243 These critics argue that "minority
239. See, e.g., F. PARKER, supra note 136 (single-member districts dramatically increased
number of black elected officials in Mississippi); s. WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, URBAN REFORM
AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES 35-36, 42-46, 50 (1984) (district electoral system helps new urban
forces of ethnic-minorities, neighborhood-based groups, and those groups most spatially segregated, such as blacks, to balance political power of conservative urban organizations; at-large
systems disproportionately favor those with greater financial resources); cf. Ackerman, supra
note 175, at 726-28 (discrete, insular minorities enjoy district-based organizing advantages).
240. See supra notes 124-33, 145 and accompanying text; cf. Holland v. Illinois, 110 $.Ct.
803, 816 (1990) (black jurors' citizenship right to serve on juries affirms their status as equal
participants in criminal justice administration); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986)
(same).
241. As generally used, the term gerrymandering refers to political manipulation that unfairly excludes or disadvantages a distinctive group within the process of drawing district boundaries. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 338 (1960) (classic gerrymander altered municipal
boundaries, created uncouth 28-sided figure and removed all but 4 blacks from city limits); McDonald & Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THB
COURTS 178 (B. Groftnan ed. 1990); see also infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
242. Deliberative or "legislative gerrymander'' is a term suggested to me by my colleague
Seth Kreimer. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text (describing deliberate exclusion
and diminution of black legislators from critical policymaking meetings or from sharing critical
appropriations authority).
243. A. THERNSTROM, supra note 67, at 7; Schuck, What Went Wrong With the Voting
Rights Act, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1987, at 51, 55; Thernstrom, "Voting Rights" Trap, NBW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1985, at 21, 23. This same argument was made by congressional opponents
to the 1982 amendments. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (additional views of Sen.
Orrin Hatch) (arguing that majority-black single-member district would be nothing more than
"political ghettos for minorities" in which "minority influence [would] suffer enormously").
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representation might actually be increased not by raising the number
of black officeholders [elected from black-districts], but by increasing
the number of officeholders, black or white, who have to appeal to
blacks to win." 244
Both conservatives and liberals underestimate the enduring significance of racial polarization to minority empowerment. Themstrom's
call for virtual representation of minority interests by white politicians
elected at large reinforces existing unfairness. By ignoring the phenomena of racial bloc voting and white prejudice, Themstrom rationalizes current distortions in legislative deliberation and bargaining. 245
Similarly, liberal justifications of majority-black districts overlook the
negative impact that a prejudiced majority legislative faction may have
on the effectiveness of black voters. Black representatives may transcend electoral polarization only to reexperience legislative exclusion
because of third generation legislative or deliberative gerrymandering.
Recent voting rights scholarship also fails to consider fully the legislative implications of the polarization hypothesis. For example, Professor Abrams' model of interactive participation suggests that black
interests are best represented by aggregating minorities and sympathetic whites within multiracial districts. 246 Abrams' extended, interactive participation model fails to recognize, however, that intergroup
cooperation in a polarized environment requires structural support at
each stage of the political process if black political influence is not to
be contained at every opportunity.241
Professor Karlan's cogent process-based civic inclusion theory is
244. Thernstrom, supra note 243 at 21.
245. See supra notes 185·92 and accompanying text.
246. For example, Abrams promotes minority sponsored white candidates, elected from
within a geographically splintered districting plan, to represent blacks. But these representatives
may experience, despite the multiracial nature of their constituency, the same hostility from their
colleagues as do black representatives. As a result, such coalition candidates may fail to advocate
aggressively on behalf of their least popular, namely black, constituents. Instead, they may compromise the needs of the more stigmatized members of their electoral base in order to obtain any
success on behalf of the coalition. See J. CoNYERS & W. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 144-45
(some black officials elected by multiracial coalitions feel obligation to satisfy white constituents);
cf. Guinier, supra note 129, at 394, 427-29 (describing dilemma of black voters who are either
taken for granted or ignored).
For Abrams, the "generation of cooperative political behavior" is independent of black representation, and a development that voting rights enforcement should pursue without prerequisites.
This unwillingness to recognize the polarization hypothesis undermines her other\Vise important
contribution.
247. For blacks, in whose embryonic political life each gain has been both hard fought and
ultimately evaded, special protection from normal political behavior is considered necessary
before they can answer the question Abrams asks - "How do those who exert themselves effectively within the system behave?" Abrams, supra note 6, at 490 n.218. Without structural support to protect blacks from majority prejudice and to insure effective representation of black
interests, Abrams' interactive model of political influence is indeterminate and inaccessible.
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also flawed. Essentially the theory would broaden the scope of judicial
inquiry from current concerns about geographic districting to more
substantive issues such as direct minority participation and decisional
responsiveness to minority interests. Enforcement of dilution claims,
if based on civic inclusion values, would transcend current judicial
preoccupation with majority-black single-member districts and other
easy-to-apply mathematical rules.24s
Karlan's response to the polarization assumption, however, ends
with legal protection to ensure minority presence. 249 In this sense,
Karlan's vision is as optimistic as Abrams. Both scholars fail to consider the enduring effect of racism and prejudice on members of both
the majority and minority group throughout the political process. 250
D.

The Responsiveness Assumption

The responsiveness assumption suggests that black representatives
share the original civil rights vision, which targeted the least well off
members of the community. In this assumption, black voters gain
substantive policy influence by electing racial compatriots with special
attachment to and understanding of the black community and its distinctive interests.251 The assumption also portrays black elected repre248. Informed by the value of civic inclusion, Karlan's vision of voting rights litigation is
interactive like Abrams' but more committed to authentic minority representation. Karlan,
supra note 6, at 218 (promoting diversity of representation to ensure fuller deliberation based on
a richer perspective and to legitimate the governing body as a democratic instrument).
249. Karlan attempts to answer the wrong question: whether blacks are better off with several mildly sympathetic whites or one aggressive "black" representative. In casting her vote with
the "authentic" black representative, Karlan maneuvers around the implications of the deliberative gerrymander. For Karlan, a process in which black voters elect black representatives who
fail, because of majority prejudice or minority cooptation, to advocate forcefully on behalf of
their constituents can still be a fair process as long as black representatives are allowed to participate within legislative deliberation and dialogue.
250. Abrams denies its influence on voter choice. Karlan understands profoundly the pervasiveness of polarization within the electorate, and she also takes important preliminary steps to
address structural barriers that deny black representatives civic legislative inclusion. Karlan,
supra note 6, at 237-48 (discussing supermajority decisional rules and the rotation of powers as
potential remedies to legislative exclusion). But Karlan still tends to measure success by the
number of blacks elected. Although Karlan acknowledges the Voting Rights Act's goal to reconstruct society, a civically inclusive society would be more open, more accessible, but not necessarily more equal. Legislative inclusion, although critical, does not produce equal outcomes
dependably, especially when relying primarily on the ameliorative role of familiar, intimate association in small, collegial decisionmaking bodies. Id. at 240: "(W]hile the claim for equal political access is always legitimate, the claim for a particular substantive outcome to the governing
process is not."
251. See supra note 177; Hamilton, Public Policy and Some Political Consequences, in PUBLIC
POLICY FOR THE BLACK CoMMUNITY, supra note 15, at 237; see also Extension of the Voting

Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights ofthe
House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 365-80 (1982) (testimony of Henry Marsh, Mayor,
Richmond, Va. and Michael Brown, Coordinator, Va. St. Conf. of NAACP); id. at 590-742
(testimony of Laughlin McDonald, Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU); J. ELY, supra
note 52, at 86-87; D. GLASGOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS: POVERTY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND
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sentatives as the first line of defense against racist legislation.252
Advocates of the responsiveness assumption believe that black
elected officials will discharge their official duties differently than
white officials.253 Black elected officials will intuitively understand the
positions favored by their black constituents.254 Their black constituents also will enjoy a special relationship with black representatives. 255
Thus, increasing the number of black representatives effectively influences legislative policy debates and leads to more favorable substantive
political outcomes.
Empirical evidence of racial bloc voting supports the assumption
that blacks, to a great extent, are ideologically homogeneous on many
issues. 256 Black voting patterns reflect two decades of consensus on
ENTRAPMENT OF GHETTO YOUTH 22 (1980). Thus, membership in the "victimized" group suggests a special sensitivity and loyalty to a victim perspective. T. BRANCH, supra note 13, at 895;
S. WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, supra note 239, at 23 (issue of concern to most black city council
members appears to be civil rights); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 326, 333-35 (black Americans are
the paradigm victim group of our history with distinct normative insights); Morris, supra note
152, at 277.
252. See supra note 52.
253. See, e.g., F. PARKER, supra note 136, at 134-35; see also Applebome, King Holiday
Observances Point Out Both Pain and Triumphs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at B4, col. 1 (first
black mayor of New York City greeted marchers observing the Martin Luther King, Jr., National Holiday, while marchers critical of white predecessor had been stopped by barricades
holding them at the edge of City Hall Park; quoting march leader, "Today we marched as the
included. The last time we marched in protest. Today we march to participate."). The core idea
of the black advocacy perspective is that doing something about the problem of racial discrimination means attention to issues from the perspective of those experiencing discriminatory conditions. Freeman, supra note 7, at 98; see also Ackerman, supra note 178, at 733 n.35, 735, 744-45.
254. L. CoLE, supra note 152, at 114, 233. Black representatives themselves acknowledged
special insights. "If you are a minority person you know what's needed. And what you do is go
about the business of trying to fill that need." Id. at 89.
255. M. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 94 (1982) (black constituents
do have special relation to black representatives, who represent a broader constituency than electoral district); see also Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified subnom.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (trial testimony of Frank Ballance; black in North
Carolina considered his own representative in the 1950s to be Harlem's black congressman
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.). J. ABERBACH & J. WALKER, RACE IN THE CITY (1973); Sears,
Black Attitudes Toward the Political System in the Aftermath of the Watts Insurrection, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 515 (1969) (blacks believe that black elected officials more trustworthy than
white elected officials); see also Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), modified
756 F. Supp. 1195, ajfd. 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991) (three-judge court) (some white state legislators
refer black constituents from their electoral districts to black legislators representing other areas); L. COLE, supra note 152, at 109, 111; Lee, The Black Elected Official and Southern Politics,
in THE BLACK PoLmCIAN supra note 64, at 85-86 (black elected official effective because of
identification with frustrations of blacks who "know what it feels like to want someone in government who can be trusted"). But cf. Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Focus
MAGAZINE, TRENDLETTER, 2 (Apr. 1988) (reporting results of 1987 Gallup survey) (blacks
write letters and lobby to a much lesser extent than whites). 256. See e.g. C. Hamilton, Measuring Black Conservatism, in THE STATE OF BLACK
AMERICA 47-51 (ed. J.D. Williams 1982); Seltzer & Smith, Race and Ideology: A Research Note
Measuring Liberalism and Conservatism in Black America, 46 PHYLON 98 (1985); Welch &
Combs, Interracial Differences in Opinion on Public Issues in the 1970's, 7 WEST. J. BLACK
STUD. 136 (1983). Black voting patterns reflect near unanimity in contests in which a viable
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the need for greater civil rights enforcement, social welfare expenditures, and government intervention in domestic affairs. 257 Thus, advocates of the responsiveness assumption claim that if more blacks are
elected, black voters will be able to reshape the way laws are made and
tax dollars are spent to reflect their interests. 258
Four difficulties exist with the responsiveness assumption. First,
the assumption relies too heavily on the singular advancement of authentic individual black officials to transform the status of the group as
a whole. Depending on black politicians to shoulder so much of the
burden of redistributing resources and power is naive. 259 Even when
genuinely concerned, the status of black representatives as "assimilated" members of the political establishment may threaten their commitment to community-based models of reform. 260 Thus, although
feasible, the civil rights movement's goals of government intervention
on behalf of the poor may not be generally acceptable to many
politicians.261
Second, the responsiveness assumption fails because of the message
already conveyed to black elected officials by the authenticity assumption. The authenticity assumption converts black elected officials into
group spokesmodels without continuously articulating either the basis
for a cohesive, community agenda or the responsibility to develop any
black candidate competes and in presidential contests in which blacks overwhelmingly support
the Democratic candidate. See T. CAVANAGH, INSIDE BLACK AMERICA (1985).
257. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text; cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
51, 57 n.25 (1986) (black representatives are those black-community-sponsored candidates whose
election reflects the community's "distinctive minority group interests"); S. WELCH & T. BLl!D·
SOE, supra note 239, at 23 (civil rights is issue of concern to most black city council members).
Some social science studies tend to support the assumption of consensus. See R. BROWNING, D.
MARSHALL & D. TABB, supra note 198; N. NIE, s. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING
AMERICAN VOTER 253-55 (1979) (no other group as distinctly liberal as blacks as a group in
terms of position on central issues).
258. See Herring, Legislative Responsiveness to Black Constituents in Three Deep South
States, 52 J. POL. 740 (1990); Marable, Foreword to THE NEW BLACK VOTE, supra note 48, at 1;
Morris, supra note 152, at 271. But cf. Bullock, Congressional Roll Call Voting in a Two-Party
South, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 789 (1985); Whitby, Effects ofthe Interaction Between Race and Urbanization on Votes of Southern Congressmen, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 505 (1985).
259. A. KARNIG & S. WELCH, supra note 60, at 13-14 (some people have clung to unrealistic
hopes about black elected "supermen and superwomen" who could "cure the ills of three centuries overnight").
260. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. See generally Reed, supra note 4, at
67; Austin, supra note 124; J. Bond, Winning the Ballot, Losing the War: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. Symposium, Mar. 3, 1990, at 3 (transcript on
file with author) (lack of mobilized constituency base to provide "will" for change causes black
elected officials to limit their agenda; in addition, class of locally elected black officials has been
captured by black entrepreneurs rather than black community based activists).
261. A. KARNIG & s. WELCH, supra note 60, at 14; see also D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note
59, at 109 (to serve constituents' interests black politicians in Chicago in the first decades of this
century faced paradox of highlighting issues that provoke strong resistance from other organized
groups).
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agenda. The role model is a spokesmodel simply by virtue of being a
black elected official.
Yet, as already discussed, black politicians may be electorally successful without being authentic. 262 The authenticity assumption implicitly encourages black representatives to view their personal
advancement as a group advantage' and to position themselves to seek
higher status based on the attendant privileges of seniority.263 Elected
from "safe" districts, black representatives can afford to spend less
time "at home." 264 Thus, black representatives may act even more
independently than the responsiveness assumption contemplates.
Third, the vision that prompted the shift from protest to politics
may have overestimated the transformative possibilities of electoral activity. Electing individual candidates, even those who are effective and
accountable, may fail as a means of creating and redistributing political power and economic wealth. 265 Of course, black electoral success
alone cannot transform the depressed political and economic state of
the black community, especially given that blacks are concentrated in
politically impotent and economically isolated parts of urban metro262. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text. This is consistent with game theories
ofleadership incentives. See, e.g., W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 203-08 (pluralist system devises
reward structure that encourages opportunism; system prefers leaders who want absolute power,
prestige and maintenance of position). The benefits of incumbency may insulate the beneficiary
from electoral pressure, undermining the assumption that electoral ratification insures substantive policy advocacy. Abrams, supra note 6, at 487 n.214; see W. RIKER, supra note 171, at 20708. The promotion of professional political careers, exemplified in the 98% reelection rate of
incumbents to Congress, affects white as well as black politicians; but then whites' expectation
for government attention is lower. Even within state legislatures, the trend is toward longer
tenure and professionalization of their positions. See M. JEWELL, supra note 161, at 5.
263. See supra notes 147-51, 196-201. This is similar to the critique of the message conveyed
by black middle-class success as that of individual advancement at the expense of social and
group consciousness.
264. See supra notes 160-63. But cf S. WELCH & T. BLEDSOE, supra note 239, at 24 (black
city council members appear more conscious of constituents and are more likely than whites to
schedule regular meetings with them; casework may simply be more important to more needy
black constituents).
265. See supra note 198; Barnett, supra note 15, at 41 ("hodge-podge of well-meaning but
limited social programs [cannot] actually end poverty"). White ethnic groups are often cited as
successful models for political empowerment. But these groups used politics to legitimize and
enhance preexisting social and economic assimilation. They viewed political participation as a
primary means of assisting and facilitating the redistribution of economic and social goods that
was already ongoing. See J. ELY, supra note 52, at 80-81; Barnes, supra note 149, at 264 (difference in assimilation for whites and blacks is that "other ethnic groups haven't felt as deprived
socially and economically as the blacks," (quoting Professor Seymour Lipset, Stanford University)); Wildstrom & Stodghill, supra note 162, at 49; cf Pohlmann, Race-Ethnicity and Society
(Book Review), 105 POL. Sci. Q. 165 (1990) (urban political machines had diminished as assimilation agents when racial minorities attempted to press for political power). White ethnic groups,
who were not as deprived socially and economically as are blacks, relied on politics for symbolic
status recognition, not wealth redistribution. Barnes, supra note 149, at 264 ("What these other
groups were looking for is sort of symbolic status recognition - 'We've made it in America.'
The blacks are looking for more," (quoting Professor Lipset)).
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politan areas where racial polarization continues. 266 The limitations
of black electoral success are also evident when blacks are concentrated in the least influential positions267 or are elected to posts in
largely black municipalities without significant economic resources. 268
The theory is problematic regardless of whether black electoral mobilization positively correlates with white legislative support for black
issues. 269
In response, one might argue that if the goals of poor blacks are
restated to appeal more universally to poor and working class
whites, 270 then platforms benefiting blacks disproportionately need not
alienate whites. 271 Yet, as discussed in conjunction with the polarization assumption, representatives who retain a community-based or
generally progressive consciousness may still be ineffective in a polarized legislature. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that race,
not class, more often defines political preference. 272
Fourth, the responsiveness assumption presumes that elections
provide the policy issue control postulated by early political scientists
of representation. 273 Advocates of the assumption assert that constituents recruit like-minded candidates, who offer descriptive representation. In addition, constituents can vote out officials whose policy
views or performance disappoint voter expectations or preferences.
This latter assertion assumes that constituents monitor official behav266. Blacks are concentrated in urban cities in which, as a result of continued white prejudice and white flight, the resident "managerial" class of politicians administer a declining tax
base in a crime infected urban environment. Cf. Freedman, supra note 197, at HS, col. I (black
elected officials, with few exceptions, have become bureaucrats and caretakers).
267. S. KARNIG & A. WELCH, supra note 60, at 24 (blacks have least representation in most
desirable and prestigious posts).
268. See id. at ISS (black representation concentrated in city councils where elected officials
least likely to affect public policy).
269. See supra notes 159, 262.
270. See Wilson, How the Democrats Can Harness Whites and Blacks in '92, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 24, 1989, at A31, col. I.
271. Some black activists, consistent with their protest roots and civil rights philosophy, have
begun to promote a black political agenda of resource allocation that suggests• certain social
goods - health care, housing - are recognized as basic entitlements. See Hamilton, supra note
14, at xix-xx; cf. Cavanaugh, South Politics After Super Tuesday, (rights to basic social services an
integral part of public policy in other industrial democracies). Many of these programs would
also benefit poor whites, although a black agenda might target spending as "reparations" or
geographically to benefit majority-black, inner city neighborhoods.
272. A. Glazer, K. Brace, B. Norrander, R. Griffin, V. Campagna, D. Brady & L. Handley,
Three Variations on a Theme by V.O. Key: Race and Politics, Race and Politics, and (the ever
popular) Race and Politics (paper presented at Annual Meeting of Am. Pol. Sci. Assn., Sept.
1988) (describing decline of class and the rise of race as fundamental cleavage line in American
politics); cf. Guinier, supra note 129, at 414-17.
273. See, e.g., Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 51 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 45
(1963).
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ior beyond election day.274
The responsiveness assumption adopts this theory of electoral accountability based on the belief that constituents will punish unresponsive representatives at the polls. Where constituents are poor,
however, electoral activity may prove too costly, 275 particularly if it
involves organizing and campaigning against an incumbent. 2 76 Even
where constituents are not poor, electoral activity inevitably presents
collective action problems. 277 In addition, electoral ratification may
simply reflect symbolic activity and not any in-depth knowledge of
politics. 278 Unless the concept of political participation transcends
election day activity, a constituent is not providing much substantive
direction simply by casting a ballot.279
In addition, election day votes may not adequately convey latent
issue conflict within the black community if voters are encouraged to
vote for authentic, but not necessarily reformist, black candidates.
274. This is consistent with political science literature finding incentives for individual members of Congress to respond disproportionately to constituent monitoring. See Fitts, The Vices of
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms ofthe Legislative Process, 136 U. PA.
L. REv. 1567, 1605-07 (1988).
275. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.114 (Poverty depresses political participation.).
276. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. Contemporary empirical evidence suggests that most voters are ignorant of their representatives' policy preferences and are insufficiently motivated even to participate in elections. See, e.g., Preston, Black Politics and Public
Policy in Chicago: Constituent Representation, in THE NEW BLACK PoLmcs, supra note 14, at
167; Polman, U.S. Election Fund Drops as Public Abstains, Phila. Inquirer, July 29, 1990, at Al,
col. l; Primary Results: Setting the Stage for November, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at B6, col. 3;
Reinhold, As Primary Victor, Feinstein Becomes Democrats' Hope, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at
B6, col. l; see also Oreskes, Low Voter Turnout, supra note 144, at Bl6, col. 4.
277. See generally M. OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
278. Empirical observations about the electoral process suggest the electorate is guided not
by enforcing representative responsibility - the classic view that electoral ratification is the main
technique for holding the representative responsible - but by vague moods about public policy
in general. See, e.g., Eulau, Changing Views of Representation, in THE PoLmcs OF REPRESENTATION 49-50 (H. Eulah & J. Wahlke eds. 1978); Wahlke, Policy Demands and System Support:
The Role of the Represented, in id. at 74-75 (few citizens think about, communicate, inform
themselves or are interested in legislative functioning and do not realize that voting is an opportunity for making policy demands or choices). Spokesmodels, for example, reflect the growing
involvement of elected representatives in candidate-centered activities, promoting personal trust
rather than an issue-based reason for voting. See supra note 197. Thus, even if black election
'turnout exceeds that of their socioeconomic cohorts, voting for a candidate, without more finely
tuned issue identification, provides primarily symbolic ratification. Electoral ratification is also
an empty gesture if the representative does not seek reelection or faces only token opposition or
opposition that does not focus on the representative's record. See infra note 279. Of course,
some political theorists would argue that the failure to vote, or to cast an educated vote reflects
contentment with the status quo, and performs the same function as extended political participation might.
279. See supra notes 148-51, 163 (elections are imperfect devices for preference aggregation);
see also supra note 255 (blacks tend not to lobby or write letters to their representatives, or to
engage in the extended political process in proportion to their electoral participation or comparable to white participation). But cf R. FENNo, supra note 140, at 207 (policy change most likely
by replacing representatives not by converting them).
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Although poor and working class blacks may be at the heart of a black
electoral majority, they may not form part of the governing coalition
put together by middle-class black politicians.280 Black electoral success theory discourages poor blacks, who may not identify with their
middle-class counterparts on every issue, from looking beyond their
common racial identity. 281
In fact, issue cohesion within the black community is generated by
common concern about civil rights enforcement, government intervention on behalf of the poor, and increased opportunity for black mobility. 282 On these issues, black representatives may intuitively represent
their constituents. But, unless the responsiveness assumption understands the value of sustained voter participation over time and across
issues, the emphasis on election day turnout may not forge a common
identity if the opponent is also black, nor ensure responsive government if the official must contend with countervailing pressures from
white business elites.283

III.

BEYOND BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS

Black electoral success theory has two major failings. First, the
theory abandoned the civil rights movement's transformative vision of
politics. In that vision, the purpose of political equal opportunity was
to ensure fairness in the competition for favorable policy outcomes,
not just fairness in the struggle for a seat at the bargaining table. In
addition, legislative responsiveness would not be secured merely by the
election day ratification of black representatives. Rather, legislative
responsiveness would depend on citizen participation, legislative presence, and legislative success in meeting the needs of a disadvantaged
group.
280. C. STONE, supra note 198, at 205-07, 241 (challenge for black politics is finding a way to
bring the poor into a coalition of the white business leadership and the black middle class; instead
of promoting redistribution toward equality, Atlanta governing coalition of middle-class blacks
and white business elites perpetuates inequality); see supra notes 148-51, 155-57, 160-63, 196-99.
281. Barnes, supra note 149; see also supra notes 160-63, 266.
282. See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
283. C. STONE, supra note 198, at 189-91, 195, 216 (selective incentives and business control
shape Atlanta governing coalition; effectiveness of business centered civic network possible because voter contact shallow and ephemeral); Nelson supra note 16 (black regimes adopt "corporate center" development strategy that undermines reform platform); Reed, The Black Urban
Regime, supra note 160 (political institutions and entrencned patterns of political behavior con·
strain black mayors' impact on budgetary allocations, including service delivery patterns and
composition of public employment; black regimes unable to affect high levels of poverty and
unemployment); Reed, Neo-Progressivism, supra note 160, at 212-13 (proposals to reformulate
allocative element of business development agenda to include niche for blacks are not redistribu·
tive; consensus around development policy derives from political processes in which interests of
black poor are not represented); see supra notes 196-200.
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Second, black electoral success theory misses the point of the polarization hypothesis. The theory contains three proceduralist assumptions: one, that technical access usually entails meaningful
access to the political process; two, that procedural rules that ensure
visibility and technical access draw a neutral line between majority
rule and minority rights; and three, that political. choices should be
made openly and within a process that includes minority representatives. If, however, the majority constitutes itself based on prejudice, as
the polarization hypothesis declares, then simply providing technical
access for the minority group representatives yields very modest results at best.284
Building on these criticisms of black electoral success theory, I
propose to shift the analysis of black political empowerment in two
ways. First, as a matter of broader democratic theory, voting rights
activists and litigators should begin to worry more about the fundamental fairness of permanent majority hegemony in a political system
whose legitimacy is based solely on the consent of a simple, racially
homogenous majority. Consistent with fairness, equality, and legitimacy, the original civil rights vision suggests fundamentally different
tradeoffs between majority rule and minority rights.
Second, I propose to refocus on the problems affecting marginalized groups within the legislative decisionmaking process. This renewed focus builds on the civil rights movement's view that the values
for which our society stands are defined by what we do for the dispossessed. Thus, a theory of representation that derives its authority from
the original civil rights' vision must address concerns of qualitative
fairness involving equal recognition285 and just results. 286 For those at
284. Cf. Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretation of Equal Protection, 58 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1029, 1044-45, 1048-50 (1980) (process-based approach does not require
equalization of political influence; decisions to continue subordination of minorities can occur
even if political process considers their interests); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1077 (1980) (protecting minorities requires
theory of substantive rights).
285. By "equal recognition," I mean equal status as full participants in politics. See Baker,
supra note 284, at 1079 (describing equality of respect model).
286. Beitz, Equal Opportunity in Political Representation, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 155, 16768 (N. Bowie ed. 1988) (any satisfactory doctrine of political equality must simultaneously address three concerns of democratic decisionmaking about public policy: (1) its value by virtue of
public cooperative enterprise, (2) the content oflegislation it produces, and (3) its contribution to
political education of its citizens). The ultimate aim would be the promotion of just legislation:
Although it may be too much to expect that by manipulating the structure of representation
just legislation can be systematically promoted, it may at least be possible to minimize some
of the familiar dangers to which representation schemes have historically been prone....
[especially] the danger that the majority in the legislature will pay too little attention to the
interests and rights of popular minorities.
Id. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99
ETHICS 250, 261 (1989) ("[A] democratic public ... should provide mechanisms for the effective
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the bottom, a system that gives everyone an equal chance of having
their political preferences physically represented is inadequate. A fair
system of political representation would provide mechanisms to ensure
that disadvantaged and stigmatized minority groups also have a fair
chance to have their policy preferences satisfied.
While at one level such an inquiry might explore basic issues of
democratic principle, the scope of this article is more limited. I simply
invite voting rights activists and litigators to consider on behalf of the
Act's intended beneficiaries a different conceptual, remedial, and pragmatic approach to the immediate problem of legislative responsiveness
within the statutory framework of the 1982 Voting Rights Act. To
achieve this limited but important objective, I propose the concept of
"proportionate interest"287 representation. Proportionate interest representation is a general term subsuming a number of implementation
strategies. Proportionate interest representation addresses the black
electoral success model's failure to develop a realistic enforcement
mechanism for achieving legislative responsivenes~.
A. Proportionate Interest Representation
Proportionate interest representation disavows the pluralist conception of fairness, which falsely assumes equal bargaining power simply based on access, or numerically proportionate electoral success for
all groups. 288 Fairness and responsiveness should be related objectives. Yet, in a racially polarized environment, some systems may be
procedurally fair but fundamentally unresponsive. 289 For example,
representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of [disadvantaged constitu·
ent groups].").
287. "[P]roportional representation systems are non-zero-sum at the electoral level, since
[those with less than a plurality] as well as [those with a plurality] are elected." W. RIKER, supra
note 171, at 184 n.10. By contrast, in an at-large election system, or in a legislature governed by
a simple majority, it is possible to get no seats or no legislation with 49% of the vote. See, e.g., B.
Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society 4-5 (Oct. 19, 1990)
(unpublished paper prepared for The Brookings Institution Conference on the 25th Anniversary
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) (proportional representation minimizes the number of wasted
or nonwinning votes; wasted votes are those votes cast for a nonwinning candidate or in excess of
the minimum needed to win a seat).
The term "interest" refers to self-identified interests, meaning those high salience needs,
wants and interests articulated by any politically cohesive group of voters. Interests, however,
are not necessarily descriptive of an essentialist concept of group identity but are fluid and dynamic articulations of group preferences. Others use different terms to refer to a similar concept.
See, e.g., I. Young, supra note 206 (arguing for a communicative theory of democracy based on
specific group representation).
288. Presuming fairness based on a naked, self-interested system of bargaining is not consistent with information about prejudice. See supra notes 207-229.
289. Baker, supra note 284, at 1061 (full counting of minority group preferences in process·
based model overtly favors powerful and oppressive elements of status quo); Tribe, supra note
284, at 1079; Young, supra note 286 (political equality depends on social and economic equality).
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while improving the prospects of black electoral success, black singlemember districts may undermine the possibility of effecting true policy
change. In a system shaped by irrational, majority prejudice, remedial
mechanisms that eliminate pure majority rule and enforce principles
of interest proportionality may provide better proxies for political
fairness. 290
At this stage, I am simply assuming, without definitive explication,
that qualitative fairness is incompatible with majority bias, where such
bias systematically tends to produce inequalities in preference satisfaction291 because of prejudice. 292 This assumption makes sense in light
of our ostensible national commitment to ensuring that blacks achieve
meaningful legislative representation, or "a fair chance to influence the
political process."293 The implications of qualitative fairness as a principle of remediation, and its complementary premises and enforcement
290. The single-member district enforcement mechanism uses the maximum electoral potential of minority voters as a baseline for fairness. Proportionate interest representation suggests an
alternative remedial standard, more closely related to the civil rights vision bench mark of policy
responsiveness. If interest proportionality were a proxy for assessing political fairness at the
remedy stage, it might be potentially more judicially manageable than unresponsiveness was as a
measure of the violation itself. As a direct evidentiary proxy for establishing a violation, unresponsiveness early on proved unworkable as a judicially manageable standard. See supra note 88.
Notwithstanding its remedial value, however, interest proportionality may not be most viable as
a litigation strategy. Unlike single-member district remedies, which are still rooted in a
majoritarian and territorial tradition, proportionate interest representation, once it is more fully
developed, may be feasible primarily as a settlement or political strategy. Cf. infra notes 304-05,
313-14, 317, 351 and accompanying text.
291. This conception borrows liberally from the work of Charles Beitz, who contends:
[E]veryone has an equal right to have his or her political preferences satisfied; but since it
will normally be impossible to satisfy all political preferences simultaneously, some compromise is necessary, and the only compromise consistent with equality is that political decisions should satisfy the [legitimate] preferences of each member of the population an equal
proportion of the time.
Beitz, supra note 286, at 165. Remediation of inequalities in preference satisfaction also involves
equality of respect to cleanse pluralist politics of racist preferences. This is an intermediary, but
more just version of pluralism, from which a civic republican model might follow.
Although some may object to the arbitrary, checkerboard implications of this conception,
those implications are not the only possible ones. Cf. A. LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL
SOCIETIES 39-40 (1977) (proposing linkage as a partial solution to the checkerboard problem of
proportionality); Young, supra note 286, at 261-62 (specific group representation for disadvantaged groups requires (1) group self-organization, (2) mechanisms forcing decisionmaker to take
group perspective into consideration, and (3) group veto for policies directly affecting group). I
intend to explore further alternative implications. See L. Guinier, Beyond Majoritarianism: The
Political Equality Paradox (unpublished manuscript).
292. Prejudice is defined here by two criteria: (1) the presence of a permanent, hostile, fixed
majority which dominates the policymaking agenda; and (2) the resulting absence of interest
satisfaction for disadvantaged minorities on issues of greatest concern. Where there is prejudice
against a politically cohesive, permanent minority, that minority may be disproportionately disadvantaged or in the extreme case excluded altogether.
293. Davis v. Bandemar, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (equal protection violation may be found
"where electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively"); see also supra notes 2, 69 and infra note 332 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms, can best be understood by referring to a concrete
example. 294
Suppose a jurisdiction contained two kinds of people: the yellow
and the blue. The yellow people constituted 75% of the population,
were geographically dispersed around the jurisdiction's perimeter, and
were politically cohesive to the extent that a substantial majority
would only vote for yellow candidates. A small group of yellow people were more tolerant. Their interests were subsidiary, however, because they represented only 17% of the jurisdiction's total population.
The blue people, who were concentrated in the jurisdiction's inner
center, were also politically cohesive. As a numerical minority of
25%, however, they never elected any blue people to the jurisdiction's
four governing positions.
Black electoral success theory would criticize the exclusionary at
large election format2 9 5 in this jurisdiction because essentially it would
allow a bloc voting racial majority to control all four of the elected
positions. Because exclusionary at large elections require a 50% plus
one majority to win any representation, 58% of the population (the
yellow people minus the more "liberal" contingent) would decide
100% of the elections. The blue minority would be permanently excluded from meaningful participation. In this situation, black electoral success theory would focus on electing more blue officials by
creating one majority-blue single-member district. With one blue legislator out of four, however, the blues would only be technically represented if the other three districts contain only the politically cohesive
yellows.
A remedy based on qualitative fairness would retain the at large
format but modify the threshold of exclusion. 296 Instead of requiring
the 50% plus one vote for election jurisdiction-wide, the votes needed
for election would be reduced, for example, to 20% plus one of all
votes cast.297 Any candidate receiving more than 20% of the votes
294. I propose the proportionate interest representation approach primarily as a remedial
alternative for statutorily protected groups. At this preliminary stage, I am not advocating proportionate interest representation as the sole basis for finding a statutory violation, for judicial
review in general, or as a universal principle of equal protection.
295. An exclusionary format would utilize numbered posts, staggered terms and/or a majority vote requirement to reduce election competition to head-to-head contests.
296. The threshold of exclusion is the largest possible proportion of the voteiwhich fails to
guarantee election. Rae, Hanby & Loosemore, Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of
Exclusion, 3 COMP. POL. STUD. 479, 480 (1971). In exclusionary at-large elections, the threshold
of exclusion is 50%.
297. The degree of modification necessary could be determined on a case-by-case basis taking
into consideration the local factors presently addressed in voting rights litigation such as the
extent of polarization, the degree of socioeconomic disadvantage, and the use of other mecha·
nisms, including those within the legislative process, that reduced minority influence. Altema-
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would be elected. All voters would be given four votes. They could,
however, use their votes to express the intensity of their preferences
through cumulative voting. 298 In other words, voters could "plump,"
or cumulate, all foui of their votes on any one candidate. As a result,
a politically cohesive numerical minority of at least 20% could elect
one legislator. 299
In addition, because 17% of the population in our hypothetical
jurisdiction are "liberal" yellows, the proportionality principle permits /
a cross-racial electoral coalition. 300 Assuming the blues could be organized to take maximum advantage of their political cohesion, only
84% of the blues (21 % of the total jurisdiction electorate and just over
tively,an across-the-board minimum threshold of exclusion could be set to meet the concern that
the tiniest politically cohesive minority not be empowered merely to fragment or destabilize the
ability to govern. Depending on the number of open seats, the threshold would be more than 1%
but less than 50% to recognize sizable minorities with reasonable expectations of representation
and legislative influence. This reflects the intuition that a group of 15% or 20% is less likely to
accept the legitimacy of a system in which they are the permanent losers. Also given their size,
their disaffection would be more destabilizing of the system in general. Finally, fringe groups
with illegitimate preferences would be represented but if their preferences prevailed, the resulting
legislation would be vulnerable under existing constitutional analysis.
An across-the-board threshold of exclusion could also be developed on a state-by-state basis
rather than nationwide, to take into account the varying state percentages of minority population
and other local conditions. Whatever the exclusion threshold, it would be no more arbitrary
than existing determinations establishing the number of seats on a council or local commission.
298. Cumulative voting is a semiproportionate electoral method widely used in the corporate
context to protect minority shareholders' interests. See R. CLARK, CORPORATION LAW 361-66
(1986); c. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS (1951); Glazer, Glazer &
Grofman, Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy into the Equation, 35
S.C. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1984) (explaining that the purpose of cumulative voting is to permit
minority interests to gain proportional representation on the board of directors roughly commensurate with their share of ownership; each shareholder has number of votes equal to number of
shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected; shareholders may distribute those
votes among many candidates; by strategic distribution of votes, minority shareholders may attain roughly proportionate representation on board). Some state constitutions or statutes contain
provisions requiring cumulative voting to protect the interests of minority stockliolders against
potential abuses of the majority rule principle. See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 2048 nn.10-11 (rev. perm. ed. 1987) (noting hine constitutional
and ten state statutory provisions). The coexistence of cumulative voting rights with a corporate
tradition of one vote per share and majority vote approval at both the director and shareholder
level (with two-thirds vote required for certain fundamental changes) suggest potentially valuable
analogies to the democratic political rules being considered here. Other devices to ensure minority representation in the corporate context, such as supermajority quorum requirements and
weighted voting, are also relevant to the concept of proportionate interest representation and will
be further explored elsewhere. See Guinier, supra note 291; see also Note, Alternative Voting
Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 153-60 (1982).
299. The formula for determining under cumulative voting the threshold of exclusioq is one
divided by one plus the number of seats. See, e.g., Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts,
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 76, at 249, 255-56. Cumulative voting allows minority voters to make precise calculations as to how many representatives they can elect. See infra
note 309 and accompanying text.
300. Cumulative and limited voting systems are election methods that foster and reinforce
coalitions. Because these methods lower the thresholds of exclusion, blacks can successfully express their candidate preferences despite their minority status. Whites who share the civil rights
vision of political transformation can also join with blacks to support progressive candidates.

1140

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1077

the threshold of exclusion) would be needed to elect a blue candidate. 301 Thus, the blues could use their otherwise wasted votes (16%
of the blues, 4% of the total electorate) to join the 17% "liberal" yellows. Given the 20% plus one threshold of exclusion, the blue/yellow
coalition of 21 % would also have enough votes to elect a representative. The legislature would then contain one blue member, one
"green" member, and two yellows. The two yellows would no longer
enjoy complete majority hegemony and the blue member would finally
have a green "ally" to second her motions and to join with her in
demanding access to the governing coalition. In this way, proportionate interest representation would disaggregate the majority.
If modifying the exclusion threshold alone did not yield proportionate interest representation, winner-take-all majority rule by a permanent, hostile legislative majority could be modified. Where
majority representatives refuse to bargain with representatives of the
minority, simple majority vote rules would be replaced. "A minority
veto" for legislation of vital importance to minority interests would
respond to evidence of gross "deliberative gerrymanders." 302 Alternatively, depending on the proof of disproportionate majority power,
plaintiffs might seek minority assent through other superm'ajority arrangements, concurrent legislative ·majorities, consociational arrangements, or rotation in office. 3 03
301. The threshold of exclusion is only the threshold of victory under the most adverse circumstances. If more than five yellow candidates run, the blues might elect someone with less
than 20% of the vote.
302. Alternatively, a minority veto reserved for issues of majority concern would force the
majority to bargain. See infra note 317. See generally, A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 36-38
(fact of veto more important than its use). The minority veto is a form of supermajority rule.
Unanimity or supermajority decisional rules give numerical minorities power to protect their
interests and provide incentives for more thorough and inclusive deliberation and decisionmak·
ing. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (consensus building voting rule ordered as
part of the remedy on remand for structural vote dilution). Deviations from pure majority rule
that force everyone into indispensable coalitions could provide real power to minority representatives. Minority group members would become "acceptable role partners." See W. RIKER, supra
note 171, at 95-96 (within a theory of minimum winning coalitions, the role of the minority
opposition may be to create value in the majority coalition unless the minority is perceived as an
"acceptable role partner," meaning a potential coalition follower or leader). I treat these issues
more comprehensively elsewhere. See L. Guinier, supra note 291.
303. Id. The concurrent majority is a particular type of supermajority requirement. It was
initially promulgated by John Calhoun to protect the minority interests of the South. J. CAL·
HOUN, A DISQUISmON ON GOVERNMENT 25, 28 (1943) (in order to pass, legislation would need
the support of a majority of minority representatives, however defined, as well as a majority of
majority representatives); cf. A. LDPHART, supra note 291, at 25-52 (defining comparable idea of
consociational democracy in terms of four essential elements of communal representation: grand
coalition of political leaders from all significant population segments; mutual veto or concurrent
majority; proportionality; and segmental autonomy). Rotating officials may also empower blacks
throughout the jurisdiction and invite alliances with white voters. See, e.g., Dillard v. Crenshaw
County, 649 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986), ajfd. in part and remanded in part, 831 F.2d 246
(11th Cir. 1987); see also First Woman in Swiss Cabinet Quits; Husband Is Scrutinized, N.Y.
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Coalition building has always raised two issues: one, how to encourage alliances between members of the dominant white majority
and economically depressed minorities; and two, how to keep those
alliances reciprocal and empowering. Interest proportionality, complemented by a minority veto, addresses both problems. 304
Proportionate interest representation would urge courts, lawyers,
and voting rights activists to consider black voters' claims in the context of remedies that "soften the harshness of majority rule."
Although remedies that deviate from pure majority rule may not always be feasible in litigation, such proposals may be expe.rimentally
implemented through settlement negotiations or political initiatives.305
Three examples, two actual cases and one open-ended hypothetical situation, suggest distinctions between an agenda driven by black electoral success theory and one that envisions remediation based on
proportionate interest representation.
Example 1. The first example involves a judicial interpretation of
legislative unresponsiveness in Durham, North Carolina. In Durham,
a black had been consistently elected over ten years to the North CaroTimes, Dec. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 1 (under Swiss rotating executive system, first woman was
scheduled to become vice-president); Blacks and Whites Share Control in Selma, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 29, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (city council agreed to appoint 10 voting members on school board,
five white and five black with a chair rotating annually between the two racial groups; when
asked how the board would operate, the white mayor who helped negotiate agreement said,
"Well, you're going to operate with the art of compromise").
304. Proportionate interest representation gives black voters the opportunity to form crossracial electoral and/or legislative constituencies through voluntary bargaining. This might seem
inconsistent with the authenticity principle. If proportionate interest representation encourages
cross-racial coalitions at the electoral level, candidates with broad appeal might prevail over
candidates with strong community-based credentials. The concern that coalitional candidates
will succeed at the expense of accountable representatives is legitimate, but not necessarily dispositive. Authenticity and coalitional politics are not inherently inconsistent goals. First, proportionate interest representation allows a numerically significant group based on the threshold
of exclusion to elect their most preferred candidate. Thus, the option of electing authentic black
representatives is available. Proportionate interest representation allows the voters themselves to
determine the importance of authentic representation. Second, it allows self-defined voluntary
constituencies to evolve because it disaggregates the majority into groups that may perceive their
own self-interest sympathetically with black self-interest. Third, even if tension exists between
the authenticity and coalitional values and blacks choose the latter, at least blacks are in a position to keep the coalition reciprocal. Under proportionate interest representation, they have
many more options to leave one coalition in favor of another. In other words, blacks are less
permanently locked into a particular bargaining strategy or particular set of allies.
305. Given the firmly entrenched mythology surrounding majority rule, see Whitfield v.
Democratic Party, 686 F. Supp. 1365, 370 (E.D. Ark. 1988), affd. by equally divided court, 890
F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (majority vote a "bedrock ingredient of democratic political
philosophy"), proportionate interest proposals to deviate from pure majority rule may be contemplated initially only by parties in settlement negotiations or as political initiatives. See supra
note 303 (as result of negotiations between city council and two black civic clubs, Selma School
Board to operate with a rotating racial majority); Engstrom, Cincinnati's 1988 Proportional Representation Initiative, 9 ELECTORAL STUD. 217 (1990) (describing 1988 Cincinnati proportional
representation referenda).
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lina General Assembly from a three-person multimember district.
Nevertheless, in 1982, black Durham voters challenged the use of the
multimember district format. 306 Influenced by black electoral success
theory, plaintiffs argued that blacks, who constituted slightly more
than 30% of the Durham voting population, would be better represented by a black elected from a majority-black single-member Durham subdistrict. Plaintiffs asserted that persistent racial bloc voting
caused the one black representative to be elected only as a result of
single-shot voting by blacks. 3 o1
Although supported by Durham black voters, the successful black
candidate also depended upon support from some moderate to conservative whites. To appease the white voters, the successful black did
not "effectively represent" plaintiffs' interests in the legislature. He
"sail trimmed" and relied on black legislators elected from majorityblack single-member districts elsewhere in the state, to protect the interests of blacks in Durham. 3 os
Black electoral success theory, however, gave the Supreme Court
no mechanism through which to examine, under section 2, the quality
of the representative's legislative participation. Black electoral success
theory apparently convinced the Court that nothing more than proportionate, "descriptive" representation was required. On remand,
this aspect of the case was ultimately dismissed.
·
A lawsuit informed by the concept of proportionate interest representation would highlight plaintiffs' concerns with legislative participation. Evidence that racial bloc voting in an unmodified at large
system disabled the descriptive black representative in Durham from
representing within the legislature the interests of his black constituents would substantiate the violation. If a violation were established, a
court could order as a remedy, or plaintiffs could attempt to negotiate
306. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), modified sub. nom., Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
307. Single-shot or bullet voting exists where voters voluntarily abnegate their right to vote
for a full slate of candidates, casting only one ballot, for example, although three seats are open.
By limiting its votes to express the intensity of their preference, Durham's politically cohesive
black community maximized their voting strength, because racial bloc voting limited their ability
to influence all three election contests. Single·shot voting, however, is unfair when compared to
the threshold-lowering schemes proposed here. Single-shot voting forces a minority to limit its
vote while the majority exercises its control over the full slate. As plaintiffs demonstrated in
Durham, even with single-shot voting by blacks, whites still selected all three candidates: the two
whites and the one black who were elected. Moreover, single-shot voting alone does not ensure
any black election. The election of one black is conceivable only with the support of some whites
and the wasting of votes by other whites. Even if black voters single-shoot for a black candidate,
it is equally conceivable that under some circumstances only three whites will be elected.
308. Gingles, 590 F. Supp. 345 (trjal transcript) (plaintiffs could not run their most preferred
candidate who might aggressively advocate their views but never command enough white support to get elected); see also supra notes 150-5, 159-62.
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through settlement, a modified at large system with a threshold of exclusion lower than 51 %. In this case the threshold would be 26%.309
Example 2. The second illustration, which arises in the context of
the 1990s "dispersal gerrymander," responds to criticism that proportionate interest representation fails to protect the autonomy of black
neighborhoods. 31° For example, housing controversies erupted when
recently developers were encouraged to provide low income housing in
outer perimeter "urban villages" in exchange for tax abatements and
other benefits. Some black politicians and scholars claim that these
relocation plans will erode the black political base. 311 These black
electoral success proponents argue that black voting strength is realistically recognized only to the extent that it is concentrated in innercity neighborhoods capable of electing a black representative. 312
A ballot initiative similar to one attempted by the Rainbow Coalition in Cincinnati, however, could lead to at large proportionate interest representation. 313 Elections would be jurisdiction-wide with a
lowered threshold of exclusion. Thus, no matter where blacks lived
they could assert their political preferences on a self-identified basis. If
implemented as part of a voter initiative, blacks could take advantage
of both proportionate interest representation and intergroup solicitude
without litigation.314
309. Using cumulative voting, for example, the 30% black voting population could expect
proportionate interest representation from a representative directly accountable to their interests.
Using the formula of one divided by one plus the number of seats, see supra note 299, blacks who
were more than 25% of the population could not be denied representation if they plumped all
three of their votes on a representative. The modified system would be more fair than single-shot
voting because blacks were now casting as many votes as whites and the black representative
would be directly accountable to black interests. Moreover, because their numerical strength
exceeded the threshold of exclusion, with foresight some blacks could use their extra, otherwise
wasted votes to join with liberal whites to influence the election of one of the two white
candidates.
310. See Letter from Jim Blacksher to author (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author) (majorityblack districts important to recognize ethnic community autonomy).
311. See, e.g., Note, Racial Geography, supra note 237, at 1264-65 nn.78-80 (citing scholars
who criticize housing integration for overlooking necessity of black solidarity to black power,
where voting rights determined along geographic lines); Transcript of tape number seven from a
debate among John Calmore, Jean Cham, and john powell sponsored by The New Public Interest Law Conference and entitled Race and Space: Housing and Minority Communities (comments of J. Calmore) (spatial equality, not racial integration, needed to redress black's
socioterritorial disadvantage, meaning isolation and containment of inner city; integrationist
strategies "dilute central city Black voting strength" and "rob central city Black communities of
..• representation").
312. Similarly, politicians faced with redistricting decisions after the 1990 census must decide
which black neighborhoods to aggregate into majority-black districts. See infra notes 343, 348.
313. Engstrom, supra note 305, at 223-24 (cumulative voting remedy prompted by concerns
over dispersal of the black community and likely gerrymandering).
314. In the § 2 litigation context, however, several courts have approved these alternative
remedies where blacks were geographically dispersed, making a single-member-district remedy
implausible. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987); Dillard v. Chilton
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Example 3. The final example addresses the third generation "deliberative gerrymander." In Etowah and Russell Counties, Alabama,
a successful black challenge to the at large election system resulted in
a court imposed majority-black single-member district, and the election of the first black county commissioners. 3 15 Once elected, however, these black commissioners were gerrymandered out of the one
resource the commission controlled: the road shops. The holdover
incumbent white commissioners, representing now majority-white districts, refused to share fiscal responsibility for appropriating tax dollars to maintain the roads. A three-judge court considering a
subsequent challenge to this legislative exclusion dismissed the case
because it did not involve the diminution of the minority constituents'
electoral power. Rather, the challenge addressed the legislative influence of the black representatives. 31 6
Guided by the concept of proportionate interest representation, the
lawsuit could have helped the court understand legislative exclusion as
a serious threat to a "meaningful vote," comparable to direct interference with the right to cast a ballot. Based on statutory language ensuring a right "to participate equally" throughout the political
process, plaintiffs could have asked the court to institute a minority
veto for road shop resource allocations or to rotate fiscal responsibility
among the commissioners. 31 7
B.

Criticism of Proportionate Interest Representation

By making black representatives necessary participants in the governing process, by giving minority groups additional bargaining
power, and by granting blacks a minority veto on issues affecting vital
minority interests, proportionate interest representation helps protect
substantive minority interests. Proportionate interest representation
may split fixed, racially homogeneous majority constituencies into
subgroups who would enjoy greater political leverage through preelection coalition building with other politically cohesive electoral
County Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870 (M.D. Ala. 1988), affd., 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1989)
(adopting magistrate recommendation that cumulative voting be used for election of county com·
mission and school board); Dillard v. Town of Cuba, 708 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (limited voting scheme acceptable under § 2 for city council elections).
315. Mack v. Russell County, No. 90-712 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 1990) (three-judge court) cert.
pending 59 U.S.L.W. 3460.
316. Mack, No. 90-712.
317. See Letter from S. Issacharoff to author (Sept. 24, 1990) (if plaintiffs establish
nonresponsiveness, not as a matter of an evidentiary requirement of liability, but as proof of the
scope of the remedial concern, then no policy should be effectuated on the areas of nonrespon·
siveness without the assent of the minority representative).
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minorities. 31s
In addition to its strategic value, proportionate interest representation serves the collegial function of encouraging more open deliberation. To the extent that legislators would be accountable to a larger,
more heterogeneous electorate, threshold lowering arrangements
might influence legislators to be more "public regarding" because
technically, each legislator would be elected from the entire constituency. By giving dignity to strongly held sentiments of minorities, interest proportionality principles may also produce more reasoned, just
decisions. 319
Finally, proportionate interest representation structures political
competition so as to formalize coalitions and intergroup interaction.
For example, formalizing intergroup coalitions might ultimately promote minority political parties by causing changes in election structures. 320 Formal coalitions, negotiated by a political party
representing minority political interests, might be preferable to diffused minority presence within an umbrella political organization. 321
The proportionate interest representation principle proposed here
is therefore based on a view of politics that is both interest-based and
deliberative. 322 I self-consciously reject, however, several assumptions
held by Abrams and Themstrom, as well as the more idealistic views
of some civic republicans. Proportionate interest representation does
not assume, as both Abrams and Themstrom apparently do, that the
interests of black voters are fungible with those of whites. 323 Thus,
318. It is this process of factionalizing the majority constituency and empowering politically
cohesive minorities that raises concerns about the stability and efficiency of proportionate interest
systems. Others call this the grand coalition. A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 25-31. I intend to
explore these issues elsewhere. See Guinier, supra note 291.
319. Recognizing minority and dissenting viewpoints stimulates dialogue to enhance the
political discourse. See supra notes 175, 179; see also Nemeth, supra note 220 at 38.
320. If minority political factions were electorally sanctioned and empowered, they would
enjoy a more formal role in formulating government policy. Existing umbrella political parties
would be replaced by a proliferation of parties formally committed to expressing more intensely
minority viewpoints. See infra note 348 and accompanying text. But cf. supra note 318. On the
other hand, organized groups of black voters could also coalesce to demand formalization of
intergroup coalitions.
321. Formal rules assist in exposing the contradiction between behavior and public norms.
Similarly, the "confrontation" theory posits that formal public settings are safer for minorities.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text. Structured, public settings better enforce the highly
principled norms which inform the "American creed" to reject racism, unfairness, and inequality. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 80 (1962).
322. By deliberative I mean "an argumentative interchange among persons who recognize
each other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect." Michelman, Conceptions ofDemocracy, supra note 178, at 447.
323. See supra notes 134-39, 246-47; cf. Guinier, supra note 129, at 427-29 (Blacks "are in
greater need of government sponsored programs and solicitude which whites often resent and
vigorously oppose.").
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authentic, black-community-based interest identification and representation are important.
Moreover, the concept does not assume, as some civic republicans
seem to, that coalitions can be sustained by appeals to conscience or
sympathy. Coalitions require more than dialogue and deliberation by
civically virtuous representatives. They require institutional changes
in the structure of deliberation, formal incentives for interracial cooperation, and political prote<;tion for minority groups. Unlike either
Abrams or Thernstrom, I therefore assume that coalitions are only
possible between relatively equal groups that are in deliberative environments where majoritarian controls are modulated. 324
As an interest-based approach, proportionate interest representation nevertheless may be criticized on the ground that it contains all of
the flaws of the pluralist bargain without its stabilizing thrust of majority rule. According to some critics, the potential for promoting special interest representation is a fatal defect. These critics argue that
despite institutional structures or incentives for fair minded bargaining
special interest representation may not yield transformative politics.
Proportionate interest representation is actually construed by some as
an argument for legislative set-asides, electoral quotas, or equality of
representation based simply on the election of descriptively black
representatives. 325
Proportionate interest representation arguably weakens the twoparty system by facilitating the formation of minor parties. 326 By proliferating the number of parties, and by highlighting the importance of
interests, proportionate interest representation may facilitate the representation of extremist viewpoints, make compromise more difficult,
and simply lead to political paralysis or ungovernability because of the
absence of a governing majority. In particular, disadvantaged minorities with an interest in changing the status quo may not find salvation
324. See supra note 289. Some civic republicans do profess concern with reducing the influence of exogenous inequalities. The response of others seems focused on ensuring proportionate
"descriptive" representation and insulating all representatives from constituent,,pressure. See
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 34, 82-85 (1985). Proportionate descriptive representation fails to provide safeguards for the minority group from majority domination even within a "civically virtuous" deliberative process. I also claim that
pressures toward cooptation affect minority group representatives who, like all other representa·
tives, cannot be trusted to deliberate effectively on behalf of their constituents in the absence of
constituent monitoring. Insulation from constituent pressure would simply enhance existing majority control. Yet, I share the civic republican desire to perfect the legislative process.
325. The statutory disclaimer in § 2 was drafted to address similar fears. See supra notes 2 &
134. The statutory language suggests that a litigant cannot make a prima facie case based only
on the disproportionate absence of descriptively black members of the legislature.
326. A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 46-47, 78, 137 (because of the low threshold of exclusion, proportionate representation linked to multiplication of parties).
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by deviating from majority rule. Rules that protect minorities against
unfriendly legislation may also make it more difficult to pass friendly
legislation.
Some scholars contend that district representation strikes a better
balance between group representation and stalemate. Although district representation assumes geography is an adequate proxy for interests, it does not emphasize unyielding interest representation.
District-based representation simply facilitates community organization because it focuses on a smaller geographic area and promotes
knowledgeable voters whose representative is more socially and geographically accessible.327
Finally, many commentators object to proportionate interest representation on separation of powers and judicial management grounds.
Given the demand for justiciability that irresistibly shaped the black
electoral success litigation strategy, judicial monitoring to remedy inequality of consideration within the legislative process is arguably
neither feasible nor desirable. Legal intervention to change legislative
procedural rules may seem unlikely when those rules ensure that each
person can put issues on the agenda, propose solutions, and offer support or criticisms of proposals.
I am undeterred by these criticisms for five reasons. First, I emphasize the importance of disaggregating majority interests in a system
dominated by irrational prejudice. By disaggregating the majority,
proportionate interest representation promotes democratic decisionmaking by a more diverse and engaged electorate. This result is consistent with the original civil rights vision. 32s
•
Thus, proportionate interest representation emphasizes the illegitimacy of majority rule where the majority is permanent and constituted on the basis of prejudice. 329 Proportionate interest
representation weighs the illegitimacy of a permanent majority more
heavily than concerns about efficiency and stability, which are used to
327. See supra notes 237, 239 and accompanying text.
328. A. LUPHART, supra note 291, at 194 (proportionate representation promotes compromise and consensus rather than majoritarianism). Proportionate interest representation award&
representation and political leverage in relation to voting shares, but it does not give all the power
to the majority winner. It would no longer be possible for one group to exert complete dominance over the entire political system. A. LUPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF
MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TwENTY-ONE CoUNTRIES 23-30 (1984);
see supra notes 287, 290.
329. Winner-take-all systems undermine the legitimacy of governmental decisions where
they create permanent minorities who are unable, because of widespread prejudice, tQ recruit
defectors from the winning coalition. Systems empowering a simple majority exaggerate that
group's power and "dilute" the minority group's power by increasing the number of minority
votes cast in a losing cause. M. DURVERGER, PoLmCAL PARTIES (1964); D. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (1971).
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justify majoritarian regimes. 330 The argument for proportionate interest representation therefore starts with a legitimacy critique. Mirroring the theory of black electoral success, proportionate interest
representation relies heavily on legitimacy considerations: people who
have a meaningful voice in governmental decisions are more willing to
lend their consent to decisions with which they disagree.
Second, although proportionate interest representation rests on legitimacy derived from minority representation, the concept is not essentialist. Proportionate interest represe!ltation is an attempt to
construct a deliberative decisionmaking body that represents, in proportion to their presence in the population, minority group interests331
not minority group voters. The concept is, however, also consistent
with the one person/one vote principle because each voter gets the
same number of votes. 332
330. See B. Cain, supra note 287, at 5-7 (critics of proportionality weigh the trade-offs between legitimacy, efficiency, and stability differently).
331. These interests are not altogether independent of minority group status, experience with
racial discrimination, or historic and cultural identity. Cf supra note 145 and accompanying
text. Interest representation simply allows voters to define the relative salience of these respective variables for themselves. It reduces the number of supporters needed for a winning coalition,
or "threshold of exclusion," to something less than 51 % by allowing voters to plump or cumulate their votes to express the intensity of their political preferences. Thus, proportionate interest
representation allows all politically cohesive interest groups, which are numerically relevant
under the threshold of exclusion, to determine which interests are most important. Politically
cohesive groups are not all composed of minority group members. Proportionate interest representation is therefore not necessarily race-based and allows for the possibility that not all members of a minority group share common interests or common perceptions of their interests. Nor
does it assume that all members of the majority group are hostile to minority interests.
332. At the electoral level, proportionate interest representation clearly satisfies one person/
one vote concerns. Indeed it may do so for more people than a district-based system and for any
voluntary, self-defined minority. But proportionate interest representation also contemplates enforcement of the qualitative fairness principle at the legislative level. Here it is specifically limited to disadvantaged minorities specially protected under the Voting Rights Act. At the
legislative level, proportionate interest representation defines procedural equality in the Reynolds
v. Sims sense of fair representation, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964), meaning an equal voice in
government or an equal opportunity to influence decisions. I do not argue that the one person/
one vote standard requires procedural equality defined as more than just procedural access. I do
suggest that procedural equality at the legislative level is not necessarily inconsistent with existing equality norms as long as the majority is still proportionately represented. See United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (proportionately represented white voters had no
complaint against a compensatory or race conscious remedy to increase minority representation).
Even the minority veto might justify its deviation from pure mathematical equality in some historic circumstances, see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), at the local level, Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971), to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation, Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968), and to equalize the likelihood that minority representatives
can cast the decisive vote on legislation in relationship to their proportion of the population. See
Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244, 252, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502,
508 (1967); Franklin v. Krause, 32 N.Y.2d 234, 298 N.E.2d 68, 344 N.Y.S.2d 885 reargument
denied 33 N.Y.2d 646, 303 N.E.2d 71, 348 N.YS.2d 554 and 33 N.Y.2d 658, 303 N.E.2d 710,
348 N.Y2d 1030 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 904 (1974) (approving plan that eliminated
100% voting power for 56% population majority); League of Women Voters v. Nassau Count
Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1984) cert. denied subnom. Schmertz v. Nassau County
Bd. of Supervisors, 498 U.S. 1108 (1985) (constitutional principle of one person/one vote does
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Moreover, proportionate interest representation recognizes that
proportionate "descriptive"333 representation, as implicated by the authenticity assumption in black electoral success theory, may supply
some legitimacy to an otherwise majoritarian regime. Simple descriptive proportionate representation, however, offers no guar:antee that
voters will have equal chances of seeing their policy preferences satisfied. 334 Majority bias may still control the integrated legislature.
Third, the promotion of self-identified, rather than geographically
predetermined, interest preferences arguably sharpens issue conflict
while it helps alleviate social conflict and political alienation. Black
representatives elected under the proportionate interest model would
be potentially more effective within legislative deliberations because
they would not be elected from isolated districts. 335 If the minority
also had a mutual veto, blacks would enjoy a valuable, strategic, bargaining position, which assures that the majority would be able to get
anything done without their assent. 33 6
Fourth, the concept specifically addresses the mobilization and responsiveness aspects of representation. Once elected, minority representatives would be more responsive to their constituents because
individual incumbents would not be assured of reelection. 337 Effective
representatives would be continuously engaged in issue identification
and articulation. Indeed, proportionate interest representation hypothesizes increased black turnout as elected officials respond to core
black interests. 338
not require a state to give absolute majority control to a population majority; cf. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259 (1977) motion
denied 431 U.S. 902 (1973) (concurrent majority referendum requirement approved as constitutional method for recognizing constituencies with separate and potentially opposing.interests).
333. See supra note 114.
334. Beitz, supra note 286, at 155, 162. "All that is promised is that the legislature will
mirror in some sense the political preferences of the electorate as the voters themselves identify
them. Popular minorities will be represented, but their representatives will constitute legislative
minorities, unable except through compromise to effect their constituents' will."
335. See supra note 304.
336. See supra notes 302, 328.
337. Thus, even after the first symbolic victory, black officials might face competitive electoral contests. Because these election structures are more complicated, the candidates would need
to develop political organizations that educate the electorate, keeping them informed about the
candidate's policy views and mobilizing their support on an issue-based agenda. In addition,
interest representation provides a more flexible tool for resolving conflicts between the elected
incumbent and her constituents. Because her constituents are not geographic captives, they more
easily switch allegiance if their interests are not represented.
338. Cf. Applebome, Blacks and the Election, supra note 166, at 30, col. 2 (noting decline in
black voting in mid-term elections because, "This is not 1964. Blacks aren't thrilled to death just
because they have the right to vote. They have to have someone to vote for. One cost of moderating the message by Democrats is that they aren't exciting their most loyal voter core"; widening gap between black and white voter turnout attributed to the failure of the political parties to
address civil rights and other concerns of blacks); supra note 153.
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In addition, the concept of proportionate representation would not
deplete the electoral energy generated by black electoral success theory. That proportionate interest arrangements depend on political cohesion and organization is a potential advantage for the black
community. Despite their disproportionately depressed socioeconomic status, political activity is salient for blacks. 339
Fifth, by modifying the threshold of exclusion in at large election
systems, proportionate interest representation also avoids the gerrymandering problem common to district-based systems. By avoiding
the need to draw subdistrict boundaries, proportionate interest representation obviates contemporary preoccupation with redistricting decisions. 340 Any system that relies on district representation, no matter
how subtly gerrymandered, cannot equalize prospects of electoral success as effectively as a proportionate interest system. 341 Given geographical constituencies, some voters will always vote for losers. In
addition, even where blacks are extremely geographically insular, they
may not all be captured in a single relatively compact district. Some
blacks will thus reside outside the district, and will be unrepresented
or only virtually represented. 342 Other blacks, for reasons of political
expediency, may be "packed" into a majority-black district, where
their votes will be wasted. 343
In other works, I explore further the implications of interest proportionality for democratic representation in general and separation of
339. Once convinced of political possibilities, blacks are able to mobilize collectively, creating
"historical moments" of"magical quality." G. McWorter, D. Gills & R. Bailey, supra note 153,
at 8-9, 23, 27 (Afro-American Studies and Research, University oflllinois, Urbana). Controlling
for income, blacks are consistently more politically active than their white demographic cohorts,
and may also be more politically specialized and motivated. See D. PINDERHUGHES, supra note
5, at 232, 244-49; Ackerman, supra note 175; Jones, Study Finds Americans Wont News But
Aren't Well Informed, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1990, at 13, col. 1 (survey found higher proportion of
blacks tl]an whites were consistent news consumers).
340. See infra note 349. Proportionality achieved in the legislature via "gerrymandered district representation" yields at best the presumed ranking of voters' interests according to the
designers of the district. Beitz, supra note 286, at 163. The degree of fit between voter interest
and voter residence is an empirical question which I intend to explore elsewhere.
341. Id.; see also R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 115, 117-19 (1981) (singlemember districts with plurality elections, although consistent with popular assumptions regarding democratic principles, do not ensure minority representation).
342. See supra note 135. This is particularly important where blacks are dispersed throughout the jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGhee v. Granville County, 860 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1988);
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1988).
343. Parker, supra note 99, at 85, 96 (packing involves the overconcentration of minority
voters in a single district). This is certain to become a critical issue in the redistricting efforts that
follow the 1990 census where the number of black voters necessary to maintain a "safe" black
district will be the source of contention between black incumbents interested in packing their
districts to retain their seats and black activists committed to expanding the black community's
base of power.
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powers in particular. 344 My response here is limited to the feasibility
concern. If it is true, as I have argued, that representatives are equal
only if existing distributions of power, resources and prejudices do not
play an "authoritative" role in their deliberations, 345 then it is not
clear that the remedial goal of equal political participation in the form
of a fair and equal distribution of preference satisfaction is realistic,
especially within a litigation context. 346
Even if doctrinally acceptable as a remedial strategy, proportionate
interest representation may be politically unsuccessful in a time of retrenchment and regression. The political status quo factors that defeat
the traditional electoral success model will predictably dilute any concerted litigation effort to improve legislative performance on behalf of
black interests. 347 It may be that no electoral strategy, unaccompanied by a protest-based model of insurgent politics, can mobilize sustained commitment either to incremental reform or to more
substantive conceptions of political justice. Moreover, the transformative effect of political power at the local political level is questionable.
While formidable, these concerns do not alter the proposal's political and doctrinal plausibility at the electoral.level and its aspirational
value for legislative deliberation. Proportionate interest representation
disaggregates the majority to benefit some whites as well as blacks. At
the electoral level, lowering the threshold of exclusion potentially empowers all numerically significant groups, including minority political
parties, organized groups of women, the elderly, as well as any group
of working class or poor people presently politically disadvantaged
under a majoritarian model. 348 Retaining at large elections eliminates
344. See Guinier, supra note 291.
345. See Cohen, supra note 204, at 22-23.
346. Cf. supra notes 290, 314 and accompanying text. The concept of proportional interest
representation and the concept of proportional interest satisfaction, however, are not coterminous and objections to the interest satisfaction approach do not necessarily vitiate the value of
interest representation.
347. Indeed, one might draw the lesson from my critique of black electoral success theory
that no process-based reform, even one which attempts to enforce a substantive justice standard,
may ultimately make a difference. One certainly could argue convincingly that blacks will never
achieve political equality until they first achieve social and economic equality. As Professor Bell
suggests with reference to the interest-convergence dilemma, see supra note 232, any alternative
with real potential effectiveness will face fierce and politically powerful opposition. Others have
also described this theme of pyrrhic victories. See Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does
Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95, 106 (1990) (describing Law of Racial Thermodynamics
in which "[r]acism is neither created nor destroyed" but merely has different guises, including
"procedural" racism of seemingly neutral rules that predictably handicap black).
348. Hybrid forms of electoral representation, such as those I have advocated to satisfy proportionate interest representation, are better than exclusionary multimember election systems for
all these groups. Depending on the particular facts, they are probably even preferable to singlemember districts that waste votes within the district presumably controlled by the group and do
not use efficiently group member votes in other majority-controlled districts. In any event, self-
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the decennial contestation over political power, including the inevitable fight between incumbent politicians and minority groups seeking
representation. 349
At the legislative level, though much more problematic, pursuit of
a radically different litigation strategy is still worthwhile. As applied
to legislative decisional rules, these proposals are necessarily fact specific. Given the special historic, social, and political circumstances of
a particular case, alternative remedies may be desirable, even
preferable. 350
The constitutionality of alternative threshold lowering electoral
approaches has been upheld in a number of states, 351 although few
courts and voting rights litigators have actually expressed a preference
for these alternatives. But, even if litigators approach the violation
stage of a voting rights case much as they do now, it may still be possible to strengthen, through proofs and briefs incorporating the proportionate interest principle, the remedial side of the judicial inquiry.
defining, voluntary political constituencies including blacks will probably not come out worse
under a hybrid form of representation and probably will come out much better, because they will
be able to preserve both authenticity and reciprocity values. These distinctive self-defined groups
will be able not only to elect candidates of choice but to become members of a coalition large
enough to influence policy outcomes.
In addition, hybrid election reform "discards only the discriminatory part of the at-large
system - the voting rule itself - and retains the part that is permissible - the underlying multimember district and the form of the elected body." Note, supra note 298, at 158-59 (citation
omitted).
349. See Berke, G.O.P. Tries a Gambit with Voting Rights, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1991, at DB,
col. 4 (white Democratic incumbents who do not want to cede seats because of shifting
demographics complain about "unholy alliance" between Republicans and minority groups seeking majority minority single-member districts).
350. See Still, Voluntary Constituencies: Limited Voting and Cumulative Voting as Remedies
for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, YALE L. & POL. REV. (forthcoming 1991). Of
course, at the legislative level those cases will be hard to prove. Plaintiffs will have to put the
local government on trial. This is problematic both as to a quantitative evidentiary analysis as
well as the divisiveness with which any such inquiry is necessarily associated. A court might see
fit to order a qualitative fairness remedy for legislative decisional rules only if plaintiffs prove
high polarization thresholds and obviously discriminatory policy outputs over an extended period of time. This is also true if legislative remedies are implemented following proof of a violation at the electoral level.
351. See, e.g., Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982) (limited voting scheme for election of Commonwealth representative is "reasonable" and facilitates minority
representation); Orloski v. Davis, 564 F. Supp. 526 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (limited voting for Commonwealth Court); Hechinger v. Martin, 411 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (upholding limited voting scheme for D.C. city council elections); LoFrisco v. Schaffer, 341 F. Supp. 743
(D.Conn. 1972) (three-judge court) (limited voting for school boards); Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F.
Supp. 602, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (limited voting scheme does not violate equal protection clause as
long as each voter casts the same number of votes); Blaikie v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 134, 243
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 439 (1964) (limited voting for New York City
Council); cf. Engstrom, supra note 305 (challenges to basic plurality format increasing in U.S.
driven by minority voter dissatisfaction with that representational format; number of local governments have adopted, through settlements in voting rights lawsuits, semi-proportional
arrangements).
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Moreover, as referenda or ballot initiatives, it may be useful and practical to explore further the qualitative advantages of an interest proportionality principle employed in conjunction with legislative
decisionmaking changes. 352
CONCLUSION

The concept of proportionate interest representation represents an
initial foray into a previously neglected field of research critically exploring pluralist theories of black political participation. Proportionate interest representation, however, does not address all the defects I
identified in black electoral success theory. I have argued, for example, that black electoral success theory fails to address issues of false
consciousness, cooptation, and the representational relationship between black voters and their representatives. By raising but not addressing concerns about the internal dynamic between black
representatives and black voters, I have left open several related, additional responses to this dimension of the process of representation. 353
I have merely assumed the possibility of developing a black representative who can listen to her constituents as well as her colleagues
without becoming coopted, and who may be held accountable to black
interests by political parties or community-based arrangements. 354
Similarly, the "role model" hypothesis and its delineation of the expectations and responsibilities in black elected officials warrants further analysis. 355
352. See Engstrom, supra note 305; supra notes 290, 302-05, 314.
353. For example, a participatory model of "strong democracy" may be compelled based on
further inquiry into the importance of interactive, continuous communication between the black
representative and the voter. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 127. In this sense, the representational dynamic may require reviving a more activist, protest model for electoral processes. See,
e.g., J. BUTION, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 236-41 (1989) (pluralist assumption flawed that
conventional politics alone produces major change for outgroups; protest and unconventional
politics are important supplements to mobilize and make visible the claims of disadvantaged
groups).
354. This new black representative is, or can become, an effective listener, Williams, supra
note 1, at 411 (bridging gaps requires "listening at a very deep level to the uncensored voices of
others"), who can bridge a dual consciousness, W.E.B. DUBOIS, supra note 133, at 3 (describing
double consciousness of being black and being American); cf. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The
Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. R.Ev.
1864, 1866 (1990) (describing dual consciousness as conscious perception of people of color that
their lives and concerns are valued differently by the white majority). The new black representative consistently and confidently transforms constituent consciousness into mainstream discourse
and appropriates the transformative power of mainstream texts. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 33342 (defining transformation in contrast to cooptation).
355. For example, I plan elsewhere to investigate the nature of community-based leadership
to analyze how merely focusing on the symbolic achievements of black elected role models distracts from their more important mentorship, teaching, and leadership functions. In particular, I
will argue that spokesmodels have an affirmative responsibility to their constituents to create
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The critique also contains the seeds for developing a model of community-based political parties organized around a specific set of demands or interests. 356 Within this conceptual framework, even bolder
attempts to dismantle existing district-based election systems may be
necessary to promote and reinforce political organizations or third
political parties dedicated to expressing minority viewpoints.
Although my ideas are not yet completely formed, I offer this set
of suggestions as a political and remedial position most advantageous
to civil rights advocates. Proportionate interest representation contains strategies for reform at both the electoral and legislative level to
address some of the process defects in black electoral success theory
that have failed to yield substantive justice.. Proportionate interest
representation is tied both to the congressional and the civil rights vision underlying the Voting Rights Act. The proposals discussed here
apply whether civil rights advocates adopt an exclusively pluralist conception of political bargaining or a civically virtuous notion of
deliberation.
By extending my speculative reconstruction of political equality to
legislative deliberations, however, I am not articulating a grand moral
theory of politics. Nor do I argue that these proposals are statutorily
or constitutionally required. My purpose has been to attempt to conceive of a deliberative process in which racism does not control all
outcomes. I do not articulate a general principle of judicial review,
but have limited my suggestions to the specific context of racial discrimination as a remedial approach to statutory violations.
Without regard to the fact that these proposals may not be immediately implemented, at least political and civil rights activists can
measure the failures of the current model assisted by an understanding
of political equality that begins to define a future vision. Even if unrealistic, proportionate interest representation serves as an ideal to
guide further efforts. Proportionate interest representation is an empowering concept to the extent it enables black voters to "name [their]
political reality" 357 or to develop their political imagination.
their own template of how the representational role should be carried out, and ought not rely for
legitimacy simply on their role model "status."
356. See, e.g., J. Bond, supra note 260, at 27 (formation of independent political parties at the
local level can promote minority interests in cross-cultural coalitions); letter from D. Cunningham to author (Sept. 24, 1990) (on file with author) (effective interest representation builds on
organizational models of trade unions, community-based nonhierarchical Baptist churches, and
civil rights protest organizations such as the SNCC and SCLC); cf Fitts, supra note 274 (strong
political parties help discipline representatives).
357. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1336 (1988) (describing blacks' greatest political
resource as the ability to "name [their] political reality").

